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Voluntarism and Reflection 
Felix Koch 
 
The dissertation examines the prospects of and the relation between two types of metaethical 
theories, constitutivist and voluntarist ones, which in different ways place the will, or volitional 
attitudes, at the center of an explanation of practical reasons and practical normativity. 
Voluntarism explains reasons or normativity by reference to the content of an agent’s will. 
Constitutivism does so by reference to the nature or structure of the will, understood in a certain 
demanding way. I argue that while these two explanatory projects are often run together, and for 
good reason, it is important to keep them distinct, since each is more likely to be defensible when 
articulated in isolation from the other. In their most prominent versions – such as the one 
developed by Christine Korsgaard –, both constitutivism and voluntarism depend on a particular 
conception of the will as self-reflexive. By considering what is involved in (first-personally) 
ascribing the relevant kind of self-reflexive structure to one’s own will, I conclude that both 
types of theory are likely to succeed only in modest, first-order normative forms, not as 
metaethical explanations of practical normativity or practical reasons in general. I then explain 
the use of modest voluntarism, namely, to account for the distinctive role that certain exercises of 
the will could be thought to play in our practical reasoning; and I show the use of modest 
constitutivism by offering an explanation of structural rationality that like a particularly 
influential recent account of structural rationality, proposed by Niko Kolodny, is constitutivist in 
spirit, yet rejects the formalism that Kolodny’s account inherits from the metaethically ambitious 
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Chapter 1: Constitutivist Theories of Practical Reason 
 
1. Overview of the dissertation 
The goal of this dissertation is to illuminate the role that the concept of the will – and more 
generally, volitional concepts – may play in our understanding of what reasons for action 
persons have, or of what it is rational for persons to do, or even of what reasons for action or 
rationality are. The dissertation proceeds by examining a number of philosophical proposals that 
accord the will a central role in explaining normative truths and normativity, broadly speaking. I 
focus on two families of such proposals, which give two quite different kinds of explanatory 
role to the will. They are sometimes combined but should be distinguished from each other. 
One, which I call voluntarism, places the will at the center of an explanation of reasons, or 
rational action, in virtue of its content. The other, which I call (a form of) constitutivism, places 
the will at the center of an explanation of reasons in virtue of its constitution, and especially in 
virtue of a specific – self-reflexive – kind of structure that an individual’s will may have.  
This introductory chapter aims to provide a basic map of some of the philosophical terrain in 
which the following chapters are located, and to introduce the concerns that are common to 
them. I begin by describing the outlines of the philosophical project that has come to be known 
as “constitutivism”: the project of explaining the nature or content of practical rationality by 
reference to the kind of entities agents – at least a special kind of agents – are. This kind of 
approach can be employed to give the will a central role in the explanation of reasons or 
rationality: namely if the states that are constitutive of being a person, and that therefore explain 
what makes persons practically rational or irrational, are identified with volitional states. I then 
explore the connection between constitutivism and voluntarism: the way in which and even the 
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fact that the content of the will can give rise to reasons or subjective reasons, as voluntarism 
claims it can, may in part be owed to rational requirements that arise from the structure of the 
will or the nature of volitional attitudes.  
Thus the two distinct ways in which the will could play the role of explaining a person’s 
(practical) normative situation – on the one hand through its contents, on the other through its 
structure or through the types of attitudes in which willing consists1 – could complement each 
other. But I argue that they may also undermine each other, when the claims made for either of 
these roles of the will are particularly ambitious. In the later part of Chapter 1 I recapitulate 
some recent critiques of constitutivist approaches in order to assess two things: first, how much 
room these critiques leave for explaining some aspects of practical reason in ways that are 
constitutivist in spirit but do not share the meta-ethical ambitions of the most prominent 
constitutivist theories; and second, how they affect the prospects for building a voluntarist 
theory on constitutivist foundations. 
In Chapter 2, I examine and criticize a meta-ethical theory, that of Christine Korsgaard, 
which combines constitutivism and voluntarism. I reconstruct and criticize Korsgaard’s attempt 
to derive the normativity of practical reasons from the allegedly antecedently intelligible self-
reflective character of human agency, claimed by her to be part of “human nature”. I argued that 
far from being inescapable, the sort of reflectiveness that she regards as the “source” of 
normativity it itself a contingent and fragile product of the acknowledgement of normative 
demands on the part of reflective agents. The self-critical attitude that brings about the relevant 
                                                          
1 The structure of the will is constitutive of being a person, or of agency in a sufficiently demanding sense, if to be a 
person or an agent is necessarily to have a will that is structured in that way; the types of attitudes in which willing 
consists are constitutive of agency if to be an agent is necessarily to have those attitudes; and the content of the will 
may play a constitutive role for agency in determining what actions and attitudes qualify as being properly 




kind of volitional reflexivity in an agent is, from that agent’s point of view, transparent to 
normative reasons. Therefore the normative force of the latter cannot, from that same point of 
view, be explained by recourse to the fact of reflectiveness, conceived as prior and independent. 
The reflective agent cannot regard her own activity of reflection as the fundamental source of 
normativity, on pains of undercutting what, to her, is the point of engaging in that activity: 
namely, to respond to certain normative standards that are already there anyway. Therefore 
Korsgaard’s purported solution to the “problem of normativity” is self-effacing or unstable 
under reflection.  
Chapter 3 explores the prospects for voluntarism when it is divorced from a constitutivist 
theory of practical reason. It does so by examining two recent proposals, by Ruth Chang and 
David Enoch, that bring to light important constraints on a satisfactory voluntarist theory: such a 
theory should explain why the will has the normative role voluntarism claims for it, and it 
should explain what makes that role distinctive. I argue that neither of the two proposals I 
consider is fully persuasive but that the concerns that are operative in them – as well as in other 
forms of voluntarism such as Korsgaard’s – can usefully be addressed and assessed by thinking 
about the normative role that purportedly reason-creating volitional acts or attitudes may 
legitimately play in practical deliberation. This approach to voluntarism can draw on the concept 
of normative power articulated, originally, for the purpose of analyzing other practical 
phenomena that appear to cast exercises of the will in a normatively creative role. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I turn to a recent debate concerning the normative role of the notions of 
rationality and irrationality, understood in a distinctively internal sense. I explain and criticize 
the view of internal or “structural” rationality developed by Niko Kolodny, which builds on 
skeptical arguments regarding the normative import of the requirements that codify what it is to 
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be rational in that sense. Kolodny’s “Transparency Account” is meant to explain the appearance 
that such requirements have normative import, without vindicating that appearance. I argue that 
while the account may be right in its skeptical presuppositions, it leads to an objectionably 
subjectivist and formalist view of what structural rationality consists in. In place of the 
Transparency Account I propose a view of structural rationality that better explains how persons 
could fall short of its requirements, and I show how more detailed accounts of the content of 
structural rationality go hand in hand with different views of what is constitutive of agency.  
What I am offering in these chapters is in almost all respects incomplete and tentative. The 
views I discuss are chosen selectively, and my discussion of them certainly does not begin to 
exhaust logical or conceptual space, or, for that matter, the relevant literature. The constructive 
proposals I make require much more detailed elaboration, critical scrutiny, and refinement in the 
light of objections. Not least, given more time than I had at my disposal, it would be important 
to look at the ways in which some of the questions and answers discussed here have been treated 
– and the terms in which they can now be stated very significantly shaped – by past 
philosophers, in light of larger philosophical concerns of which this dissertation hardly scratches 
the surface.  
 
2. Constitutivism 
There is a family of views about the nature of practical reason that has received much 
philosophical attention in recent years, and that many philosophers have come to call 
constitutivism.2 The basic thesis of constitutivism, at first approximation, is that it is constitutive 
                                                          
2 The earliest use of this label that I was able to identify is in Lavin (2004). It has been widely adopted since, for 
example by Enoch (2006: 187, n. 38), Ferrero (2009), and Tubert (2010). Korsgaard (2008: 39, n. 9) identifies her 
own view as well as Velleman’s as forms of constitutivism. Setiya (2007) speaks of “ethical rationalism” to refer (it 
seems) to the same type of view (more on this below). 
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of an individual’s being an agent – or at least constitutive of her being a certain special type of 
agent (call her a person) – that she has certain sorts of psychological dispositions or attitudes 
that in turn determine or constrain what she may rationally do: for example, that she endorses or 
accepts specific rules of practical deliberation, or that she is disposed to conform to certain 
formal requirements on the contents of her attitudes, or that she is disposed to realize certain 
aims (such as knowing or understanding her own activity, or being self-governed, or being free, 
or being at one with herself). Having (perhaps) established some version of this basic thesis, a 
constitutivist theory will then typically attempt to put it to work to derive claims about practical 
reason, in one sense or another of that term: for example about basic standards or requirements 
of practical rationality; or about the reasons for action that there are for particular agents or for 
all agents; or about what reasons agents, as such, believe or must believe there to be; or about 
what it is for there to be normative truths. Recent philosophers who defend constitutivist theses, 
in the wide sense that I have just delineated, include but are certainly not limited to Donald 
Davidson, Harry Frankfurt, Christine Korsgaard, David Velleman, and Michael Bratman.3 They 
are joined by authors who attribute constitutivist views to certain past philosophers – as, for 
example, Robert Pippin and Robert Brandom (without using the term) do to Hegel, and 
Korsgaard to Plato and Kant. 
                                                          
3 Other recent writers who employ constitutivist arguments include, arguably, Bilgrami (2006), Brandom (2007), 
Burge (2011), Raz (2011), and Scanlon  (2007). A few exemplary statements of constitutivist theses, or the generic 
program of constitutivism, include the following:  
“[The basic principles of logic, the principle of continence, and others] are principles shared by all creatures that 
have propositional attitudes or act intentionally; and since I am (I hope) one of those creatures, I can put it this way: 
all thinking creatures subscribe to my basic standards or norms of rationality.” (Davidson 1985/2004: 195).  
“To will an end just is to will to cause or realize the end, hence to will to take the means to the end.  This is the 
sense in which the principle is analytic. The instrumental principle is constitutive of an act of the will. If you do not 
follow it, you are not willing the end at all.” (Korsgaard 1997: 244) 
 “If there were something at which action constitutively aimed, then there would be a norm of correctness internal 
to the nature of action (…) And this norm of correctness for action would in turn determine what counts as a reason 
for acting. (….) Self-knowledge is the constitutive aim of action” (Velleman 2000: 16, 26). 
The “basic claim [of constitutivism] is that the norms and requirements of practical rationality and morality can be 
derived from the constitutive features of agency. Hence, a systematic failure to be guided by these requirements 
amounts to a loss of agency.” (Ferrero 2009: 304). 
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Thus constitutivist views, in the sense I have in mind here, have two main parts. One is a 
thesis about the nature of agency: constitutivism aims to elucidate the nature of (a special kind 
of) action or agency, or at least the nature of certain propositional attitudes that each and every 
agent (of that special kind) must have. The other part consists in some further explanation of 
how whatever is essential to agency bears on the rationality of actions and attitudes, by 
generating the standards by which their rationality is assessed. Constitutivism wants to explain, 
at least at some basic level, the content or nature of the considerations that figure in the guidance 
and assessment of action. This general explanatory schema has been fleshed out in various 
ways. What follows is an attempt at a rough taxonomy, which should be useful as a background 
for the following chapters.  
First, we can distinguish different varieties of constitutivism according to their respective 
“constituendum”: what it is that any given constitutivist theory takes to be constituted in the 
specific way the theory purports to explain. While constitutivism is always in some sense about 
agency, there is room for variation here. The most prominent versions of constitutivism make 
claims about the constitutive elements of one of the following: an individual’s being an agent 
(either of a special sort, or tout court); an individual’s counting as the author of some specific 
action or other; an event’s counting as an action; or a psychological state’s counting as a specific 
sort of attitude that is essential to agency or action (for example, its counting as a belief or an 
intention). Most of the views on which I focus take it to be constitutive of the targeted sense of 
action or agency that they involve specific forms of reflexive higher-order attitudes: that is, 
attitudes that are about other attitudes or actions of the same agent, as belonging to that same 
agent. According to one family of views including those of Frankfurt, Korsgaard, and Bratman, 
the higher-order attitudes characteristic of the relevant kind of agency are volitional attitudes, 
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and specifically volitional attitudes directed at other volitional or motivational states or attitudes 
of the same agent. According to other views including those of Joseph Raz and David Velleman 
(however different in other respects), the higher-order attitudes characteristic of agency or 
intentional action are beliefs or judgments be it about the value of one’s action, be it about its 
intelligibility in the light of a concern with causal explanation. On either type of view, the 
content of these higher-order attitudes in particular is at once relevant to understanding what 
counts as an intentional action attributable to a particular agent and to determining what it would 
in one sense or another be rational for that agent to do.  
Second, as I already mentioned, different varieties of constitutivism offer different kinds of 
constituents. Generally, these are psychological attitudes or dispositions of agents. Candidate 
attitudes include beliefs, prospective intentions (perhaps even special kinds of intentions: 
“maxims” or “policies”), or intentions-in-action. Candidate dispositions include dispositions to 
pursue putative “essential aims” or to comply with “constitutive norms” be it of agency-
constituting attitudes (for example, the disposition to make one’s intentions consistent with one 
another) or of action itself (for example, the disposition to do what one finds it intelligible that 
one would do). Constitutivism claims that insofar as one is an agent – in the relevant sense –, or 
insofar as one acts intentionally, one accepts or is disposed to satisfy those aims or 
requirements.  
The fact that the constituents of agency put forward by constitutivist theories are 
psychological states is sometimes obscured by elliptical discourse that refers only to the 
contents or objects of those states (for example, in the case of Korsgaard, “principles” and 
“practical identities”). This elliptical way of speaking is easily explained by the constructive 
ambition of some forms of constitutivism: they aim to uncover truths about the content of 
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practical reason, and at least some of them take those truths to derive not simply from the 
necessary presence of certain types of psychological attitudes in an agent but rather from the 
specific content of those attitudes. The elliptical way of speaking may also be to blame for the 
occasional vagueness or elusiveness regarding the kinds of psychological attitudes claimed to be 
constitutive ingredients of agency or action: if, for example, some “principle” is said to be 
constitutive of agency, does this mean that the agent must accept the principle, or be motivated 
by it, or endorse it, or conform to it, or believe it to be valid, or something else yet?4 
It should also be noted that seeking to locate the constitutive elements of agency in features 
of individual agents’ psychology is a generally shared but contingent feature of recent 
constitutivist accounts. An example of a constitutivist account that departs from the individualist 
aspect of this assumption may be Hegel’s view of agency, at least on some influential 
interpretations of it that stress the agency-constituting significance of interpersonal attitudes of 
“mutual recognition” (in addition to, not in place of, intra-personal or reflective ones).5 But this 
proposal and related ones, while rejecting – for better or for worse – the individualism that 
characterizes recent constitutivist approaches, still retain their psychological foundationalism.6 
And it may turn out that this foundationalism, whether in an individualist or an anti-individualist 
form, is an inessential element of constitutivism or even a liability for it. 
                                                          
4 For instance, David Velleman changed his mind over time regarding the psychological features in which the 
„essential aim“ of action is anchored; and Michael Bratman’s terminology of “plans” and “policies” sometimes 
remains ambiguous between being about psychological states and being about the content of such states.  
5 Cf. Pippin 2008.  
6 By that I mean the ambition of explaining reasons and rationality in terms of truths about the psychology of agents 
(as such), or (in non-individualist versions) truths about socially shared practices or attitudes, that can themselves 
be described and understood without reference to what there is reason to do, what it is rational to do, or what is 
valuable. A clear statement of this foundationalist ambition is found, for example, in Velleman (2000: 16): “Ideally, 
the norm of correctness for action should be exempt from deliberative criticism. That is, the norm should not leave 
open any question about whether to act in accordance with it. If such a question could be raised, it would have to be 
answered by appeal to reasons for acting in accordance with the norm; whereas the norm is supposed to determine 
what counts as a reason for acting, in the first place.” 
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Third, constitutivist theories differ in the reach of the conclusions about practical reason that 
they try to establish on the basis of their respective constitution theses. Here we can distinguish 
constitutivist theories along at least two partly independent dimensions: (i) as aspiring to be 
more or less informative with regard to practical reason; and (ii) as being more or less 
normatively or meta-ethically ambitious.  
(i) Constitutivist theories aspire to be informative if they aim to provide us with substantive 
information about what makes actions rational, or about what reasons for action there are. Such 
substantive information could come, for example, in the form of “structural requirements of 
rationality”: requirements that specify certain relations in which an agent’s attitudes must stand 
to each other if the agent is not to be (to some extent) irrational. Or they could come in the form 
of propositions about reasons for action: for example, reasons to comply with certain categorical 
requirements of morality.7 
But constitutivist theories need not aspire to being informative in this way. For one, they may 
content themselves with stating necessary connections (perhaps only biconditionals) between 
their chosen constituents, on the one hand, and what there is reason to do for an agent, or what 
makes actions or attitudes qualify as rational, on the other. Learning about such necessary 
connections will be uninformative if it does not enable us to derive conclusions about the latter 
from independently available truths about the former. This will be the case, for example, if in 
order to determine whether something is an instance of agency or intentional action we first 
need to know about at least some of the normative reasons or requirements of practical reason 
that there are.8 In this case, learning what is constitutive of agency gives us no independent 
                                                          
7 An example is Korsgaard’s view that failure to act in conformity with the “moral law” is to that extent a failure to 
be an agent.  
8 Davidson’s thesis that rationality is a ”constitutive ideal“ of the practice of interpreting the linguistic and other 
behavior of individuals as expressive of agency or agential attitudes – i.e., of interpreting those individuals as 
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purchase on the entire domain of reasons, subjective reasons, or requirements of rationality. A 
constitutivist theory will also be relatively uninformative if it allows us to draw conclusions 
about what it would be practically rational for an agent to do, or what there are reasons for her to 
do, only in conjunction with some information about the idiosyncratic contents of the relevant 
attitudes on the part of that particular agent.9 
Furthermore, constitutivist theories may be uninformative with regard to practical reason 
because what they wish to explain is not which reasons or which requirements of rationality 
there are, but rather what it is for something to be a reason or a requirement of rationality, or 
what it is for there to be a difference between actions and attitudes supported by reasons and 
ones that are not so supported. In other words, they may want to illuminate the nature of 
normativity, not to provide us with information about how to reason or how to conduct 
ourselves. This is Korsgaard’s avowed project in Korsgaard (1996), although she does not 
confine herself to it for long.10  
The aspiration of some constitutivist theories to be informative with regard to the existence, 
content, or nature of unconditional or categorical reasons for action has tempted some to 
characterize constitutivism in general as an attempt to find a middle way between “internalism” 
about reasons for action, understood as the thesis that all reasons for action depend on prior and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
subjects of determinate beliefs, desires, and intentions – may be an instance of this. On this view, our understanding 
of rationality gives us an understanding of what agents are or must be – not the other way around. The view is still 
constitutivist in that identifying an individual as an agent commits us to a set of beliefs about what it would be 
rational for that individual to intend and to believe, and in that an accumulation of irrational attitudes on the part of 
the individual would an obstacle to counting the individual as an agent at all. Thus rationality is constitutive of 
agency, but its content cannot be inferred from the mere concept of agency.  
9 This is perhaps most clearly the case for Frankfurt’s view that reasons have their source in contingent attitudes of 
“caring”. It is also true of Korsgaard’s theory to the extent that it aims to account for the existence of obligations 
and reasons beyond the two fundamental Kantian imperatives, by reverting to individuals’ endorsement of 
“practical identities”.  
10 Her theory thus straddles both of the goals identified in Enoch (2006: 170): “On the metanormative level, the 
hope is that an attractive second-order theory of normativity (or perhaps just of morality) can be developed starting 
with the insight that practical normativity is, in some sense, grounded in what is constitutive of action. (…) On the 
normative level, the hope is that we can find out just which standards are the right ones by deriving them from what 
is constitutive of action.” 
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potentially idiosyncratic desires or other motivational states on the part of an agent, and its 
denial, “externalism”, insofar as the latter makes room for the thesis that there are some reasons 
(specifically, moral reasons) that apply to all agents without exception. But given what I have 
said so far, this is misleading as a general characterization of constitutivism. At best it describes 
one widely shared motivation for developing a constitutivist theory, especially among professed 
Kantians.11 Constitutivists need not be concerned with establishing the existence of reasons or 
requirements that are at once categorical and informative.  
(ii) Constitutivist theories are normatively or meta-ethically ambitious if they aim to explain, 
at the most general level, the existence of objective normative reasons: if they either aim to tell 
us about some or all of the reasons for action that there are (in which case they also aspire to be 
informative, in the sense just explained), or aim to explain to us what it is for something to be a 
(normative) reason (in which case they do not aspire to be informative, in the sense I specified). 
These two ambitions may not be entirely independent of one another. “Meta-ethical” 
propositions – that is to say, propositions about what it is for something to be a normative 
reason – are likely to have “normative” implications – that is to say, implications concerning 
what reasons there are. But these implications may be so indirect that the theory just by itself 
does not allow us to proceed from the former to the latter; it may allow us to do so only when 
we are given further information about the contents of a particular agent’s constitutive attitudes. 
By contrast, constitutivist theories are both normatively and meta-ethically unambitious (or 
perhaps better: abstinent) if they do not by themselves entail anything – whether directly or 
given the addition of (non-normative) further information about the contents of an agent’s 
                                                          
11 For example, Enoch (2006: 173) plausibly attributes this motivation to Velleman: “to show that even though 
there is a necessary connection between normativity and motivation, still the externalist—who denies such a 
connection—can have almost all she wants. In particular, she can have normative reasons that are not as unstable 
and subjective as garden-variety desires.” 
12 
 
attitudes – about what there is reason for an agent to do, nor anything about the nature of 
reasons or normativity.12 To say that they are unambitious, in this sense, is not to say that they 
are uninformative or uninteresting. It is just to say that what they seek to derive from the 
constitutive features of agency is restricted to claims about agents’ practical rationality that 
bracket the question of whether to be rational in that way is to be properly attuned or responsive 
to the normative aspects of the world.  
Constitutivist theories can remain meta-ethically and normatively abstinent, while still 
closely mimicking ambitious ones, by eschewing claims about reasons or normativity and 
instead restricting themselves to claims about what an agent must take to be a reason, 
independently of whether or not it is in fact a reason. The “must” here expresses, in the first 
place, metaphysical necessity. An agent’s failure to take there to be the reasons she “must” take 
there to be is, to that extent, to fail for her to be an agent. The claims about rationality that 
constitutivist theories aim to establish are then explained by reference to the metaphysical 
consequences of failures of rationality, and explain what rational necessity consists in. Thus the 
“must” should be read as at least derivatively referring to rational necessity. The constitutivist 
proposals I consider in this dissertation generally claim that what an agent must rationally take 
to be reasons – call this her “subjective reasons” – depend in part on what other attitudes she 
has.13 These dependency relations arise from internal or “structural” requirements of rationality, 
which codify the ways in which the presence of a given set of attitudes in an agent determines 
what further attitudes it is or would be rational or irrational for her to have.   
                                                          
12 Michael Bratman’s professed neutrality vis-a-vis meta-ethical could suggest that his constitutivist theory falls 
into this category. However, his theory does not seem to be similarly neutral with regard to substantive normative 
questions.  
13 Thus “subjective reasons”, as characterized here, are not necessarily identical with what an agent believes to be 
reasons; subjective reasons and believed reasons coincide when an agent is structurally rational. A similar use of 
the term “subjective reason” is found in Schroeder (2009), although I am here using it in a somewhat wider sense. 
Claims about subjective reasons are claims about what considerations enjoy, in Michael Bratman’s parlance, 
“subjective normative authority” for an agent (2007: 4). 
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Thus in order to make claims about what agents must rationally take to be reasons, in an 
internal or structural sense of “rational”, constitutivist theories have to claim that agents, in 
virtue of the attitudes that constitute them as agents, are subject to requirements governing the 
relation between their attitudes. And insofar as such theories wish to remain abstinent in the way 
just outlined, they will remain agnostic as to whether those requirements have any normative 
force that derives from their constitutive role (that is, as to whether their agency-constituting 
role yields any reasons to comply with them).  
Constitutivist theories that are metaethically or normatively ambitious generally contain 
unambitious or abstinent claims as intermediate steps towards their more ambitious conclusions. 
As I try to show in Chapter 2, Korsgaard’s is an example of this. She asserts that it is 
constitutive of agency that agents endorse, or take themselves to be subject to, two basic 
“principles”: Kant’s categorical imperative and the “instrumental principle” (roughly, the source 
of Kantian hypothetical imperatives). These two fundamental “principles” function as 
requirements of rationality in an internal or structural sense. They determine what reasons an 
agent must take there to be, on pains of irrationality; and given the explanatory aims of 
Korsgaard’s theory, the relevant kind of irrationality must be one that is not (yet) the 
irrationality of failing to respond to normative reasons: in other words, what I have been calling 
“internal” or “structural” irrationality. Specifically, the instrumental principle requires an agent 
to take there to be reasons that depend on her goals or intentions, and the categorical imperative 
requires an agent to take there to be the reasons entailed by the various “practical identities” and 
“general principles” she endorses (among them, crucially, her allegedly non-optional practical 
identity as a rational being).14  
                                                          
14 How are “practical identities” individuated, and what determines the content of a “practical identity”, such that it 
could entail specific reasons for action, or specific “principles” specifying conditional reasons for action? The 
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Yet Korsgaard does not intend to rest with an abstinent view. How does she achieve the 
transition from subjective to objective reasons? I will examine this question in some more detail 
in Chapter 2, but it will be useful to distinguish here more generally between two directions that 
an ambitious constitutivist theory could take at this point.  
On the one hand (and this corresponds to one construal of what Korsgaard is doing), the 
theory could rely on a further premise that allows it to infer truths about objective reasons from 
truths about subjective reasons. One likely candidate for such a premise is some thesis about the 
concept of a normative reason itself, to the effect that normative reasons for action quite 
generally just are the considerations that individuals take to be such reasons, as long as the 
relevant attitude of “taking” satisfies certain constitutivist constraints (for example, that it makes 
a person more intelligible to herself, or enables her to achieve some form of volitional unity).15 
The question then is whether the concept of a reason thus stipulated is in fact our concept of a 
normative reason, or is at least close enough to it. If it is not, a theory that relies on it may be 
true on its own terms but risks being irrelevant.  
On the other hand, a theory may hope to achieve the transition from subjective to objective 
reasons without taking any further step in the argument, and thus without introducing a further 
premise. Instead, it could aim to effect this transition from subjective to objective reasons by 
relying on the dialectical situation in which it is put forward. Once a constitutivist theory has 
shown that to be an agent is necessarily to take oneself to be subject to certain requirements of 
rationality, or to take oneself to have certain reasons for action, perhaps all there is left for the 
theory to do is to get itself accepted by those who believe that they are agents, in the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
examples Korsgaard gives of practical identities are usually social roles. In what way do specific reasons “derive” 
from a social role? There seem to be two possible answers: either a conventionalist or “role positivist” one (cf. 
Applbaum 1999); or, alternatively, one that identifies roles with valuable functions and takes the role-given reasons 
to be determined by that value. Both answers, it seems to me, create challenges for Korsgaard’s view. 
15 Cf. Velleman (2000); Korsgaard; and Frankfurt.  
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sense. The theory articulates a set of attitudes and dispositions (for example, beliefs about 
reasons or about requirements of rationality, or dispositions to hold oneself to such 
requirements) which it claims are shared by all those who count as agents. To believe that one is 
an agent and to accept such a theory, it seems, is thereby to commit oneself to thinking in the 
way the theory claims agents must think in order to be agents; which is to say, to knowingly 
commit oneself to taking there to be the reasons or the rational requirements that the theory says 
any agent must take there to be. But if one is knowingly committed to believing there to be (say) 
a reason to ϕ, then, unless one is being irrational, one believes that there is a reason to ϕ. A 
question for this strategy – to be pursued in Chapter 2 below – is whether believing what the 
theory (qua theory of practical reason) says agents must believe about what it is for reasons to 
exist is compatible with the reasons that its addressees have for believing the theory to be true of 
themselves, or (equivalently) with the reasons they have for believing themselves to be “agents” 
in just the sense intended by the theory.  
***** 
 
This concludes my brief taxonomical survey of constitutivist theories. The inclusion of 
theories that are relatively uninformative, as well as meta-ethically and normatively 
unambitious, allows us to discern the commonalities between accounts of practical reason and 
rationality commonly characterized as constitutivist (such as those of Korsgaard and Velleman) 
and those that are not commonly so characterized. I discuss some of the more conspicuously 
constitutivist views in the remainder of this chapter and in the next one. Here I will say a few 
words about the inclusion of certain views not usually classified in this way.  
One is the “guise of the good” thesis about intentional action defended by a number of 
philosophers, which at least one recent critic of constitutivist approaches, Kieran Setiya, 
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associates with them. In what way is it a constitutivist thesis? The thesis (at least a strong 
version of it) states that something is an intentional action only if it is done in light of 
considerations that explain why the action is in some respect good. On this view, if an individual 
does something that she believes to be in no way or respect valuable, worthwhile, and the like, 
her doing it is not an intentional action. It is not attributable to her will or her agency. Thus 
believing one’s action to be in some respect good is a necessary condition of that action’s being 
intentional, or (in weaker versions of the thesis) of its being done with an intention.16 This 
amounts to a non-trivial claim about the structure of practical thought: acting for a reason (or for 
what the agent at least believes to be a reason) presupposes a readiness on the part of the agent 
to affirm certain evaluative judgments. It also amounts to a non-trivial claim about the subject 
matter of practical thought: it invokes the nature of intentional action to tie reasons for action to 
value. These claims become part of a constitutivist account more narrowly speaking if one adds 
that acting for reasons (at least sometimes), or acting intentionally, are constitutive of agency or 
of personhood.17 
Another case of an unavowedly but discernibly constitutivist thesis is Thomas Scanlon’s 
claim that there are some attitudes that are “judgment-sensitive” on pains of (structural or 
internal) irrationality. This idea can be understood as a variation on the “guise of the good” 
account, which extends the latter to attitudes other than intention, and weakens it from a 
constraint on the ascription of a certain type of attitude (intention) to a constraint on the 
                                                          
16 Raz (1999: 8) asserts a “guise of the good” constraint with respect to ascriptions of “choice” and “decision” 
(though not with respect to ascriptions of intentions or intentional actions): “Both choice and decision are subject to 
rules of rational constraint, the most important of which is that one can only choose or decide for a reason, i.e. for 
what one takes to be a good reason for the option chosen. This places a limit on what one can choose in any given 
situation.” In later writing (2011: 59-84) Raz extends the thesis to intentions, and to intentional action insofar as it 
is governed by intentions. 
17 Cf. again Raz (2011: 96), who holds that “responsiveness to reasons is constitutive of personhood.” Coupled with 
the guise of the good thesis about acting for reasons, this yields the thesis that it is partly constitutive of personhood 
that when one acts one (generally) responds to features of the world in ways that one believes to be to some extent 
good or worthwhile in light of those features.  
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rationality of various attitudes. To say of an attitude that it is judgment-sensitive is to make a 
claim about the conditions under which – specifically, the judgment or belief in the presence of 
which – it is rational, in an internal or structural sense, to have that attitude. It is in the nature of 
the attitude, or constitutive of it, that it is subject to this standard. As Scanlon explains, the 
relevant judgments or beliefs on which the rationality of having the attitude depends are not 
generally higher-order judgments about the desirability of having the attitude in question. More 
commonly they are judgments that an agent is rationally required to accept if she has the attitude 
in question, so that if she comes to reject the judgment, and she is fully rational, she loses the 
relevant attitude. They are judgments that make sense of the attitude, by representing things to 
be such as would warrant having the attitude.  
The relation between judgment-sensitive attitudes and their attendant judgments can be 
imagined more tightly or more loosely. The connection would be a tight one if the relevant kind 
of judgment were strictly constitutive of the attitude, such that absent the judgment, it cannot be 
the case that an agent has that attitude.18 But this does not seem to be what Scanlon has in mind. 
As he intends the concept, judgment-sensitive attitudes can in fact be out of step with the 
relevant judgments. Accepting the relevant judgment is a condition of rationally having the 
attitude. Thus an agent could have the attitude even while rejecting the judgment, but she would 
in a certain sense (in a structural or internal sense) irrational in doing so. To ascribe a judgment-
sensitive attitude to a person is to thereby commit oneself to certain propositions about what 
attitudes a person may rationally have (given her present beliefs or judgments), and possibly 
also about what normative judgments that person may rationally make (while retaining the 
attitudes she has).  
                                                          
18 This appears to be the claim of some strongly cognitivist views of emotion.  
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Scanlon’s view about judgment-sensitive attitudes, which I discuss in greater detail in 
Chapter 4, amounts to a modest constitutivist theory, or perhaps a borderline case of a 
constitutivist theory. The relevant results in the theory of practical reason, in Scanlon’s case, are 
“structural” requirements that govern the operation of important types of psychological attitudes 
– those that Scanlon classifies as “judgment-sensitive” attitudes. Belief and intention are central 
among the judgment-sensitive attitudes in that they are indispensable to agency. The standards 
governing intention and belief therefore apply to all agents, whereas the standards governing 
other judgment-sensitive attitudes apply only to those who happen to have those attitudes. But 
being at least susceptible to having those other types of attitudes may well be a necessary 
component of certain valuable forms of agency.  
 
3. Voluntarism and volitional reflexivity 
Constitutivism overlaps with a family of theories of normative reasons that I will call 
voluntarist. Voluntarist theories aim to offer an explanation of the existence or the nature (or 
both) of normative reasons, or alternatively of what I have called subjective normative reasons, 
in terms of an agent’s will. More specifically, voluntarism aims to offer a will-based explanation 
of normative reasons that is either in some way deep or complete – perhaps to the extent of 
amounting to an explanation of “normativity” or “subjective normative authority” as such –, or 
that applies to a subset of normative reasons that are in some interesting way unified by the 
manner in which they are created by the will. In the first case, which is my focus in Chapter 2, 
voluntarism shares the explanatory ambitions of constitutivism. In the second case, which I 
consider in Chapter 3, it simply seeks to provide the contents of (some) volitional states with a 
distinctive role in our practical reasoning.  
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Voluntarism, like constitutivism, identifies certain privileged attitudes – those that amount to 
an agent’s will, or her (relevant) “volitions” – in order to explain by reference to them what it is 
either substantively or internally rational for that agent to do. The reason-generating attitudes 
singled out by voluntarism may coincide with those singled out by some types of constitutivism, 
and when they do, the coincidence is hardly an accident. It has to do with the fact that what a 
person does – in the demanding sense that goes along with the concept of agency on which 
constitutivism relies – should normally overlap to a significant extent with what she “wills” to 
do, again in a more or less philosophically engineered sense. That sense, and thus the notions of 
“will” and “willing”, can be cashed out in terms of common concepts such as intention, 
decision, choice, commitment, identification, adopting an end, caring, and the like, as well as 
slightly less common ones, such as “endorsement”. Thus the near-synonymity of “will” and 
“agency” (or of “having a will” and “being an agent”, or “exercising one’s will” and “acting”) is 
not only a feature of much recent philosophical theorizing. It also seems to capture an aspect of 
the ordinary use of many concepts, such as the ones just listed, which do double duty as 
expressions both of the engagement of a person’s will and of the exercise of her agency.  
We should distinguish between two quite different ways in which the will could play a role in 
explaining the kinds of things constitutivism wants to explain (reasons, subjective reasons, 
requirements of rationality, or the nature of normativity). On the one hand, the will could be 
explanatory in virtue of its contents. On the other hand, it could be explanatory in virtue of what 
it is – its nature or structure. I will be speaking of voluntarism only where the will plays the 
former kind of explanatory role. It might be accorded this role – one that makes practical 
reasons or rationality sensitive to its content – either in the context of a constitutivist theory or 
independently of it. By contrast, when the will is assigned the relevant explanatory role in virtue 
20 
 
of its structure or mode of functioning, and regardless of its specific contents, this is generally in 
the service of a constitutivist theory: one that seeks to establish its conclusions about practical 
reason by showing how they can or must figure in a satisfactory explanation of how the will 
could have this kind of structure, or how it could function in the way it does, or how a will with 
this kind of structure could be the will of a unified agent.  
This means that constitutivism, even when it is centrally concerned with the will, need not 
coincide with voluntarism. Not all constitutivist claims about what makes actions and attitudes 
rational, or what it means for them to be rational or not, need involve reference to the content of 
an agent’s will. Constitutivist theories can limit themselves to anchoring their claims about 
practical reason in facts about the structure of the will, or facts about the generic nature or 
function of volitional states, or even in facts about agents that are not facts about their will at all. 
Conversely, voluntarist theories need not be constitutivist theories: voluntarists need not claim 
that an agent’s volitional attitudes, or her will – even while being central to determining which 
actions and attitudes are rational on her part – are constitutive of her agency. Still, constitutivism 
and voluntarism often coincide, for example in the work of Christine Korsgaard and Michael 
Bratman. 
Korsgaard’s constitutivism, which I discuss in more detail in Chapter 2, is one theory that 
gives a central explanatory role to the will in both of the ways just mentioned. In fact, as I will 
explain there, her favored image of a “source” of normativity (or of normative truths: truths 
about what reasons there are) extends to the will both with regard to its structure and with regard 
to its content. First, the will – which for Korsgaard is equivalent with agency – is a source of 
normativity in virtue of its reflexive structure. Normative reasons are in some sense products of 
the activity whereby a creature with a self-reflexive will “imposes unity” on her own volitions 
21 
 
and thus “constitutes herself” as an identifiable author of actions. Where such volitional 
reflexivity is absent, according to Korsgaard, no normative reasons apply. Second, the will is a 
source of normative reasons in virtue of its contents. What reasons there are for a person 
depends on the content of that person’s volitional attitudes of “endorsement” and 
“identification.” 
Another constitutivist theory, that of Michael Bratman, resembles Korsgaard’s in placing 
both the content and the self-reflexive structure of the will at the center of its conception of 
practical rationality. On Bratman’s view, the content of a person’s will – in the form of 
intentions, plans, and “policies” – shapes to a significant extent what further attitudes (especially 
intentions) it is rational for that person to have. It does so by engaging what I have been calling 
“internal” or “structural” requirements of rationality, which (if they exist) govern the relation 
among a person’s attitudes. What an agent may rationally intend, what an agent takes (or may or 
must rationally take) herself to have reason to do, and what an agent takes (or may or must 
rationally take) to be a reason for what, are all sensitive to an agent’s intentions and policies and 
thus to contents of her will. The structural requirements to which this sensitivity is owed are also 
explained by reference to the will, though not by reference to its contingent contents but rather 
by reference to the specific function of volitional states such as intention.   
In contrast with Korsgaard’s theory, Bratman’s seems at least at first glance to be of the 
unambitious or abstinent kind: it is concerned to explain, in the first place, not what reasons 
there are but what agents must, on pains of irrationality, believe to be reasons or accept as 
reasons. It is true that in combination with the view – which also seems to be Bratman’s – that 
there is reason for agents to believe and act in the ways that are rationally required of them, the 
theory does entail claims about objective reasons. But these claims are established only by 
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reference to prior normative truths (concerning the reasons to believe and act in the way 
structural rationality requires). Whether the theory is ambitious or not then depends on whether 
the assumption that there is reason to conform to rational requirements is in turn established 
simply by pointing out that doing so is constitutive of being an agent. And this does not seem to 
be true of Bratman’s theory: instead he relies on a further normative premise, namely, that there 
is value in being the kind of agent of whom conforming to these requirements is constitutive.  
Of special interest with regard to the relation between constitutivism and voluntarism in 
Bratman’s theory, and also with regard to subsequent discussions in this dissertation, are the 
volitional attitudes Bratman calls “policies”. Policies are “[commitments] to a certain kind of 
action on certain kinds of potentially recurrent occasions.”19 The role Bratman’s theory of 
agency accords to policies is what makes it a constitutivist theory in the first place: that is to say, 
one that offers both an account of the constitutive elements of agency and, based on that 
account, an enumeration of some central structural features of practical reason. Policies, over 
and above plans and intentions, are a central part of Bratman’s theory of agency since in his 
view it is policies, specifically, that enjoy what he calls “agential authority”. They are the 
attitudes that determine “where the agent stands”; for actions to be governed or guided by them 
is for the agent to be “self-governed”; in other words, they “constitute” the agent’s “self”. 
Policies owe this constitutive status to their functioning as “cross-temporal psychological ties” 
that in Bratman’s Lockean view constitute an agent’s diachronic identity.20 If they play this role 
in the constitution of diachronic identity, Bratman thinks, they (and derivatively, the attitudes 
“authorized” by them) are also the best candidates for being those psychological elements that 
                                                          
19 Bratman (2007: 27).  
20 Cf. especially Bratman (2007), Chapters 2 and 10.  
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can be regarded as most fundamentally expressive of a person’s agency at any given moment in 
time.21  
At the same time, policies are said to play a role in explaining what practical rationality 
requires of an agent. First, like more particular plans and intentions, they are, Bratman claims, 
subject to rational requirements of consistency, coherence, and stability over time, simply in 
virtue of the kinds of psychological states they are.22 If that is true, and if having policies is 
constitutive of being an agent (in the relevant sense of “agent”), then one is subject to those 
requirements insofar as one is an agent. Second, like more particular plans and intentions, the 
particular policies that have “agential authority” for some particular agent have further 
implications for what practical rationality requires of that agent, in virtue of their content.  
Specifically, there is a type of policies – which Bratman calls “self-governing policies” – of 
which this holds in a different way than it does in the case of simpler plans and intentions. 
Briefly addressing it will prepare the ground for part of my discussion in Chapter 3 below. 
Whereas simpler plans and intentions are volitional attitudes directed at interventions in the 
world, self-governing policies are “guiding attitudes that articulate what one is to treat as a 
justifying reason in one’s motivationally effective practical reasoning.”23 They “say what to 
treat as a reason, and with what weight and significance—and thereby help determine what has 
subjective normative authority.”24 
                                                          
21 Cf. especially Chapters 1 and 2 in Bratman (2007).  
22 Why are they subject to them? Bratman’s answer appeals to the functions served by these kinds of attitudes, 
which they could not serve unless they were (at least as those who have them see it) subject to these requirements, 
or came with dispositions to generally do as these requirements demand.  
23 Of course there can also be more particularized intentions and plans with this type of content.  
24 Bratman (2007: 6). The idea of a self-governing policy as a policy to treat certain considerations as reasons for 
certain actions, or as having a specific normative import, is first introduced in Bratman’s “Intention, Decision, and 
Treating as a Reason”, reprinted in Bratman (1999). There as well as in later presentations Bratman often suggests, 
implausibly, that what is “treated as a reason” or as “reason-giving” in complying with a self-governing policy is 
some desire or motivational state of the agent herself. For example, Bratman writes that self-governing policies 
specify “which desires are to have for the agent what we can call ‘‘subjective normative authority’’” (2007: 210), 
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The role played by self-governing policies, so understood, is intelligible only if we suppose 
that the will has a reflexive structure similar to that envisioned by Korsgaard: that is, only if we 
suppose that an agent has volitional attitudes not just with respect to states of the world (and 
therefore also with respect to his own on-going or future activity, by which such states could be 
brought about), but also or more specifically with respect to his or her own volitions, as such. 
Like Korsgaard, Bratman is inspired here by Harry Frankfurt’s views about volitional 
reflexivity, but also like Korsgaard, he departs from Frankfurt (or at least proposes a substantive 
elaboration) in insisting that the lower-order volitions that are the object of reflexive or higher-
order ones should be thought of as responses to reasons, as the person sees them. What a person 
wills, at the higher-order level, is not simply that she be volitionally disposed to perform certain 
acts (blandly understood), but rather that her lower-order volitions should be determined by (or 
responsive to) specific sorts of considerations.  
The notion of “treating as a reason” on which this conception relies is certainly in need of 
further elucidation. But the reference to “motivational efficacy” and “normative authority” in 
the passage just quoted makes it clear that what is meant, in part, is just normative guidance. To 
treat some fact p as a reason to ϕ is to act as one would if one believed that p is a reason to ϕ, 
and if one were properly motivated by one’s normative beliefs. To treat p as a reason to ϕ is 
compatible with p’s in fact being a reason to ϕ – in fact its being so is the normal reason for 
treating it so –, but it does not entail it; and it also implies a specifically active stance, so that a 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
when what should be credited with such authority would rather seem to be the considerations by which the agent 
takes those desires to be supported. Thus Bratman’s view could appear to be relying on an implausible picture of 
practical reasoning according to which the fundamental deliberative considerations are an agent’s own desires. But 
whether or not Bratman is or was at any point committed to such a picture, it forms no essential part of the idea of a 
self-governing policy. What matters is that such a policy prescribes what considerations to treat as reasons for 
which actions or attitudes. The relevant considerations could be ordinary facts in the world, rather than an agent’s 
motivational states (although the latter are of course among the former, and thus may sometimes legitimately figure 
as to-be-treated-as-reasons in an agent’s self-governing policy). For what may be a partial retraction of the 
implausible view, see Bratman (2007: 219, n. 53).  
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volition whose content is one’s own “treating” is plausibly understood as a second-order 
volition, a volition about the functioning of one’s own will.  
Thus it is true of Bratman’s constitutivist view of rational agency no less than of Korsgaard’s 
that the will plays a two-fold role in explaining what an agent may or must rationally do. On the 
one hand, it plays a voluntarist role in virtue of its content, insofar as it is a capacity to influence 
“at will” – through the adoption of intentions and policies with various specific contents – what 
one takes or must rationally take to be (or “treat as”) reasons. This is roughly analogous to the 
role that the content of voluntary attitudes of “endorsement” (directed at “principles” and 
“practical identities”) play in determining an agent’s reasons according to Korsgaard’s 
voluntarism. On the other hand, the way in which the will is structured, such that it amounts to 
constituting a certain sophisticated type of reflective agency (in Bratman’s terms, solving the 
“problem of agential authority” for agents who are “self-governed”), explains why the volitional 
contents have this (subjective) normative import; and the (functional) nature of the volitional 
attitudes, qua types, also imposes independent constraints on an agent’s practical reasoning, in 
the shape of rational requirements of consistency, coherence, and stability. The role of these 
constraints corresponds to that played in Korsgaard’s constitutivist theory by the two basic 
requirements of rationality, the categorical imperative and the instrumental principle.  
 
4. Critiques of Constitutivism 
I have described two examples of constitutivist theories that incorporate voluntarist elements, 
and thereby motivate voluntarist theses, by reverting to the agency-constituting role of the will. 
A further example of such a theory would be the one developed by Harry Frankfurt in his later 
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writings.25 One result of my discussion is that the two kinds of project – explaining an agent’s 
reasons by reference to the content of her will, and showing a specific kind of volitional 
structure to be constitutive of agency – are in principle separable. In Chapter 3, I examine the 
prospects of voluntarism when it is divorced from claims about the agency-constituting role of 
the will. Asking to what extent voluntarism can stand on its own feet suggests itself both as a 
reaction to what I argue in Chapter 2 is the failure of an especially ambitious attempt to fuse 
voluntarism and constitutivism, that of Korsgaard, and for the reason that constitutivist theories 
more generally have been subjected to forceful critiques. In this section, I present some 
influential recent criticisms of constitutivism in broad outline, in order to show how they 
undermine the ability of constitutivist arguments to support voluntarist conclusions in particular. 
I will not assess the success of these criticisms in detail. Instead I will presume that voluntarism 
stands to gain by not relying on claims that are exposed to them.  
A second purpose of surveying these recent critiques of constitutivism is to understand to 
what extent aspects of a distinctively constitutivist approach to explaining practical rationality 
can survive them. As it is presented by its most prominent defenders, and attacked by its critics, 
the goal of constitutivist theories is to explain all practical reasons or all of practical rationality 
at one stroke. But as I have pointed out, constitutivist arguments can and do take more modest 
forms. In this dissertation, after the discussion of voluntarism in abstraction from constitutivism 
in Chapter 3, constitutivist considerations make a reappearance in Chapter 4, this time in their 
                                                          
25 Especially in his Tanner Lectures (Frankfurt 2006). There the volitional attitude of “caring” is identified as the 
answer both to the question of what makes an individual’s behavior count as done by her, in an emphatic sense (in 
virtue of the structure of caring; this is Frankfurt’s constitutivism) and to the question of what agents have reason to 
do (in virtue of the content of their caring; this is Frankfurt’s voluntarism). When Frankfurt writes – taking up the 
imagery introduced by Korsgaard – that „the ultimate source of practical normative authority lies not in reason but 
in the will” (2006: 3), it seems that he has in mind both. 
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turn without the company of voluntarism, and in a form that should not be vulnerable to the 
objections I now discuss. 
Recent critiques of constitutivism as an approach both to the understanding of practical 
reason and of normativity have come from a number of authors. Considerations advanced by 
David Enoch, Niko Kolodny, and Kieran Setiya have been especially influential.  
The basic strategy of Enoch’s critique could be described as “normativity out, normativity 
in” – essentially, an application of Hume’s Law. Let us suppose, Enoch proposes, that 
constitutivists such as Korsgaard and Velleman are right in their claims about what is 
constitutive of agency, and also that they are right in whatever conclusions they draw from this 
with regard to the content or structure of practical reason for agents, so understood. But even 
supposing all that, why should we do what it takes to constitute ourselves as agents in the 
relevant sense? Even if it were true that we “must” constitute ourselves as agents in the sense 
that we have no choice but to do so, this would not entail that we have any (let along strong or 
overriding) reason to do so.26 “Why shouldn’t our agent treat the motives and capacities 
constitutive of agency as normatively arbitrary? Why shouldn’t she treat the very fact that they 
are constitutive of agency as normatively arbitrary?”27 The only satisfactory answer would be 
that there is strong or even overriding reason not to do so, and instead to aim to constitute 
ourselves as agents. But if this is correct, constitutivism fails as a general explanation of the 
existence of normative reasons for action, since it presupposes what it purports to first account 
for. Contrary to its declared purpose, “the constitutivist strategy cannot give us the whole story 
of normativity.”28 This means at the same time that “perhaps (…) thinking about what is 
                                                          
26 This is what I understand to be the gist of the arguments in Enoch (2006) and (2011).  
27 Enoch (2006: 178).  
28 Enoch (2006: 186) 
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constitutive of agency can do some work in our metanormative theory. But it cannot do the 
fundamental work it was supposed to do.”29 
As this sketch of Enoch’s argument should make clear, his objection, if sound, is effective 
only against forms of constitutivism of the meta-ethically ambitious kind. On the wider 
conception of that I outlined above, constitutivism could take forms that are not vulnerable to 
Enoch’s objection. His objection may be circumvented either by citing reasons to be an agent of 
the relevant kind, or by limiting the constitutivist conclusions to claims about rationality that do 
not entail anything about what there is reason to do.  
Setiya’s critique takes a somewhat different approach than Enoch’s, and it has a wider scope. 
He argues not that constitutivist theories are question-begging due to their ambitiousness but 
that their constitutive thesis itself is false: none of the things from which various constitutivist 
views seek to derive their conclusions about practical reason are in fact constitutive of a suitably 
basic sense of agency, namely, acting with an intention.30 Instead of “constitutivism” Setiya 
speaks – roughly equivalently, given my wide conception of constitutivism – of “ethical 
rationalism.” He describes it as the view that “the standards of practical reason can be derived, 
at least in outline, from the nature of agency or practical thought.”31 An implication of this view, 
Setiya points out – and, to its supporters, the promise of the view – is that “the philosophy of 
                                                          
29 Enoch (2006: 192)  
30 Thus more precisely, on Setiya’s view, the various constitutivist theses may be true but only to the extent that 
they rely on rigged, question-begging conceptions of agency. Thus his critical strategy is in fact rather similar to 
Enoch’s. Its scope is nevertheless wider, since his argument targets not only meta-ethically or normatively 
ambitious versions of constitutivism but also unambitious or abstinent ones. What agency (in the allegedly basic 
sense of acting for reasons that Setiya favors)  fails to deliver is not just normativity (normative reasons) but any 
content whatsoever (whether in the form of normative reasons or in the form of principles of rationality; Setiya’s 
locution “standards of practical reason” could be understood as referring to either). 
31 Setiya (2007: 14). The label „ethical rationalism“ seems to me to be potentially misleading. What it suggests, 
contrary to Setiya’s intentions, is a view that holds that there is some non-contingent relation between ethical norms 
and the norms of (practical) reason – a view that is in fact Setiya’s own. “Rationalism about agency” or “moralism 
about agency” may be more suitable terms for the view that Setiya means to attack.  
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action is the foundation of ethics.”32 To deny rationalism (that is, constitutivism), on the other 
hand, is to hold that “the standards of practical reason cannot be derived from the nature of 
agency or practical thought, not even in outline, or in general terms.”33  
The burden of an argument to this conclusion, Setiya thinks, is to show that “there is nothing 
in the nature of action, or of practical thought, from which the standards of practical reason 
could derive.”34 Setiya takes this to amount to the challenge of establishing that there is nothing 
in the nature of action or of practical thought from which any standards of practical reason could 
derive. And he takes it on himself to meet this challenge by offering an account of agency – 
more precisely, of acting with an intention – that is sufficiently sparse to render hopeless any 
attempts to derive standards of rationality or necessary contents of practical reason from it. 
I will not here try to assess whether Setiya’s own favored account of acting with an intention, 
or acting for reasons, is plausible or tenable, or whether it is true that that account offers no 
foothold to constitutivist arguments. I merely want to point out that a significantly weaker 
argument, designed to meet a weaker challenge, would be sufficient to be able to reject 
constitutivism (or what Setiya calls rationalism) of a comprehensive kind – that is, a kind of 
constitutivism that aims to derive, as Setiya seems to think it generally does, the (meaning all) 
standards of practical reason. What needs to be shown for this purpose is only that if there is 
something in the nature of action or practical thought from which standards of practical reason 
could derive, that “something” is itself such as to presuppose the prior existence of what Setiya 
calls “standards of practical reason”. In other words, rationalism/constitutivism as a reductionist 
or strongly explanatory view can be resisted if its specific explanans (the nature of action or 
practical thought) cannot itself be described or understood without reference to the purported 
                                                          
32 Setiya (2007: 14). 
33 Setiya (2007: 15). 
34 Setiya (2007: 18).  
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explanandum (certain standards of practical reason). Resisting ambitious constitutivism in this 
way does not require us to show that standards of practical reason can never be derived from the 
nature of action or practical thought, and it therefore does not require us to develop a conception 
of agency that would make this impossible. It only requires that they cannot be derived from a 
conception of the nature of action or practical thought that does not in turn rely on (further) 
standards of practical reason. To put it another way: Setiya’s thesis is that the theory of practical 
reason (what there is reason to do, ultimately or most basically; and/or what it is ultimately or 
most basically rational to do) belongs to the domain of ethics, not simply to the theory of action, 
and that we can therefore learn nothing about it by thinking about the nature of action or agency. 
But this last conclusion is not warranted if we allow that the theory of action may itself rely on 
substantive “ethical” – that is to say, normative – premises, and thus develop conceptions of 
action and agency that are not as barren as Setiya claims his own is.  
Let me introduce, thirdly, a further problem for constitutivism that is perhaps best explained 
by reference to recent work by Niko Kolodny.35 Kolodny is there not concerned with 
constitutivism per se, but rather with the question whether so-called “requirements of subjective 
rationality” (or “requirements of rationality”, for short) – whatever exactly their content may be 
– are as such normatively binding, or whether there is some general reason to comply with such 
requirements. He argues that for the most plausible versions of widely accepted requirements of 
rationality such as (imprecisely formulated) intending what one believes one has conclusive 
reason to do and avoiding inconsistent intentions and taking the believed means to one’s ends, 
various attempts to vindicate their normativity fail, and that moreover there are independent 
grounds for doubting that these are indeed normative requirements. Kolodny grants that there 
                                                          
35 Kolodny (2005, 2006, 2008a, 2008b) 
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may be requirements of subjective rationality that are categorical in that they apply to all agents 
regardless of their individual differences – he himself proposes such a principle, Believed 
Reason, which is a generalization of the first of the three principles just named –, but he denies 
that their scope of application could be explained in terms of reasons to comply with them.36 If 
there are ever reasons to comply with the requirements, those reasons would have to be 
explained by the instrumental or (situational) constitutive role of compliance. Thus the alleged 
situation-independent applicability of the requirements cannot be explained by the existence of 
situation-independent reasons for complying with them.37 
I will not be rehearsing Kolodny’s arguments in detail here. What interests me are the 
implications that his conclusion has with regard to constitutivism, and specifically with regard to 
its voluntarist varieties. Kolodny’s “subjective requirements of rationality” are just what I have 
been calling “internal” or (adopting the terminology introduced by Scanlon) “structural” 
requirements of rationality.38 And such structural requirements of rationality figure prominently 
in various constitutivist theories. They do so in two main ways: first, as something whose 
                                                          
36 Believed Reason states that for any attitude A, “If one believes at t that one lacks sufficient reason for A, then one 
is rationally required at t to revise, or to refrain from forming A, going forward from t, on the basis of the content of 
this belief.” (Kolodny 2008a: 388). “Believed Reason” is a refinement of what Kolodny (2005) calls the “Core 
Requirement” (discussed in Chapter 4 below). The familiar idea that these requirements seek to capture is the idea 
that one’s judgment about what there is conclusive reason to do should govern one’s intentions or intentional 
action; others, adopting Aristotelian terminology, call the relevant requirement “the enkratic condition” (Broome) 
or “the Principle of Continence” (Davidson 2004: 201)  
37 I am for now setting aside an even stronger skeptical thesis that Kolodny, adopting and expanding upon the line 
of reasoning found in Raz (2005a/2011) defends with respect to at least the second and third of the requirements 
just mentioned: namely that the requirement of “means-ends-coherence”, and more generally “requirements of 
formal coherence as such”, are not even requirements of structural rationality, normative or not. Not only is there 
no reason to comply with them, but “violating” them is not as such in any respect irrational (though it may entail 
that the agent is failing to act on certain reasons that exist quite independently of those requirements). They simply 
fail to capture any genuine rationality-related concern. As Raz puts it with regard to alleged means-ends-
requirements, “there is no distinctive set of deliberative standards that are involved in getting us to reason correctly 
from ends we have to means, and that are different from those that are involved in reasoning about which ends to 
have” (2005a: 26). If this is true, a theory’s reliance on such standards is of course an even greater liability than it is 
if the theory merely falsely presupposes that there is reason to comply with those standards on all occasions.  
38 At least approximately. As I will suggest in Chapter 4, it is not accidental that Kolodny speaks of “subjective“ 
rather than structural requirements, and it is better to think of structural requirement along somewhat different lines 
than suggested by him.  
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content and force those theories hope to explain in themselves; and secondly as something on 
which some of those theories – especially voluntarist ones – rely in order to derive a reasonably 
detailed normative profile for an agent (whether in the form of reasons, subjective reasons, or 
normative obligations) from a limited subset of that agent’s attitudes.  
(i) First, insofar as constitutivist theories take the existence of general reasons to conform to 
various structural requirements of rationality as their explanandum, to deny the normativity of 
those same requirements is to deny that the phenomenon such theories hope to explain exists in 
the first place; thus it is to deny that some of the work these theories claim to do is work that 
needs to be done. But to deny the normativity of structural requirements is also to dispute an 
aspect of the constitutivist argument itself, which after all claims to explain this particular 
explanandum by in turn invoking it as an explanans (with respect to agency). Kolodny does this 
not by doubting, as Enoch does, that we have reasons to be agents in the relevant sense, nor by 
defending, as Setiya does, a concept of agency that is – allegedly – too conceptually sparse to 
give a foothold to rational requirements. Instead he does it by denying that conforming to 
rational requirements at all times is constitutive of being an agent, even when a demanding view 
of agency is being presupposed.39 If he is right about this, then even if one conceded (against 
Enoch) that there is reason to be an agent in the required sense, and (against Setiya) that the very 
idea of agency can tell us something about standards of rationality, it may not follow – Kolodny 
claims that it does not follow – that there is any context-independent reason to conform to those 
requirements: for example, to avoid inconsistent intentions, or to do what one believes one has 
conclusive reason to do, or to do what one believes will further one’s ends.  
                                                          
39 More precisely, this denial is the main negative part of Kolodny’s case against the normativity of rational 
requirements. Its positive part consists in pointing to various implausible implications of affirming the normativity 
of rational requirements.  
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Kolodny grants that it may be constitutive of agency that one conform to at least one central 
requirement, “Believed Reason” (approximately, intending to do as one believes one has 
conclusive reason to do) by and large, or that one reach at least a certain threshold of conformity 
with this requirement. Conforming to this requirement to a sufficient degree is an “executive 
virtue”, in the complete absence of which an individual fails to be an agent in a relevant, 
demanding sense.40 Pervasive structural irrationality is incompatible with agency. But this type 
of constitutive condition is not sufficient, he thinks, to support the claim that at any given 
moment or in any given case, there is a reason to conform to this requirement – even supposing 
that there is reason to be an agent, in the relevant sense.41 His argument relies on the assumption 
that the fact that there is reason to reach a threshold of conformity does not entail that at any 
given moment, there is at least some (perhaps weak) reason to conform. This presupposition 
seems at least debatable, and the argument may founder on it.42 But if either it or one of 
Kolodny’s parallel arguments to the same conclusion, which I have not enumerated here, are 
successful, then it is not the case that agents have a principled reason to conform to 
requirements of structural rationality. And this, as we will see, would narrow down the options 
for articulating an interesting and plausible form of voluntarism.  
It is worth pointing out that Kolodny’s conclusion that there is no general reason to be 
structurally rational does not by itself entail that it is in no way constitutive of agency that one 
conform to these requirements on each occasion (i.e., that once one meets a certain threshold, 
                                                          
40 Kolodny (2005: 553-4; 2008). Here too, Kolodny follows Raz, who speaks of the “proper functioning” of rational 
capacities where Kolodny uses the term “executive virtue”; cf. his (1999: 71-2; 2005a: 18-20; 2011: 89-94). 
41 Kolodny (2005: 543-4).  
42 The argument may be more secure if the skeptical conclusion were merely that it is not true that one ought (in the 
sense of having conclusive reason, or in some more qualified sense) to conform to the requirement in any arbitrary 
instance, rather than that there is no (pro tanto) reason to conform to it. But Kolodny sets himself the task of 
establishing the second, more ambitious skeptical conclusion. Whether he is entitled to that conclusion depends on 
a contended question about the extent to which reasons to accomplish a certain end transmit to disjunctively but not 
jointly necessary means to that end.  
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conforming to the requirement on further occasions makes one no more of an agent than not 
conforming). It may still be true, compatibly with Kolodny’s skeptical conclusion (though not 
with his just-mentioned argument towards it), that conforming to structural requirements on 
each occasion is partly constitutive of agency. If that were so, then a corollary of Kolodny’s 
conclusion would be Enoch’s thesis that there is no reason to be an agent in the relevant sense 
(for if there were, there would also be reason to conform to the constitutive requirements). The 
question to what extent Kolodny’s denial that there is reason to be structurally rational is 
compatible with modest constitutivist conclusions is a topic of Chapter 4 below.  
(ii) Secondly, besides featuring as explananda, structural requirements of rationality also 
form a crucial explanatory ingredient of some constitutivist theories, especially of those – the 
voluntarist ones – that anchor an agent’s rational situation in his volitional acts or attitudes. Here 
we must look beyond the “subjective” or “coherence” requirements targeted by Kolodny’s 
critique, and include what is generally known as the “instrumental principle”, which is a 
descendant of Kant’s “hypothetical imperative”: namely that one should or has reason to intend 
the necessary (non-futile, adequate – there is room for many refinements) means to one’s ends.  
The instrumental principle, so understood, is distinct from the putative requirement of means-
ends coherence whose existence Kolodny disputes. In contrast with the latter, the instrumental 
principle is not relativized to an agent’s beliefs about what particular actions are suitable for 
realizing her ends.43 Precisely for that reason it is a more likely candidate for a principle that 
                                                          
43 The instrumental principle is not always clearly enough distinguished from the requirement of means-ends 
coherence. For example, according to Wallace (2001: 14), the instrumental principle “enjoins us to take the means 
that are necessary relative to our ends.” With this formulation he takes himself to be following Kant as well as 
Korsgaard, who writes that the principle, as put forward by Kant, tells us that “if we will an end, then we ought to 
will the means to that end” (Korsgaard 1997: 234). It is therefore puzzling that Wallace in the course of his essay 
proceeds to offer, as an “account” of that very principle, a requirement of means-ends-coherence (relativized to 
instrumental beliefs). The puzzle might perhaps be made to disappear if we read Wallace as tacitly sliding from a 
formulation of the principle as it is supposed to guide first-personal deliberation to a formulation of a third-personal 
corollary that can be used to assess whether an agent is instrumentally rational. But it is not obvious why explaining 
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could legitimately figure in actual first-personal deliberation (rather than just in external 
assessments of an agent’s rationality). It is more plausible to think that a rationally well-
functioning agent would consider herself under a requirement to take, or to have reason to take, 
what are in fact effective means to her ends, than it is to think that she would consider herself 
under a requirement to act on her (perhaps false) beliefs about means-ends-relations.44 
Conversely, there seems to be widespread agreement that failing to conform to the instrumental 
principle need not be an instance of specifically structural or internal irrationality in the way that 
a failure of means-ends coherence is. Whereas failure to take what one believes to be the 
appropriate means to one’s end seems to be evidence of internal irrationality, many see no such 
irrationality in failing to intend what are in fact the relevant means to one’s ends when one 
(faultlessly, let us assume) does not believe that they are.45 This is why most who write about 
“instrumental irrationality” identify it as failure to take the believed or apparent means.46 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
the normativity of the latter would amount to explaining whatever plausibility there may be to the former, as 
Wallace seems to assume he does. To show that I am irrational in failing to bring my intentions in line with my 
ends and my means-ends beliefs is not to show what is wrong with not taking what are in fact the means to my 
ends, and thus what (if anything) goes wrong when a person violates the instrumental principle.  
Bedke (2009) is more explicit about distinguishing a structural requirement of means-ends-coherence from a more 
objective instrumental principle, which he characterizes in terms of “end-given reasons” and “end-given oughts.”  
44 The plausibility of thinking that rational agents will accept the instrumental principle may well derive, as 
Korsgaard (1997) and Raz (2005a) suggest, from the fact that an agent who has an end usually believes that end to 
be worthwhile pursuing; this allows us to suppose that what such an agent gets right is the insight that the value of 
the end, which makes it worthwhile pursuing, is at the same time a reason to do what furthers its realization. But the 
instrumental principle itself does not state that the end must be valuable. This is what distinguishes it from other 
proposed principles in the same vicinity such as “instrumental transmission” (Kolodny) or the “facilitative 
principle” (Raz). These principles seek to make explicit what I just suggested may be implicit in accepting the 
instrumental principle as a guide to first-personal deliberation: namely that the adoption of ends is responsive to, or 
guided by, what is in fact worthwhile or valuable. 
45 There is, however, a possible interpretation of the “objective” instrumental principle that makes it a requirement 
of structural or internal rationality after all: namely, when it is interpreted as requiring an agent to intend, abstractly, 
to take the means to his ends, but not as specifically requiring him to intend to ϕ (supposing that ϕ-ing is in fact the 
relevant means). So understood, an agent satisfies the requirement if he intends to ψ, under the description (which 
he believes true) that ψ-ing is a means to his end, even when in fact it is not. To make violation of that requirement 
an instance of structural rationality, no further relativization to means-ends-beliefs is needed.  
46 As I already mentioned, Korsgaard is an exception, although it may be that she identifies the irrationality in the 
failure to intend what one believes the instrumental principle requires one to do, not in the failure to intend what it 
in fact requires one to do. Another exception is Raz, who writes (2005a: 11) of common appearances, without 
endorsing them, that “it appears that just by failing to intend to pursue the means to her end [an agent] is behaving 
irrationally.” The context of his remark suggests that he has in mind cases where the means are obvious, and where 
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What is the explanatory role that subjective requirements of rationality and the instrumental 
principle play for voluntarism?47 The specific requirements of structural rationality that are 
relevant here are of course those whose antecedents (when they are expressed in conditional 
form) contain reference to volitional acts or attitudes: to an intention or policy, an endorsement 
of a principle or identity, an attitude of caring, and so on.48 Central instances are putative 
requirements of means-ends-coherence, intention consistency, and intention stability; and the 
instrumental principle can be restated or adapted in ways that emphasize its appeal for 
voluntarist theories, by replacing the term “end” by others such as “intention” or “goal.”  
To understand the role that such requirements are made to play in the context of a voluntarist 
theory, it is useful to think about a similar role played by the notion of a “sound deliberative 
route” in an important and well-known predecessor of voluntarist views, generally known 
(unhelpfully) as “internalism.” I am thinking of Bernard Williams’ thesis that statements about 
an agent’s reasons have a “distinctive meaning” only when they are construed in an “internal” 
sense that ties an agent’s reasons to antecedent motivational states of that agent, via a “sound 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
therefore the relevant belief on the part of the agent can be taken for granted. If we set this assumption aside, it 
seems his observation should be read as being concerned with a sense of “irrational” that, if it is “internal” or 
“structural” at all, is so in a weaker sense than the one intended by those who speak of irrationality as a failure to 
conform to “subjective” or “coherence” requirements. I attempt to say more in Chapter 4 about what such a weaker 
sense of internal irrationality might amount to. 
47 The instrumental requirement is in fact also among explananda of constitutivism: Korsgaard (1997, 2009) argues 
that it is constitutive of being an agent that one accept the instrumental principle. So far as I can tell, Kolodny’s 
critique of the requirement of means-ends-coherence does nothing to cast doubt on this claim.  
48 Moreover, it may need to be the case that the relevant requirements have „narrow scope“ (i.e., that they require a 
specific attitude given the prior presence of certain other attitudes); or that, if they have wide scope (i.e., if they 
range over conditionals or over disjunctions of attitudes), there is only one way of satisfying them because the other 
logically eligible ways are unavailable in practice. For cases of the latter sort, see the discussion of examples of 
“unalterable ends” in Bratman, Setiya, and Brunero. There is disagreement as to whether wide-scope requirements 
that an agent can satisfy in different ways generate reasons, for each of those different ways, to pursue it; i.e. 
whether from the fact that S has reason to (ϕ or ψ) it follows that there is both a reason for S to ϕ and a reason for 
S to ψ, even if there may be good reasons not to (ϕ and ψ). I am not taking a view on this question here. Those who 
doubt that reasons to make a disjunction true entail reasons, for each of the disjuncts, to make it true should 
therefore read my discussion as limited to narrow-scope requirements.  
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deliberative route”.49 Williams-style internalism relies on the idea of sound deliberation to 
ensure that reasons, though ultimately motivation-dependent, are nevertheless sufficiently 
independent from an agent’s present motivations to be able to play a genuinely normative (that 
is, guiding and critical) role. The notion of sound deliberation is meant to ensure that the 
dependence of reasons on motivational states is of a suitably indirect sort.50 Similarly, in the 
context of voluntarist theories, requirements of rationality account for the possibility of distance, 
or a lack of fit, between an agent’s relevant volitional states and his reasons. This is important 
especially when, as in the context of many constitutivist theories, the reason-generating 
volitional states are ones effective motivation by which is said to be what intentional action 
itself consists in. If what an agent has reason to do were identical with what the relevant 
volitions motivate him to do, it would be mysterious how an agent could ever fail to conform to 
reasons. But unless a failure to act for reasons were at least conceptually possible, reasons 
would lack the normative dimension that is essential to them; acting and acting for good reason 
would become indistinguishable. Requirements of structural rationality serve to forestall this 
                                                          
49 This thesis is introduced, defended, and subsequently explained and refined in a series of essays extending from 
Williams (1981) to Williams (2006).  
50 In order for internalism to have bite as a theory of what reasons there are for a person (relative to her desires), the 
concept of a “sound deliberative route” would need to be amenable to being spelled out in an informative way. The 
idea of sound deliberation is introduced by Williams as a more or less intuitive condition, but it draws on familiar 
more specific ideas about what constitutes rationality in deliberation, in particular on the broadly Humean idea that 
rational deliberation is centrally concerned with identifying and specifying adequate means to the realization of 
one’s existing “motivations”. Attempts to establish the content of structural requirements of rationality can be 
interpreted as trying to offer a more detailed account of this and other elements of “sound deliberation.”  
Williams himself, however, came to express skepticism about the possibility of spelling out the concept of a sound 
deliberative route in terms of a list of rational requirements in his essay “Values, Reasons, and the Theory of 
Persuasion” (2006: 109-118). This suggests that contrary to prevailing interpretations of his internalism as a type of 
Humean metaethical theory, he either did not intend internalism to serve as an informative theory of a person’s 
reasons at all, or he thought of it as amounting to such a theory only when supplemented by a decidedly non-
formal, dynamic conception of what “sound deliberation” consists in. A sketch of such a conception is offered in 
the essay just mentioned; it turns on the contrast between “coercion” and “persuasion” in attempts to influence 
others’ actions. The way in which Williams revisited and revised the idea of “internal reasons” in this late essay is 
suited to confirm the impression, for which there is also other evidence, that that idea may all along have been 
animated by a concern with certain aspects of interpersonal relationships more than by a concern with the 
metaphysics or epistemology of reasons.  
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trivialization of reasons by prying apart reasons and (motivationally effective) willing, which 
voluntarism would otherwise threaten to collapse.51  
Suppose, for example, that all of an agent’s reasons or subjective reasons derive, in the last 
resort, from ends or goals that she has adopted or to which she is committed (where “adoption” 
and “commitment” refer to volitional acts or attitudes). Some version of the instrumental 
principle may then explain why there are reasons for her to do the various more specific things 
that are conducive to realizing her goal, whether or not she is motivated to do so (i.e., whether or 
not she has reason-generating volitional attitudes towards those particular actions), and whether 
or not she believes that she has reason to do so. Similarly, a requirement of “means-ends-
coherence”, which says that an agent should do what she believes is conducive to realizing her 
goals or intentions, could explain why she is rationally required to perform certain actions even 
though they are not directly the objects of her willing. Or suppose an agent’s reasons or 
subjective reasons derive from an agent’s will in a somewhat different way (I will say more 
below about why it is interestingly different): suppose her reasons are those that an endorsed 
“practical identity” or a “self-governing policy” specifies the agent has or must rationally take 
herself to have. Structural requirements of diachronic stability, if there are such, may then 
specify that an agent has those reasons or subjective reasons even if, in violation of those 
requirements, she abandons her endorsement of the identity or policy and fails to be guided in 
the ways specified by it.52 Thus requirements of these kinds could meet the challenge of 
explaining how the volitional attitudes that are operative in action can be subject to guidance 
                                                          
51 This line of thought would need to be elaborated in much more detail if it were supposed to show that 
voluntarism strictly needs to postulate rational requirements. There may well be ways of dispelling the concern just 
highlighted other than by recourse to rational requirements: for example by insisting that the volitional attitudes that 
are relevant for determining an agent’s reasons need not coincide with those that (according to constitutivism) 
explain the actions that are properly, actively done by her. But my purpose here is merely to gesture at a problem 
that makes it at least attractive for voluntarism to be able to avail itself of the notion of a rational requirement. 
52 The claim that there are rational requirements of diachronic stability for self-governing policies has been 
defended by Michael Bratman in numerous writings; cf. especially Bratman (2008). 
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and assessment by normative reasons, even while all of an agent’s reasons are dependent on her 
will.  
Rational requirements in their capacity as explanantia are subject to the same skeptical claim 
I introduced above with respect to their role as explananda. If there is no reason to conform to 
them, then they cannot give rise to reasons to do what one’s volitional states rationally require 
of one. While Kolodny’s critique does not target the instrumental principle, most recent 
philosophers have taken a similarly skeptical view concerning reasons to conform to it. The 
literature on this topic is large and I cannot hope to do justice to it here. I would like, however, 
to point to one consideration that unifies much of this literature by serving as a desideratum that 
any plausible account of the instrumental requirement should meet: namely that it should not 
make it possible (no more than other rational requirements should make it possible) for persons 
to create certain kinds of reasons by fiat. Especially, it should not allow the creation of reasons 
in favor of having the very attitude – for example, an intention – that is supposed to bring them 
into existence, nor reasons to do what subserves or constitutes the goal specified by such an 
attitude.53 Allowing this possibility is alleged to have strongly counter-intuitive implications at 
the level of cases. This is known (following Bratman 1981) as the “bootstrapping” objection, 
and it has come to function as a widely – and sometimes perhaps too readily – acknowledged 
constraint on theories of practical reason. It is partly the aim of excluding the possibility of 
bootstrapping that has led many philosophers to abandon the idea that a person’s ends or 
intentions, as such, create reasons to pursue the means, and to account instead in other ways for 
                                                          
53 This is a rough and probably not complete or exhaustive characterization of the notion of objectionable 
bootstrapping for practical reasons. For epistemic reasons, a different formulation would be needed. The 
bootstrapping objection should not be construed as an objection to the possibility of creating reasons by fiat quite 
generally, since it is eminently plausible that this happens all the time – assuming that any fact can potentially 
constitute a normative reason (for example for a belief, action, emotion, or other attitude), and that whatever is 
thought to constitute the relevant fiat is granted to constitute a change in what the world is like. Thus for a plausible 




the appearances on which that idea relies: either by claiming that the principle, properly 
understood, gives agents reasons to take the means to those ends that are valuable or that they 
have reason to pursue, or by retreating to the claim that agents who fail to intend what they 
believe to be the means to their ends are irrational in a structural or internal sense only. The first 
of these two revisionary accounts of the principle is no comfort to voluntarism, at least when 
voluntarism is understood as a doctrine that accounts for the existence of all practical reasons, or 
of normativity as such54; the second is subject to the skepticism concerning the normativity or 
even the very existence of requirements of structural rationality that I just discussed.   
If the existing objections to the validity of the instrumental principle and to the normativity of 
the various requirements of structural rationality are sound, then certain routes for voluntarism 
are closed off. But how much damage is inflicted by the objections depends on what exactly it is 
that these requirements are supposed to deliver in the context of a given voluntarist theory.  
It seems clear that structural requirements can explain the dependence of objective reasons on 
volitional states only when there is reason to comply with the requirements themselves; when 
there is no such reason, they cannot. The skeptical conclusion that there is no general reason to 
comply with such requirements (henceforth, “the skeptical conclusion”) leaves untouched the 
possibility that one is structurally irrational in not complying with them (though the skeptical 
conclusion entails that if it is structurally irrational not to comply with them, then either 
complying with them on all occasions is not constitutive of agency or there is no reason to be an 
agent, as such); and it also leaves open the possibility that there may be circumstantial reasons 
to comply with them (that is, reasons to avoid structural irrationality in this or that particular 
                                                          
54 And also when it is understood as a doctrine that accounts for the existence of a normatively self-sufficient subset 
of an agent’s reasons; this version of voluntarism is discussed in Chapter 3 below.  
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case). But it lessens the prospects for a successful voluntarist theory that regards structural 
requirements as being operative in the explanation of all reasons.55  
The skeptical conclusion does not entail that structural requirements cannot serve more 
modest purposes in the context of less ambitious voluntarist theories: ones that are either local 
(rather than global) or that abstain from making claims about objective reasons. I will have more 
to say about both of these in Chapters 3 and 4 below. For example, voluntarism may rest with 
the claim that there are distinctive, non-trivial ways in which volitional attitudes explain the 
existence of reasons, though they do not explain the existence of all reasons; or voluntarism may 
rest with the thesis that an agent is rationally required to intend (i.e., would be irrational unless 
she intended) what she believes conduces to her ends, or – in the case of “policies” and 
“practical identities”, but perhaps also in the case of intentions more generally – that she is 
rationally required to take herself to have the reasons that these volitional states say she should 
take herself to have. Thus skepticism about the normativity of rational requirements is 
compatible with meta-ethically and normatively abstinent versions of voluntarism, ones that 
merely assign the will either a local though distinctive role in the creation of reasons, or a role in 
determining what an agent may rationally do or intend, or a role in determining what I called an 
agent’s “subjective reasons.” It is also compatible with more ambitious kinds of voluntarism to 
the extent that they build on abstinent voluntarism in one of the two ways (stipulative and 
dialectical) in which I above described ambitious versions of constitutivism building on 
abstinent versions of constitutivism. 
                                                          
55 Contrast this with the even more skeptical conclusion – call it the debunking conclusion – that various alleged 
requirements are not in fact requirements even of structural rationality; this is the conclusion that Raz draws with 
regard to the instrumental requirement, and Kolodny with regard to “coherence requirements” more generally. The 
debunking conclusion could come packaged in the more sweeping view that rationality is not usefully thought of as 
a source of structural requirements at all. Kolodny’s positive view of structural rationality – the “Transparency 
Account” –, which makes structural rationality entirely a matter of conforming to what one believes to be reasons 





To summarize: the prominent recent critiques of constitutivism I presented do not rule out 
either constitutivism or voluntarism per se. They merely limit, if they succeed, what can be 
accomplished by way of constitutivist arguments; and they also limit the extent to which 
voluntarism might hope to benefit from being embedded in a constitutivist theory. What the 
critiques leave altogether untouched is the thought that there are specific forms of agency that 
are characterized by the presence of reflexive higher-order volitions or beliefs, and that agents 
constituted in this way stand under specific rational requirements in virtue of being so 
constituted. In the following chapter, I turn to a theory that takes such a specific form of agency 
to be the paradigm case of human agency, though I fault the theory with not sufficiently 
distinguishing between self-awareness and volitional reflexivity and therefore overlooking what 
is needed to properly understand the latter in the specific form on which the theory relies. In 
Chapter 3, I try to show how the specifically reflexive volitional structure that characterizes a 
certain kind of agency may help explain the possibility of voluntarism other than by anchoring 






Chapter 2: Korsgaard’s Voluntarism 
 
1. Introduction 
My goal in this chapter is to examine in detail a sophisticated, though – as I will argue – 
importantly flawed attempt to establish the explanatory priority of the will vis-à-vis the 
existence of normative truths. On this view both the reflexive constitution of the will and 
specific exercises of choice explain, but not in ways that are themselves explained by, the 
existence of normative reasons for action. Considerations are reasons for agents only thanks to 
certain truths about those agents – truths about the form and content of their will –, which can 
themselves be described without reference to normative reasons56.  
Korsgaard’s theory of agency and practical reason is sufficiently rich and complex to be 
worth trying to reconstruct in its own right. My primary goal, however, will be to argue that one 
of its central claims – a claim about the “source” of normativity – cannot be maintained. Beyond 
that, the purpose of this chapter is not merely critical but also constructive. In criticizing 
Korsgaard’s theory, I hope to bring out what can appear philosophically appealing about it. If 
her theory turns out to fail to deliver on its promises, this does not mean that it is not motivated 
by legitimate and interesting concerns. I argue that Korsgaard’s theory is merely one instance of 
the more general family of views that I have been calling “voluntarist”. Even if Korsgaard’s 
version of voluntarism cannot be maintained, other articulations of it are possible which may 
stand better chances of being defensible. To find out to what extent this is the case is the task of 
Chapter 3.  
                                                          
56 Though not necessarily without reference to beliefs about reasons.  
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A subsidiary goal is to clarify the relation, within Korsgaard’s theory, between her 
voluntarism – the attribution of a normatively non-derivative reason-creating role to acts of 
choice or the will – and her claim that normativity has its “source” in a certain property of the 
human will, which she calls its “reflectiveness”. What is it, on her view, that explains 
normativity: is it the reflective structure of the will, or rather the specific volitional acts and 
attitudes that Korsgaard subsumes under the label “endorsement”? As it turns out, the answer is 
“both”. To explain how, it will be necessary to look more closely at both concepts – the concept 
of endorsement and the concept of reflectiveness – as they are understood by her.  
In The Sources of Normativity (Korsgaard 1996b) and subsequent writings, Korsgaard 
describes her theoretical aim as that of explaining how persons can stand under obligations, and 
more generally, how normative propositions can be true of them – for example, propositions 
about what they should do, ought to do, or have reason to do. This is a meta-ethical project, and 
its centerpiece is a complex argument intended to identify what Korsgaard calls the “source” of 
normativity. In the space of one chapter, it is not possible to reconstruct her argument in all its 
details. Instead, I focus on those aspects of it that seem to me salient with respect to evaluating 
the prospects for voluntarism – proximally, Korsgaard’s elaboration of it, and more generally, 
other possible versions.  
One way of stating the basic question that Korsgaard aims to answer is by asking what 
makes it the case, at the most general level, that a person has reasons to do anything in particular 
– that is to say, by asking in virtue of what it can ever be true that she has pro tanto, or 
sufficient, or even conclusive reason to do X. This could be understood as a question about the 
meaning of basic normative concepts such as “a reason for action”. There are passages that 
suggest that such conceptual explanation is what Korsgaard is looking for. But elsewhere, she 
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seems to take the notion of a reason for granted, and to be asking instead how agents come to 
have them. More specifically, her question there is what can make it the case – or in virtue of 
what it can be the case – that p is a reason for S to do X, q is a reason for S to do Y, and so on.57 
Roughly speaking, whatever is necessarily cited in each and every complete answer to questions 
of this kind, if it is not itself a normative truth, will thereby have been identified as a “source” of 
normativity.58 I understand Korsgaard’s answer to the normative question to consist in the 
identification of a hierarchy of such (purported) sources, from more proximate and derivative to 
more fundamental. This hierarchy can be summarized in four theses which I will call (i) 
generalism, (ii) voluntarism, (iii) constitutivism, and (iv) reflectiveness. I address the first three 
of these theses in sections (2.) through (5.) below, and the fourth in sections (6.) and (7.).   
 
                                                          
57 Korsgaard most prominently characterizes “the normative question” as the question, “How can anything be a 
normative reason for action?” In other words, how can we account for the “normative force” of normative 
considerations, for the “authority” of purported reasons? How can it ever be the case that there is something that 
one “should” or “ought to” do? However, Korsgaard’s answer to this question is at the same time meant to be the 
answer to another, related question – the question of what determines, at the most general level, which particular 
considerations count as reasons for which types of actions, or (in simpler terms) what reasons there are for agents. 
Korsgaard’s image of a “source of normativity” tends to blur the distinction between this latter question and the 
former, and it may indeed be that she herself does not consider them to be two distinct questions: To ask what 
determines what I have reason to do just is to ask what makes any considerations normative for me – and vice 
versa. For the time being, I will remain agnostic about whether there are ways of understanding the first and the 
second questions as distinct. 
There is a certain parallel here with a debate prompted by Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law: to what extent do 
answers to the question “What is law?” constrain answers to the question “What is the law?”, and vice versa? 
Dworkin argues for a strong continuity between the two questions, and thus against a strict separability between 
legal questions of the law’s content, on the one hand, and the conceptual question of what law is, on the other. I am 
not certain where Korsgaard stands on the analogous issue concerning the relation between the conceptual question 
“What is a reason?” (“What sort of thing is a reason?”) and the existential question “What reasons are there?” 
(“What things are reasons?”) – that is to say, the relation between metaethics and normative ethics.  
58 Some writers have suggested that there is nothing intelligible that Korsgaard’s “normative question” could 
consist in. For example, David Enoch writes: “I think that the skeptical challenge as Korsgaard seems to understand 
it – roughly, the challenge that comes down to “What reason do I have to do what I have reason to do?” – is 
confused and not a genuine challenge at all” (Enoch 2006: 193). I am unsure whether to agree with Enoch or 
whether to believe that a more charitable reading of the question is available, along the lines of a quite ordinary 
request for reflective justification of normative assertions. Short of dismissing the question altogether, it may be 
that it is simply unhelpful to formulate it as a request for “the source” of normativity. This is because it may turn 
out that the question can be answered, or perhaps so much as understood, only when construed “locally”, not when 




2. Generalism  
Proximally, in Korsgaard’s view, that in virtue of which p is a reason for S to do X is 
some true proposition which states that considerations of type p speak in favor of actions of type 
X on the part of S. The truth of statements about the existence of particular reasons for action is 
explained by reference to the truth of such more general propositions, which Korsgaard calls 
“principles.” As Korsgaard sees it, “we use rational principles to pick out the substantive 
reasons.”59 I will call this thesis Korsgaard’s generalism. Generalism is one step in the project of 
identifying the source of normativity, since the existence of all reasons for action is explained by 
reference to “principles.” But generalism does not yet identify the “source” of normativity, since 
the reason-providing role of principles still rests on an essentially normative or ought-involving 
feature of principles, namely their validity or authority.60  
Generalism, so understood, can be analyzed into two distinct theses. The first consists in 
Korsgaard’s rather demanding conception of action itself. Korsgaard distinguishes between 
“actions” and “acts”. In her terminology, whereas an act is an event-type that an agent chooses 
to bring about, an action is a pair consisting of an act, so understood, and some consideration for 
which, or in the light of which, the agent performs it. In Kantian language, we can say that the 
description of a whole action is a “maxim”, which states that an act is undertaken for a certain 
reason, or for a certain end, or in response to a certain value. Korsgaard thus assumes that simply 
by acting, agents “choose maxims”: they choose not merely to ϕ, but to make certain ends, 
                                                          
59 Korsgaard (2009a: 32). Strictly speaking this formulation suggests a merely epistemological form of generalism. 
However, the context and other passages strongly suggest that on Korsgaard’s view principles are not just 
epistemologically but metaphysically and normatively prior to “substantive reasons.”  
60 Of course, many would argue that a proper analysis of the notions of validity or authority leads back to the notion 
of a normative reason. If they are right, Korsgaard’s argument may already be facing trouble at this point. Although 
I suspect that this is in fact how things stand, I will pass over this point for the purposes of reconstructing her 
argument. For the purposes of this discussion, I will be adopting Korsgaard’s own usage of the terms “authority” 




values, or reasons the “grounds” of their ϕ-ing.61 Not to act on any particular grounds, and thus 
not to choose a maxim, on Korsgaard’s view, is to fail to perform any action at all. The second 
and more distinctive element of Korsgaard’s generalism is the thesis that by choosing maxims, 
agents necessarily “endorse” corresponding general principles. An agent who chooses to ϕ for 
the reason that p thereby affirms the validity of a practical principle to the effect that 
considerations of type p count in favor of ϕ-ing. To act, in the demanding sense, is thereby to 
acknowledge certain general principles as normative or reason-providing.62  
This relatively innocuous construal of Korsgaard’s generalism still fails to capture an 
important further aspect that is quite central to her larger thesis about the “source” of 
normativity. That aspect is the normative or explanatory priority of principles vis-à-vis the 
reasons they identify. Asserting that to act (as one sees it) for reasons is thereby to endorse 
certain general normative truths is a far cry from saying that those general normative truths in 
some sense explain the existence of the reasons in question. Korsgaard’s generalism, however, 
needs to make this further explanatory claim in order to play its designated role in her “sources” 
account, in which reasons in some sense derive from principles. It thereby takes a crucial step 
beyond the bare thesis that intentional action is action for reasons, coupled with some version of 
a thesis about the generalizability of reasons statements, and it therefore cannot claim the degree 
of plausibility that it would have if it were exhausted by those two theses.  
There may be a way of understanding the role of principles in Korsgaard’s theory that 
does not commit her to assigning them explanatory priority. Perhaps her claim merely amounts 
to the following: not only is it the case that to take certain considerations as reasons for action 
(by choosing a maxim) is to endorse some corresponding general truths – and in that rather 
                                                          
61 Korsgaard (2009b); “Acting for a Reason” (collected in Korsgaard 2008). 
62 Generality, in this sense, does not preclude the possibility that a given principle may be highly specific; perhaps 
only one act or situation will ever fall under it.  
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weak sense, “principles” –, but conversely, to endorse some principle is also to commit oneself 
to recognizing the considerations specified by it as reasons. Perhaps there need not be any 
further claim that the reasons “derive from” or “arise from” the validity of the principles (even 
though Korsgaard, perhaps incautiously, uses formulations of this sort). Rather, generalism 
might be exhausted by the thesis that affirming the existence of the reasons (simply through 
intentional action) and affirming the validity of the principles are one and the same thing.  
On this reading, principles would not, after all, be the “sources” of reasons. Generalism 
would then merely amount to the claim that to affirm principle P is to believe there to be the 
reasons that are entailed by its validity, and vice versa. It remains to be seen whether this weaker 
interpretation of generalism is sufficient for the purposes of Korsgaard’s account of the 
“sources” of normativity.  
 
3. Voluntarism 
Generalism states that an agent affirms or accepts the validity of a practical principle 
simply by performing an action under a complex description, or maxim, that relies on that 
principle. But this does not yet tell us what it is in virtue of which a practical principle is in fact 
valid, and thus reason-providing (or, on the weaker interpretation of generalism, reason-
entailing), for some agent S.  
In answer to this question, Korsgaard refers to a specific type of attitude or (mental) act on 
the part of the agent in question. A principle is valid for an agent, and thus gives rise to reasons 
for her (or, on the weaker reading of generalism, commits her to certain particular normative 
judgments), just in case the agent “endorses” that principle. The following is a characteristic 
statement of her view: “We need to endorse some of the potential grounds of our beliefs and 
49 
 
actions, and when we do that, we get substantive reasons.”63 Depending on what exactly we 
understand endorsement to consist in, we may think of it either as a type of attitude (or, more 
likely, a class of attitudes) – as suggested by Korsgaard’s talk of “identification” and “practical 
identities” –, or as a type of act (or a class of acts) – which may be the more natural reading, if 
there should be any such, of the term “endorsement” itself.64 In either case, we will eventually 
want to hear more about what distinguishes the attitudes or acts in question.65 But what we can 
say right away is that in either case, endorsement consists in some modification of an agent’s 
will.66 It is in some sense constituted by an agent’s choosing, or being disposed to choose, in a 
way that can be interpreted as willing the principle in question to be binding on her – whether or 
not that principle itself is the direct object of the volitional act or attitude.67 I will call this 
Korsgaard’s voluntarism. 
                                                          
63 Korsgaard, “The Activity of Reason”, p. 32. Cf. also (2009b: 197): “Every reason arises from an endorsement of 
a proposal presented by an incentive.” Negatively stated, “unless there are some principles with which we identify 
we will have no reason to act” (2009b: 23-4). In other words, there are no will-independent reasons.  
64 Unless stated otherwise, I will speak of an agent’s endorsement of practical principles and of practical identities 
interchangeably. It is important to remember, however, that they are not obviously the same. For example, practical 
identities are usually relativized to persons or groups of persons, whereas practical principles need not be. It seems 
plausible that in endorsing a practical identity, I affirm the existence of the corresponding reasons only for those 
individuals who endorse the same identity, whereas in endorsing a practical principle, I may be affirming the 
existence of the corresponding reasons for all persons, not only for those who also affirm the principle in question. 
But it could also be that the two issues are orthogonal: some practical identities may encapsulate principles that 
claim to be valid for all persons, while some practical principles may postulate the existence of reasons only for 
those who affirm the principle, or who meet some other person-relative criteria.  
65 I will survey some of the possibilities later, in my general discussion of voluntarism. The simplest explanation 
would be to revert here to Korsgaard’s generalism: agents endorse principles simply by choosing maxims, which is 
to say (on Korsgaard’s understanding of action), by choosing actions, which is to say (again, on Korsgaard’s 
understanding of action), by acting. For example, “Introduction”, in: CA, p.1: “we… constitute ourselves as agents, 
by choosing our actions in accordance with the principles of practical reason.” This would of course lead to worries 
of circularity in Korsgaard’s account, given that what counts as agency, and thus as an agent’s choice, is meant to 
be explained by reference to the endorsement of principles. (There is also a looming regress in the idea that all 
actions are chosen; at least, it would seem that some of the relevant “choices” cannot themselves be actions.) For 
now, I will continue to refer to “endorsement”, and treat that notion as a black box.  
66 Notice that this “modification” need not be thought of as brought about by the agent herself – in fact, it probably 
should not, given the worries about circularity raised in the previous footnote. Correspondingly, “will” is here to be 
understood in a thin sense, as a term for an agent’s motivational capacity, without any implications of self-
determination.  
67 This formulation is meant to signal that it should not be required that relatively sophisticated concepts like 
“validity”, “endorsement”, or “principles”, be part of the content of the relevant attitude. What should be required 
for some attitude to play the role of endorsement is merely that the attitude be interpretable in that way. Otherwise, 
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Voluntarism, in the form in which we encounter it here, makes the validity of a principle 
for an agent dependent on acts or dispositions of that agent’s will.68 It is more or less clear how 
this translates into a thesis about the “source” of an agent’s reasons on the stronger (but more 
contentious) interpretation of generalism above, according to which reasons derive from 
principles. By contrast, it seems that in combination with the weaker reading of generalism – 
according to which the principles accepted by an agent merely state what reasons an agent 
believes she has –voluntarism merely translates into a thesis about the source of an agent’s 
belief or confidence regarding her reasons. To endorse a principle, on this reading, is to have an 
attitude that entails that one believes there to be the reasons encapsulated in it, and that may 
even be necessary for one’s believing so. But this does not show that a person’s will is in any 
sense the source of the reasons in question; all it entails is that her will (her volitional relation to 
the principle in question) is a sufficient and necessary condition of her having the conviction 
that she has those reasons.  
Setting aside for the moment the issue of deciding between the stronger and the weaker 
reading of generalism, and thus between attributing a normative and a merely psychological role 
to the attitude of endorsement, are there any constraints – normative or psychological – on what 
principles agents may endorse? Are agents free to endorse any practical principles whatsoever, 
or none at all?  
The answer is that there are certain constraints, but that they are not happily interpreted as 
being either of a normative or of a psychological sort. They are constraints that derive from 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
attitudes of endorsement would simply be too rare for Korsgaard’s view to have any hope of saving the phenomena; 
indeed, her view may otherwise end up requiring that agents explicitly subscribe to voluntarism if they are to have 
any reasons for action. This should be enough to rule out any sort of de dicto construal of the content of attitudes of 
endorsement.  
68 So do other views that I do not mean to identify as voluntarist – for example, “existence internalism” about 
reasons. I plan to say more about what distinguishes voluntarism from such related views.  
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what, according to Korsgaard, it is to be an agent at all. Specifically, there are at least two 
fundamental practical principles that agents (qua agents) are not free not to endorse, which 
Korsgaard calls – following Kant – the categorical and the hypothetical imperative.69 In this, 
they are unlike the more particular and contingent reason-providing principles that are at issue in 
practical identities. But, importantly, this does not make them exceptions to voluntarism, i.e., to 
the thesis that their normative force derives from their being willed or endorsed by agents. An 
agent has reason to do whatever is required by these as by other principles only insofar as and 
because she wills the principle to be valid. What distinguishes the two Kantian imperatives from 
other practical principles is that (according to Korsgaard) they cannot be willed or endorsed at 
will; it is not open to agents to withhold their endorsement from them. They constitute, to 
borrow an expression from Harry Frankfurt, “volitional necessities” of agents as such. It is still 
true that if an individual were not to endorse them, then they would not generate reasons for 
him, though in that case the individual in question would not be an agent.  
Korsgaard is committed to this pervasive voluntarism about reasons since she offers her 
account of the source of normativity not simply as a substantive normative theory of what 
reasons there are, but as a meta-ethical theory (a theory about what it is for reasons to exist) that 
is explicitly directed against what she calls “realist” conceptions of practical normativity.70 
Barring the existence of allegedly mysterious will-independent normative facts, she claims, 
there is nothing for the normativity of a principle, including the two Kantian imperatives, to 
consist in but its being willed or endorsed by an agent (though any principle’s being endorsed by 
an agent guarantees that the two fundamental principles are also endorsed by that same agent).  
                                                          
69 In addition to the categorical and hypothetical imperatives, there is a more demanding corollary of the categorical 
imperative, which Korsgaard calls the “moral law”. For the purposes of my discussion, I will disregard this aspect 
of her theory.  
70 See especially her (2003).   
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Besides the alleged volitional inescapability of at least two principles, are there any 
positive limits to voluntarism? Are there any principles that are excluded from being endowed 
with normative force for an agent simply by being endorsed by her? Korsgaard is not quite clear 
on this point. What is required, of course, is that the principles in question possess a certain 
degree of generality (although Korsgaard does not say how much: she explicitly does not 
demand that they should not be relativized to agents, nor does she require that other individual 
terms – e.g., referring to particular objects, places, or times – may not feature in them). But that 
is just to restate the fact that they must be principles.  
This creates an obvious worry. If there are no limits to what normative principles can be 
endorsed, then it seems that rather than explaining the possibility of normative reasons, 
voluntarism makes it impossible for them to exist at all. How so? Recall that according to 
generalism, agents choose maxims simply by acting (given Korsgaard’s demanding sense of 
“action”) and that they endorse general principles simply by choosing maxims. If we add to this 
the voluntarist thesis that agents have specific reasons simply in virtue of endorsing principles 
whose validity entails the existence of those reasons, it follows that agents can never fail to 
perform actions (in Korsgaard’s sense) for good reasons.71 Doing X and having some reason to 
do X have been short-circuited in a way that deprives the notion of a normative reason of one of 
its points, namely, to allow assessments of actions as in conformity with reasons to a greater or 
lesser extent, and to allow criticism and guidance of actions based on an assessment of the 
extent to which they conform or fail to conform to reasons. 
The most promising remedy (since it would allow Korsgaard’s voluntarism to remain 
intact) would seem to consist in laying down more demanding criteria for ascribing endorsement 
                                                          
71 This is an especially strong instance of what has come to be known, following Michael Bratman, as the 
“bootstrapping” worry (cf. Chapter 1). The force of that worry seems to me to be often overestimated, but in 
extreme instances like the one discussed here, it has the force of a prima facie objection.   
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to an agent. Korsgaard needs to avoid a view on which agents create the reasons justifying their 
actions simply by acting.  
One way of doing this would be by pulling apart the notion of action and the notion of 
acting on a maxim, which Korsgaard has terminologically yoked together by distinguishing 
“actions” from “mere acts”. But things do not look much better even when we grant that 
“actions”, in a special maxim-implying sense, are just a subset of actions in the ordinary sense. 
We would still end up with the objectionable result that actions (now understood in a narrow 
terminological sense) never fail to supply their own reasons. 
Short of being forced to restrict voluntarism after all, we might then instead try to achieve 
the required “distance” between actions and normative reasons at the next level of Korsgaard’s 
generalist view: by denying that acting on a maxim always entails endorsement of a general 
principle corresponding to the maxim in question. This, of course, brings us back to the task of 
articulating a suitable notion of endorsement of a principle. We now have a sense of at least one 
desideratum of such a notion: it should not be trivially satisfied by (or, as we might say, 
revealed in) an agent’s acting on a specific maxim.  
Finally, we might decide (still on Korsgaard’s behalf) to adopt a permissive conception of 
endorsement after all, and to locate the problem in the unrestricted construal of the voluntarist 
thesis instead. But it is not clear where a suitable restriction could be found. At first glance, the 
most salient option could appear to consist in the stipulation that endorsed principles give rise to 
reasons only when they are compatible with the two fundamental norms that agents are not free 
not to endorse (the categorical imperative and the instrumental principle). But even setting aside 
a long tradition of charging Kant’s categorical imperative with “empty formalism” and denying 
that it rules out nearly as much as should be in the business of doing, Korsgaard’s own gloss on 
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it makes it clear that she does not expect it to rule out any practical principles at all.72 This is 
because what the categorical imperative instructs agents to do, according to her, just is to act in 
accordance with principles, and nothing more.73 Moreover, in at least one discussion of a 
concrete example, Korsgaard explains that she accepts the content-neutrality of voluntarism: a 
Mafioso’s endorsement of a certain code of behavior, she writes, creates pro tanto reasons for 
him to act in the ways required by that code.74 I conclude that in order to properly understand 
Korsgaard’s voluntarist view, we would need to hear more about the nature of endorsement than 
she offers.  
 
4. Constitutivism  
So far I have identified two “sources” of normativity or reasons, as they emerge from 
Korsgaard’s discussion: valid practical principles, and – more fundamentally – an agent’s 
endorsement of those principles (whether this “endorsement” is constituted by acts or by 
attitudes, or both, and whether or not those acts or attitudes have to be explicitly about the 
relevant principles). The latter source is more fundamental since it confers normativity on the 
                                                          
72 Not so for the “moral law”, which Korsgaard distinguishes from the categorical imperative. I announced earlier 
that I would set aside the question of whether the moral law is similarly binding. 
73 This instruction can be understood in different ways. On a minimalist reading, in the bare terms in which I have 
just stated it, it looks as though the instruction will be trivially met: for any action whatsoever, we can formulate a 
principle with which it is in accordance. Due to her normative anti-realism and her replacement of it by voluntarist 
criteria of normative validity, it is not open to Korsgaard at this point to explain that what the requirement really 
says is that one should act in accordance with valid principles. One thing she might say instead, so as to render the 
requirement non-trivial, is that it requires one to act in accordance with principles that one endorses. But in order 
for this requirement not to be trivially met, there would of course need to be sufficient conceptual space between 
action (in the full-blown, maxim-implying sense) and the endorsement of a fitting principle, which would rule out 
the very option I am currently considering (i.e., the option of granting a permissive construal of the notion of 
endorsement). Alternatively, the requirement could be interpreted in a diachronic way: as instructing agents to 
choose only such actions that are in conformity with principles that they have endorsed (perhaps simply by acting) 
at some point in the past. What makes this construal unattractive is that it would amount to privileging, for no 
apparent reason, some of an agent’s actions (as “laying down her principles”) over others, and to render changes of 
mind ipso facto irrational. But this consequence could perhaps be softened by further refinements.  
74 “I want to say of the Mafioso what I said of the Knight . . . who felt himself to be obligated to fight a duel. There 
is a sense in which these obligations are real— not just psychologically but normatively. And this is because it is 
the endorsement, not the explanations and arguments that provide the material for the endorsement, that does 
normative work.” (1996b: 257). 
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former. But what explains why it is able to do so? And what explains why there are at least two 
principles that any agent “must” endorse (and in what sense “must” she do so)? In other words, 
(i) Relevance of Endorsement: Why should we believe that an agent’s “endorsement” of a 
practical principle (whatever exactly endorsement consists in) confers normative 
authority on that principle, and thus on the reasons it identifies? 
(ii) Necessity of Endorsement: Why and how is it the case that among all the practical 
principles that agents could endorse, there are two that they “must” or “cannot help but” 
endorse?  
These questions bring us to a third layer of Korsgaard’s “sources” account, which (following 
her) I call constitutivism.  
Korsgaard’s answer to at least the second of the two questions is meant to lie in a 
metaphysical thesis about the nature of agency, first presented in Sources but more fully 
developed in her more recent book Self-Constitution (2009b). The thesis is that failure to subject 
one’s choices to general practical principles necessarily amounts to a failure to be an agent, 
which is to say, a non-derivative cause of actions.75 According to this thesis, it is definitive of 
the “unity” or “integrity” of an agent – and it is therefore a condition of any event’s being 
classifiable as an action done by her, rather than just being caused by some part or property of 
her76 – that her actions, that is to say her choices of maxims, conform to the two Kantian 
imperatives. Qua agents, individuals therefore cannot not will or endorse the two fundamental 
principles. Failure to do so would amount to not “having a will”, in a certain demanding sense 
                                                          
75 More specifically, it amounts to such a failure in the case of creatures who are in a certain sense “reflective”. 
Understanding this qualification will occupy me during much of the remainder of this chapter.   
76 In the parlance of Michael Bratman, Korsgaard’s constitutive thesis is thus meant to address (at least among other 
things) the question of what constitutes “agential authority”; for another clear exposition of the problem, cf. 
Velleman 2000: 123-143, esp. 138-142.  
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that trades on the idea of volitional unity, and thus not “being an agent”, again in a demanding 
sense, to begin with.  
Thus we arrive at a third candidate for (or a third level in the explanation of) the “source” 
of normativity. The two fundamental practical principles are supposed to be normatively 
binding on all agents because endorsing them is constitutive of being an agent in the first place. 
This is a metaphysical truth about the nature of a certain type of agency (what distinguishes this 
type of agency from types of agency that are not subject to this constitutive condition will be the 
topic of section 6 below).  Correspondingly, we may say that only by endorsing those principles 
– that is, only by treating them as authoritative or reason-providing – does an individual 
“constitute herself” as an agent. Only an action governed by the categorical and hypothetical 
imperatives is an action that “constitutes its agent as the autonomous and efficacious cause of 
her own movements.”77 Call this Korsgaard’s constitutivism. Constitutivism, if true, provides 
the answer to the second question above, concerning the necessity of endorsement.  
Before I turn to Korsgaard’s arguments in favor of the constitutivist thesis itself (in 
sections 6 and 7 below), I want to briefly consider (in this section and the next) the role this 
thesis is meant to play with respect to the first question above, the question about the relevance 
of endorsement. That the thesis is meant to address that question, and is thus meant to function 
as a central part of Korsgaard’s “sources” account, becomes clear from formulations like the 
following: “…the source of normativity lies in the human project of self-constitution.”78 Given 
that Korsgaard has already identified certain volitional attitudes or acts – “endorsement” and 
                                                          
77 (2009b: xii) 
78 (2009b: 4). In another passage, Korsgaard writes (2009b: 32): “…the only way to establish the authority of any 
purported normative principle is to establish that it is constitutive of something to which the person whom it 
governs is committed – something that she either is doing or has to do. (…) the laws of practical reason govern our 
actions because if we don’t follow them we just aren’t acting, and acting is something that we must do. A 
constitutive principle for an inescapable activity is unconditionally binding.”  
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“identification” – as “sources” of normativity, the question is how their being such sources is 
explained by the role they play in the “project of self-constitution”. The answer that emerges 
from Korsgaard’s account is that self-constitution, understood as a “project”, is accomplished by 
way of more specific volitional acts and attitudes directed at “principles” and “identities”. 
Specifically, doing so is a way of conforming to the categorical imperative in its universal law 
formulation, as Korsgaard understands it.  
Voluntarism, of course, amounted to more than just the claim that we can attribute 
attitudes like endorsement and identification to agents. Voluntarism was the claim that it is in 
virtue of such attitudes that any reasons exist at all. How is constitutivism meant to support 
voluntarism, so understood?  
Constitutivism claims that to be an agent is to acknowledge the authority of certain 
practical principles – specifically, according to Korsgaard, the hypothetical and categorical 
imperatives. Even supposing that it is true that „the principles of practical reason are principles 
by means of which we constitute ourselves as unified agents,”79 it clearly does not follow that, 
conversely, what it is for a principle to have normative authority is just for it to be endorsed by 
some agent. But that is just what voluntarism asserts. Therefore, the truth of constitutivism is 
compatible with the falsity of voluntarism. That agents necessarily need to endorse some 
practical principles, or perhaps even some particular ones, does not entail a voluntarist 
explanation of the normative authority of those principles. It is compatible both with such 
principles being endorsed but lacking authority, and with their having authority despite a lack of 
endorsement. Even granted that the constitutive principles do exist (i.e., do have normative 
                                                          
79 2009b: 25. Korsgaard goes on to add: “And … that explains their normativity”.  
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authority), it does not follow from constitutivism that their existence must be explained in 
voluntarist terms. 
Thus taken by itself, constitutivism offers no sufficient foundation for Korsgaard’s 
voluntarism as I have presented it. Constitutivism does not entail that all normative authority is a 
function of an agent’s endorsement. How, then, could Korsgaard think of constitutivism as an 
underpinning for voluntarism?  
It seems to me that what is needed to understand her view here is an appreciation of at 
least two features of the dialectical situation in which the constitutivist thesis is put forward: 
(1) One is that “substantive realism” about normative reasons is taken to be ruled out on 
independent grounds.80 This is just a way of reiterating the claim that Korsgaard’s “normative 
question” is a genuine question: We cannot simply take it for granted that there can be such 
things as normative reasons; rather, their possibility needs to be established by way of a 
constructive philosophical theory. To some extent, Korsgaard seems to be relying on a simple 
dichotomy here: if realism is ruled out, and normative reasons are not “just there”, then they 
must in some way “come from us”. The question, for Korsgaard, is how there could possibly be 
anything to which our will is answerable – not why we should settle for anything less than will-
independent reasons. The upshot is that, for lack of alternatives, endorsement is a necessary 
condition of normative authority. It only remains to be shown that it is also sufficient.  
(2) Secondly, that question, and Korsgaard’s answer to it, are essentially ad hominem: they are 
addressed to an agent who is asking himself the normative question with respect to the particular 
                                                          
80 For Korsgaard’s negative arguments against realism, cf. especially her 1996b, Lecture One, and 2003. Her three 
main objections to realism are: (i) that it requires the postulation of “queer” entities (Mackie); (ii) that it fails to 
deliver an explanation of how we can be motivated by moral considerations; (iii) that it fails to deliver an 
explanation of how normative authority is possible. I will not examine the merits of these objections here.   
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reasons he himself takes himself to have.81 From this first-personal perspective, her thought 
seems to be, endorsement of a principle entails its normative authority, as the endorsing agent 
sees it. And to acknowledge that a principle is constitutive of one’s being an agent is to admit 
that one endorses it, insofar as one is an agent, and thus that one grants its normative authority, 
to the extent that one is an agent. The claim here is not that normative authority is a result of 
endorsement. Rather, the act or attitude of endorsement just amounts, on the part of the 
endorsing agent, to an acknowledgement of normative authority.  
I will say nothing here to cast doubt on the first of these two points (though nothing I say 
should incline us to accept it, either). The second, in turn, can seem a somewhat disappointing 
answer to the normative question. It seems to revoke Korsgaard’s claim that her view is a 
competitor to realism, or indeed a metaethical thesis at all (rather than, say, a psychological 
one). For on this construal, the volitional act or attitude of endorsement does not “confer” 
normativity, or constitute a “source” of reasons, in any interesting sense. The link between an 
agent’s endorsement of a principle and the reasons he has reduces to the fact that to endorse (or, 
on a weaker reading, to be unable not to endorse) some principle just amounts to believing there 
to be the corresponding reasons. But in this case the endorsement itself – the volitional attitude – 
does not in fact make any normative difference (any difference to what reasons an agent has) at 
all. It merely makes a (psychological) difference to what reasons an agent believes he has. Those 
reasons will correlate with the principles he endorses, but the fact that he endorses those 
principles will not itself, for him, be among the considerations that explain what there is reason 
for him to do. This would leave us in a similar position as the weaker one of the two 
                                                          
81 Cf. 1996b: 123: “But you are a human being and so if you believe my argument you can now see that that is your 
identity. You are an animal of the sort I have just described.” 
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interpretations of generalism that I introduced in section (2.) above. Let me now discuss this in 
some more detail.  
 
5. Subjective and objective voluntarism 
Might the interpretation I have just offered yield something that at least resembles 
voluntarism – as it were, a subjective equivalent to voluntarism proper (or normative 
voluntarism), establishing volitional acts or attitudes not as the source of reasons, but as the 
source of believed reasons?82 
 Let me call the general idea that there is some necessary connection between endorsing 
some principle and believing that one has the corresponding reasons the endorsement-belief 
thesis. More precisely, we can distinguish three possible versions of this thesis:  
(i) endorsing a principle is a necessary condition for believing there to be the 
corresponding reasons (i.e., the belief that there are certain reasons entails 
endorsement of the relevant principle);  
(ii) endorsing a principle is sufficient for believing there to be the corresponding 
reasons (i.e., endorsement of the relevant principle entails the belief that there 
are those reasons);  
(iii) endorsing a principle is necessary and sufficient for taking oneself to have the 
corresponding reasons (endorsing, and believing one has those reasons, 
mutually entail each other).  
                                                          
82 Subjective voluntarism, as I define it here, is a thesis about the dependence of an agent’s normative beliefs on his 
volitions, not a thesis about the will-dependence of what an agent must on pains of internal irrationality take or 
believe to be a reason. The latter would be one interpretation of the type of voluntarism implied by Michael 




Voluntarism, in the subjective version I am now considering, is committed at least to (ii), 
because it claims at the very least that the will is capable of creating normative beliefs. It may in 
addition be committed to (i) [and thereby also to (iii), which is the conjunction of (i) and (ii)], if 
it claims that all normative beliefs entail the presence of a corresponding volitional state. I will 
call types of voluntarism that are committed only to (ii) or to its objective equivalent “restricted 
voluntarism”: restricted voluntarism claims that some reasons depend on the will in the relevant 
way. I will call types of voluntarism – such as Korsgaard’s – that are committed to (iii) or to its 
objective equivalent “unrestricted voluntarism”, which claims that all reasons depend on the 
will.  
All three versions of the thesis leave it completely open what comes first: the endorsement 
(the volitional attitude) or the belief. But in order for a view to be voluntarist in any interesting 
sense, there has to be some sort of primacy of endorsement over belief. More specifically, it 
seems that voluntarism requires that the volitional attitude is in some sense psychologically 
independent of the normative belief, though not vice versa. Failing such independence, the 
endorsement-belief thesis in either of its versions yields no more than some form of what is 
sometimes called “judgment internalism”, which asserts that an agent’s will or motivation is 
necessarily engaged by any sincere normative judgment. According to judgment internalism, 
that an agent is suitably motivated, or volitionally engaged, is a necessary condition for 
ascribing normative judgments to him.83 Even though subjective voluntarism in its unrestricted 
form entails a form of judgment internalism, there has to be something further to it. For 
judgment internalism makes no claim about the explanatory direction between normative 
judgment and the relevant motivation or volitional state. But if voluntarism is the view that 
                                                          
83 In other words, judgment internalism is committed to version (i) of the endorsement-belief thesis: endorsement is 
a necessary condition of normative belief, though it need not be a sufficient one. 
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volitional attitudes give rise to reasons (or believed reasons), it has to go beyond a merely 
conceptual thesis about the entailment relations between ascriptions of volitional attitudes and of 
normative beliefs.84 It has to claim that normative beliefs are somehow answerable to the will, 
but not vice versa.  
Subjective voluntarism, so understood, claims merely that all of an agent’s normative 
beliefs derive in some way from his own volitional attitudes, but not that the agent himself must 
believe this to be the case. In other words, for all I have been saying so far, the agent himself 
need not believe that it is his prior endorsement of a given principle that gives rise to his belief 
that he has the reasons specified by the principle. But it is not obvious that absent this further 
reflexive belief on the part of an agent – the belief that subjective voluntarism is true –, 
subjective voluntarism is a stable or intelligible view. For we need to ask how the agent himself 
views the relevant acts of will (his acts of “endorsement”), if not along the lines suggested by 
subjective voluntarism. He could either view his endorsement of a given principle as tracking an 
independent truth (that the principle is authoritative, regardless of his endorsement), or as 
having no such aim. In the former case, it must be possible for him to already have the 
normative belief that, according to subjective voluntarism, can arise only from his act of 
endorsement. If such a case is so much as possible85, then subjective voluntarism (i.e. the thesis 
                                                          
84 The distinction between objective voluntarism and subjective voluntarism that I suggested corresponds to the 
established distinction between “reasons internalism” (or “existence internalism”) and “judgment internalism”. 
Reasons internalism ties reasons to motivational states (as a necessary condition of the existence of those reasons), 
whereas judgment internalism ties believed reasons to motivational states (as a necessary condition for ascribing the 
relevant belief or judgment). Correspondingly, objective voluntarism ties reasons to endorsement (as a sufficient 
condition of their existence), whereas subjective voluntarism ties believed reasons to endorsement (as a sufficient 
condition for ascribing the relevant belief). Reasons internalism and objective voluntarism are thus the third-
personal counterparts of judgment internalism and subjective voluntarism.  
85 A defender of subjective voluntarism could deny that such a case is possible, by stipulating that having a 
normative belief guarantees – is sufficient for – the presence of the relevant attitude of endorsement. To have a 
normative belief is thereby to endorse the relevant principle.  
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that normative beliefs always presuppose a corresponding endorsement is false) would 
presuppose a strong form of self-deception on the part of those agents who do not believe it.  
For the case of objective voluntarism, this problem does not arise. An agent could endorse 
a certain principle and take himself to be responsive to antecedent reasons in doing so, while in 
fact (unbeknownst to him) first creating those very reasons through his endorsement. We have 
seen why this will not do in the case of subjective voluntarism: Here, after all, the act of 
endorsement is meant to first create the relevant normative belief itself. It cannot perform this 
role if the belief in question is already present independently of the agent’s endorsement. The 
truth of a voluntarist account of objective reasons, on the other hand, is quite compatible (at 
least on the face of it) with the possibility of agents’ being ignorant of the truth of that account.  
Korsgaard’s “sources” account should therefore be understood as proposing objective 
voluntarism after all, not merely subjective voluntarism. But we still face the question of how on 
such an understanding, voluntarism could be thought to be supported by constitutivism. How 
might the ad hominem character of Korsgaard’s constitutivist thesis be construed such that 
objective voluntarism could be seen to follow from that thesis? It would require that the 
addressee of the argument comes to be persuaded to regard his own acts of endorsement as 
normatively consequential, indeed foundational, in the way voluntarism envisions.   
Recall again what constitutivism claims. It claims that there are certain practical principles 
that the agent who is the addressee of the argument for constitutivism (which I have not 
recounted in any detail), insofar as he is (or takes himself to be) an agent, cannot but endorse. 
Now we can think of a notion of endorsement – and Korsgaard, it seems, relies on it – such that 
the fact that an agent endorses some principle will ensure that the normative propositions 
entailed by it appear to that agent to be true. (If they do not appear true to the agent, this just 
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shows that the requisite sort of endorsement is missing.) This would amount to asserting version 
(ii.) of the endorsement-belief thesis. Given such a notion of endorsement, whenever I endorse a 
principle in the relevant way, I will also have the corresponding normative beliefs (about what 
there is reason to do). So by showing me that there are certain principles that I, insofar as I 
conceive of myself as an agent, cannot but endorse in this way, Korsgaard will have shown me 
that I have the corresponding normative beliefs. She has not thereby identified any reason for 
me to have those beliefs, or any justification for my having them. She has simply drawn my 
attention to the fact that I do have them, insofar as I endorse the relevant principles. For the 
special case of the two constitutive (rather than the various further, contingently endorsed) 
principles, she has shown me that to the extent that I am an agent, I am (psychologically) 
incapable of not having the corresponding normative beliefs, and therefore, that I have them. 
For the case of non-constitutive, merely contingently endorsed principles, she has shown me 
that I have the corresponding beliefs just in case I endorse those principles.  
Does endorsement, on this picture, play a normative role? It will, as it would have to do in 
the context of objective voluntarism, if the constitutivist argument also persuades its addressee 
to believe that questions about her normative situation – about the reasons she has – are properly 
answered by looking to her own attitudes of endorsement of a suitable principle or practical 
identity. It is an implication of objective voluntarism that all processes of normative deliberation 
should, if carried out thoroughly enough, eventually bottom out in agents’ observation of their 
own volitional states, or in coming (without further reason) to have such states. I will now ask 
whether the constitutivist argument offered by Korsgaard could possibly persuade its addressee 





Constitutivism is the thesis that one can conceive of an individual – be it oneself or 
another person – as an author of actions only if one attributes to that individual certain volitional 
properties: identification with, or endorsement of, or (in a weaker, non-volitional version of the 
view) conformity with, certain general principles governing willing and acting.86 I have 
suggested that so understood, it is not obvious how constitutivism might support voluntarism. 
Indeed, recognizable versions of constitutivism about agency are (in one version or another) 
defended by, and thus acceptable to, contemporary philosophers who do not share Korsgaard’s 
voluntarist program concerning the source of normativity. Constitutivism may explain why to 
conceive of an individual (not excepting oneself) as an agent is necessarily to attribute to that 
individual specific sorts of volitional attitudes. But constitutivism does not obviously explain 
why those attitudes play the normatively foundational role that voluntarism claims for them.  
My goal in this section and the next is to argue that not only does constitutivism not entail 
voluntarism, but that there is in fact a significant tension between the two theses, as they are 
defended by Korsgaard. To see why this is so, I introduce a fourth central element of her 
“sources” account, which she thinks of as underlying the constitutivist thesis: the claim that 
human beings are in a specific sense “reflective”. My main objection to Korsgaard’s theory of 
normativity has the following structure: by giving a central place to the phenomenon of 
reflectiveness, the theory makes use of an assumption that renders the theory unstable under 
reflection, or, as one might also say, intransparent or indirectly self-defeating. In other words, 
the theory is such that were it to become adopted by an individual, a phenomenon on which the 
                                                          
86 The constitutivist thesis could be understood either as the claim that it is constitutive of human agency that a 
putative agent effectively conform to the relevant principles, or as the claim that the agent needs to take himself to 
be bound by those principles. It seems clear that Korsgaard’s thesis is the second one. Cf. (2009b: 81): “…the 
hypothetical and categorical imperatives are constitutive principles of volition and action. Unless we are guided by 
these principles – unless we are at least trying to conform to them – we are not willing or acting at all.” 
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theory crucially relies would to that extent no longer obtain. In this section, I will examine what 
the idea of reflectiveness amounts to and why it plays a central role in Korsgaard’s theory; in the 
next section, I will explain why Korsgaard is not entitled to rely on it.  
What is the phenomenon in question? In a representative enough passage, Korsgaard 
explains that human beings are “self-conscious in a particular way: we are conscious of the 
grounds on which we act, and therefore are in control of them. When you are aware that you are 
tempted, say, to do a certain action because you are experiencing a certain desire, you can step 
back from that connection and reflect on it. You can ask whether you should do that action 
because of that desire, or because of the features that make it desirable. And if you decide that 
you should not, then you can refrain.”87 
I will call Korsgaard’s claim that human agents are “self-conscious in a particular way” 
(in what way exactly remains to be seen) the reflectiveness thesis. The centrality of the 
reflectiveness thesis to Korsgaard’s account is evident from the fact that in several passages she 
identifies the reflectiveness of human agency as the fundamental “source” of normativity itself. 
Thus she writes that “the source of reason is a particular form of self-consciousness that 
characterizes the human mind.”88 Even though she here speaks of self-consciousness as the 
“source of reason” rather than the “source of normativity”, we can take those two locutions to 
express the same thesis. In the account that traced an agent’s reasons first to practical principles, 
then to her volitional attitude towards those principles, and then to the fact that the relevant 
volitions (endorsements) serve to constitute an individual as an agent, the fourth and most 
                                                          
87 2009b: 19 (my italics).  
88 2009a: 30.  
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fundamental element is the condition that gives rise to the need for an individual to so constitute 
herself.89 
Korsgaard offers the following account of the way in which reflection, in the relevant 
sense, gives rise to the need for the kind of constitution for which constitutivism names the 
conditions: “Self-consciousness opens up a space between the experience of the incentive and 
what previously had been the instinctive response, and that space transforms incentives into 
inclinations and governing instincts into free reason. Self-consciousness is therefore the source 
of a psychic complexity not experienced by other animals, and it transforms psychic unity from 
a natural state into something that has to be achieved, into a task and an activity.”90 In this way, 
“nature sets each human being a task: self-consciousness divides his soul into parts, and he must 
reconstitute his agency, pull himself back together, in order to act.”91 To fail to constitute 
oneself is to fail to establish an entity to which actions would be attributable. Absent the right 
(constitutive) sorts of volitions, Korsgaard claims, “you are just a mere heap of impulses, and 
not an agent…”92  
The best way of understanding how reflection gives rise to the problem of constitution 
is by thinking about the contrast case of individuals that lack the relevant sort of self-
consciousness. According to Korsgaard, unreflective living beings are agents too, but in a 
                                                          
89 Other passages that support this reading include the following: “The capacity for self-conscious reflection about 
our own actions confers on us a kind of authority over ourselves, and it is his authority which gives normativity to 
moral claims” (1996b: 19 f.); “The  reflective  structure  of  human  consciousness requires  that  you  identify  
yourself  with  some  law  or  principle which will govern your choices. It requires you to be a law to yourself. And 
that is the source of normativity” (op..cit.: 104); “In this lecture I have offered an account of the source of 
normativity. I have argued that human consciousness has a reflective structure that sets us normative problems” 
(op..cit.: 122).  
90 2009b: 125 (my italics).  
91 2009b: 130 
92 2009b: 213. 
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different way.93 An animal is subject to certain “laws” – the laws of “instinct” – that 
guarantee its “unity” and “constitute” it as an agent by determining what counts as being 
done by it.94 But the authority of those laws – more specifically, their “agential authority” – 
is not a product of the animal’s own will.95 The reason for this is that the laws of instinct are 
not objects of “reflective distancing” on the part of the animal. They are not candidates for 
endorsement or rejection by the individual whose motivations they govern.  
If an animal’s lack of reflective endorsement does not turn it into a “mere heap of 
impulses”, why should this be the case for a human being? The relevant difference, in 
Korsgaard’s view, lies in the fact that the human being is already reflective. The relevant sort 
of self-consciousness, Korsgaard seems to think, spells the death of “instinct” as a set of 
constitutive laws. The “laws of instinct”, which individuate events as actions done by a 
creature unreflectively and irresistibly governed by those laws, no longer serve that function 
when a creature is capable of “distancing” and “questioning” the motivations or 
“inclinations” brought about by instinct. Once these come into the purview of choice – and 
thus of the will –, whatever claim they had to agential authority comes to be derivative of 
second-order volitional attitudes towards them. In this way, Korsgaard thinks, reflectiveness 
“disintegrates” an agent, so that it is not immediately clear what would count as being “done 
by him”. “Not immediately”, that is to say: not independently of the agent’s own reflective or 
second-order volitional attitudes of endorsement and identification.  
                                                          
93 All of Korsgaard’s examples are about higher animals. It is not clear to me whether or on what grounds she 
would draw a line excluding simpler animals or plants from possessing agency in the “instinct-governed” sense.  
94 Cf. especially 2009b: 102-108.  
95 I am using the term “agential authority” in the sense introduced by Michael Bratman, which I already referred to 
above (note 22). To assign agential authority to something – for example, some particular feature or features of an 
individual’s psychology, or, as in this case, to an individual’s “instincts” – is to offer an answer to the constitutive 
question, i.e., the question of what counts as being done by that individual considered as an agent.  
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In claiming this close relation between the problem of agential constitution, on the one 
hand, and reflectiveness, understood as susceptibility to second-order volitional attitudes, on 
the other, Korsgaard’s account closely follows that of Harry Frankfurt, although she does not 
explicitly acknowledge this debt. Like Frankfurt, she assumes – without much explanation – 
that persons have self-reflexive higher-order volitional attitudes, and that those higher-order 
attitudes override lower-order ones with respect to agential authority. Her constitutivist thesis 
can be read as her answer to the further question (which was pressed against Frankfurt by his 
critics) of what gives any such higher-order attitudes not just a greater prima facie claim to 
agential authority, but agential authority full stop.96 In the next section, I will spell out in 
some more detail what the relevant sort of reflectiveness is meant to consist in. For now, I 
just want to point out that there are several broad ways of understanding the type of property 
– whatever exactly the property itself consists in – that the reflectiveness thesis ascribes to 
those to whom it applies.  
(1) First, the thesis might be read as an empirical generalization about human agents. On 
this construal, the relevant kind of reflectiveness (the possession of higher-order volitional 
attitudes) is simply a psychological property of normal adult human individuals, just like various 
sorts of widely shared fundamental abilities and dispositions. What sort of property? Taking at 
their word some of Korsgaard’s own characterizations of self-consciousness, it may seem 
tempting to think of it primarily as a specific “ability” or “capacity”: the capacity to turn one’s 
attention on one’s own psychological states, and specifically, one’s own motivational states. On 
the other hand, as we will see in more detail soon, a mere capacity or ability may not be enough 
                                                          
96 The same basic picture also informs other constitutivist views, such as Bratman’s. The reflectiveness thesis is 
fundamental not only for Korsgaard’s constitutivism but also for other authors who defend constitutivist views, that 
is to say, views which hold that agents are in some sense “constituted” as such only in virtue of accepting certain 
normative constraints on their will. 
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to generate all the implications that Korsgaard associates with reflectiveness. More than just an 
ability or capacity, the relevant psychological property may have to a type of disposition, and 
even more specifically, a type of desire; in other words, it may have to be (in part) a specific 
volitional state.  
(2) Secondly – and compatibly with the first construal of the thesis – constitutivism entails 
that the reflectiveness thesis is true a priori (“constitutive”) of all actual and possible agents of a 
certain sort. However, this may be an uninformative truth. It may be that we are able to tell 
whether some individual is an agent of the relevant sort in no other way than by finding out 
whether that individual possesses the property of reflectiveness.  
(3) Thirdly, the reflectiveness thesis allows of a normative reading, as articulating a 
certain ideal of agency. On this construal, not only may self-consciousness or reflectiveness 
come in degrees (as on the first construal), but it need not even be attributable to any high 
degree to all or most or even any human individuals. Qua ideal, it may be largely unrealized. 
This is merely meant to be a preliminary overview over the general interpretive options. In 
the following section, I will try to characterize in more detail what reflectiveness has to consist 
in in order to play the role it does in Korsgaard’s account, and I will argue that her own 
voluntarist account of practical reasons stands in a particular kind of tension with reflectiveness, 
so understood.  
 
7. The constitution of reflectiveness 
We can intelligibly ask: how is reflectiveness itself “constituted”? In other words, what is 
required for it to operate? As we have seen, Korsgaard’s central claim is that “self-
consciousness opens up a space between the incentive and the response, a space of what I call 
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reflective distance. It is within the space of reflective distance that the question whether our 
incentives give us reasons arises.”97 But how exactly is it that self-consciousness succeeds at 
opening up such a “space” (i.e., what is self-consciousness, such that it is capable of doing this)?  
Korsgaard’s account strongly relies on spatial metaphors to characterize self-
consciousness. It largely lacks a phenomenology of the activity of reflection. To know what we 
are asking about, we should first try to explain what exactly is meant by the “distance” or 
“space” of which Korsgaard speaks. It is, she says, a distance that results from an agent’s 
“bringing into view” and “stepping back from” certain elements of his own psychology (his 
“desires and inclinations”). How are these metaphors to be spelled out? Whatever the answer is, 
it should at the same time explain how it could come about that “our own possible responses 
are… given to us as a heap of desires and fears and impulses, and it is up to us to put ourselves 
back together.”98 In other words, an elucidation of the relevant concept of self-consciousness 
should explain how self-consciousness has the power to bring about the “disintegrated” situation 
that gives rise to the question of agential authority, to which constitutivism then offers a type of 
answer.  
It is clear from the set-up of the problem that the relevant sort of “distance” involves an 
absence of identification, in the following stipulative sense: for an agent who is “identified” 
with a certain motivational state, whether unknowingly or knowingly, the question of whether to 
endorse that state does not arise. Whenever there is “reflective distance”, on the other hand, the 
question does arise. What is reflective distance, such that it gives rise to this question for an 
agent?  
                                                          
97 2009b: 116. The phenomenon Korsgaard has in mind here is taken for granted by many philosophers, especially 
those influenced by the work of Harry Frankfurt. Cf. for example Velleman (2000: 139): “When an agent reflects 
on the motives vying to govern his behavior, he occupies a position of critical detachment from those motives.” 
Many further instances could be found.   
98 2009a: 33. 
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The short answer is that one has reflective distance vis-à-vis one’s own motivational state 
if one holds it to some standard of appropriateness, and at the same time declines (at least for the 
moment) to treat it as reliably responsive that standard, instead viewing it as “opaque” in the 
sense that its mere self-ascription does not entail an answer to the question of its 
appropriateness.99 Reflective distance is thus distinct from self-awareness (and even self-
knowledge): the ability to make these states the objects of one’s thought, i.e., to ascribe them, 
and correctly ascribe them, to oneself. Self-consciousness or “reflective awareness” in that sense 
does not by itself confront an agent with the question of whether to endorse the relevant 
motivations or not. It is perfectly compatible with their already being endorsed by him, as well 
as with his not raising the question of whether to endorse them. The need, as felt by an agent, to 
first adopt a second-order volitional attitude of endorsement (or rejection) toward one or another 
among his motivational attitudes arises only when that agent  
(i) experiences the attitude in question as opaque in the sense just characterized, and 
(ii) regards the attitude in question (or the effects it may bring about) as belonging to 
him in such a way that he cannot simply be indifferent to its appropriateness or 
inappropriateness, and to its existence or absence.  
In other words, the type of “reflective self-consciousness” that Korsgaard identifies as giving 
rise to the “task of self-constitution” (that is, to the “need to work at being unified”, or to the 
                                                          
99 I speak of “appropriateness” rather than “justification” since one might believe one’s attitude to be justified, all 
things considered, and yet find it opaque in the relevant sense. Opacity and transparency are determined by 
responsiveness to the specific or the right kind of reasons for attitudes of a given sort. Different writers use different 
terminology to capture what they respectively consider the core of this intuitive notion; for example, Derek Parfit 
speaks of “object-given reasons”, and Joseph Raz of “standard reasons” (for a given type of attitude). See the 
further discussion in Chapter 4.  
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“necessity of exerting a kind of control over our beliefs and actions”), arises only when (i) and 
(ii) are in place.100  
The satisfaction of conditions (i) and (ii) goes beyond mere reflective awareness.101 For 
just that reason I can for my present purposes set aside the question of what makes such self-
awareness possible. Let us suppose that an answer is available that does not create any 
difficulties for Korsgaard’s project. Likewise, I will not say anything further about (ii), even 
though it is an important – and difficult – point, and one which Korsgaard acknowledges (if at 
all) only in passing.102 Instead I will focus only on condition (i), which, assuming that (ii) is in 
place, we can understand as isolating the relevant sort of “reflective distance”. My question now 
is: what makes it the case that (i) is in place, when it is?  
There is what we might call a “genealogical” undercurrent in Korsgaard’s discussion, 
amounting to the suggestion that the relevant condition of opacity or “distance” is something 
that the agent first brings about by way of an activity of hers. The “distanced” opacity of her 
own motivational states is not something an agent simply finds herself with. The unreflective 
operation of motives (as in animals) is, as it were, the default case, by contrast with which the 
case of a human individual’s distanced relation towards her own motivations calls for special 
explanation. This contrast is part of a genealogical or broadly naturalistic argument insofar as 
the unreflective, unbidden operation of motives characteristic of animal action tells us 
                                                          
100 2009b: xii, 125, and passim; 2009a: 32. It follows that it is misleading to say, as Korsgaard does, that “the task 
of self-constitution… places us in a relationship with ourselves” (2009b: xii). To the contrary, to the extent that 
there is such a task, it presupposes that we have a (specific sort of) relationship with ourselves. 
101 Some of Korsgaard’s own formulations conceal this fact: for example, she writes that “what makes it  necessary  
for  us  to  justify  our  beliefs  and  actions  is  the  form  of  self-consciousness involved, which enables us to call 
the grounds of our beliefs and actions into question.” The illicit slide from “ability” to “necessity” is obvious here. 
102 She remarks that “it is not as if the incentive itself appears in consciousness as something that is not you, but just 
something you might pick up, the way you might pick up a stone off the ground. The incentive arises from your 
nature and it appears in consciousness as something that wants to be you.” (2009b: 126) This passage fails to 
explain, however, why indifference to what I perceive as “wanting to be me” is not an option.  
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something about what a motive is, even in the case of human action. As Korsgaard writes, “the 
incentive arises from your nature and it appears in consciousness as something that wants to be 
you.”103 By default, an individual’s will is identical with (or constituted by) the motives present 
in that individual, and its actions are whatever results from those motives; in that sense, the 
motives “are” the agent. The reflective distancing of motives is supposed to modify this account 
of action, but only in presupposing it. If Korsgaard is right that it is an essential concern of 
agents to be “unified” in the sense of undoing the effects of “reflection” and “distancing”, we 
might legitimately wonder what leads them to engage in this type of activity in the first place, 
and thereby to bring about condition (i).  
Korsgaard’s answer is simple: this just is what we are like.104 But this answer is not 
satisfactory. For one, we are not in fact like that. Here it is worth recalling again Korsgaard’s 
contrast case: the lack of reflectiveness that characterizes animal consciousness. Korsgaard 
writes that “for the other animals, perceptual representation and desire and aversion are not 
strictly separate. (…) an animal’s world is teleologically organized: the objects in it are marked 
out as being “for” certain things or as calling for certain responses.”105 Accordingly, “the other 
animals do not need to justify their beliefs and actions because their way of conceptualizing and 
responding to the world is simply given to them by their teleological perception, by the 
instinctive ways in which they represent the world to themselves.”106 Why should we doubt that 
the same is true for human beings? Is there any reason to assume that for human agents, 
“perceptual representation and desire and aversion” are “strictly separate”?  
                                                          
103 ibid.. 
104 E.g., 2009b (115): “…we human beings are self-conscious in a very particular way. We are aware, not only that 
we desire or fear certain things, but also that we are inclined to act in certain ways on the basis of these desires or 
fears. We are conscious of the potential grounds of our actions, the principles on which our actions are based, as 
potential grounds. And this, as I have argued elsewhere, sets us a problem that the other animals do not have.” 
105 2009a: 31. 
106 2009a: 33. 
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In fact, it seems difficult to deny that a human agent’s world, too, is to a large degree 
“teleologically organized.” What may be true is that that the separation between “perceptual 
representation” and “desire and aversion” of which Korsgaard speaks can be increased through 
the activity of reflection, whereas this is not even so much as an option in the case of animals. 
But the degree to which individuals who possess the capacity for reflective distancing exercise 
that capacity may vary greatly, and there is no reason to suppose that the separation could ever 
be fully achieved, whatever “fully” could mean in this context. Even if contrary to animals 
human beings can call the grounds for each of their acts into question, as a matter of fact they do 
not, nor is it desirable that they do. And this means that the problem of self-constitution will 
normally arise only to a limited degree.  
This might all be for the best, were it not the case that Korsgaard is in the last resort 
defending a thesis about reasons for action, which she claims are generated by a certain type of 
volitional attitude – “reflective endorsement” – that in turn is essentially a response to the 
constitutive problem, as faced by an agent. It seems that where that problem does not arise, 
neither are there any reasons favoring one course of action over another, or speaking against 
some courses of action. Reasons, it would seem, apply only to “agents” in a terminological 
sense that is much narrower than on the ordinary understanding of that term.  
There are at least two possible responses on Korsgaard’s behalf. One is to bite the bullet 
and accept that agency – in the terminological sense – may be a rare occurrence, and that only 
agents – in that narrow sense – have reasons.107 Another response might consist in explaining 
                                                          
107 The carving out of such a narrow, terminological sense of agency is implicit in much recent philosophy of 
action. Some of the locutions used by recent authors other than Korsgaard to denote this narrow, “proper” sense 
include “full-blooded agency”, “fully autonomous agency”, “agency at its best”, “action in the paradigmatic sense”, 
“whole-hearted agency” – as distinguished from “marginal cases of agency” or “mere behavior”. These terms 
correspond to so many conceptions of what constitutes agency in the “proper” sense. I place the word “proper” into 
quotation marks, since the term highlights a problem shared by all of these accounts: namely, the fact that what they 
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that the voluntarist account of reasons for action contains an element of idealization, such that 
an individual’s reasons are a function not simply of her de facto endorsements, but of some 
suitably specified counterfactual volitions. Such counterfactual accounts have to contend with 
the impression that they are manufactured or specious, among other problems they face but 
which I will not pursue at this point. For now, I will set the problems arising from the “rarity” of 
reflective action aside and limit my consideration to the case of the fully (or sufficiently) 
reflective agent – an agent who exhibits “agency at its best”, or of whom the relevant sort of 
idealization is actually true.  
Adopting this narrower focus, we still need to explain what is involved in the capacity for 
self-distancing and in the exercise of that capacity, regardless of the frequency with which it is 
in fact exercised. What must be true of an individual if he is to have and exercise this capacity? 
Here we come to a second, and deeper, reason to be dissatisfied with Korsgaard’s reliance on 
the fact that “this is just what we are like”. I have argued that self-awareness is not by itself a 
sufficient explanation of this capacity. What needs to be added? This question brings us back to 
the task of explaining the metaphor of “distancing”.  
Recall that reflection is an activity. This activity may be to a certain degree habitualized 
and more or less automatic. In other words, reflective agents may have a standing disposition or 
“inclination” to engage in it. But precisely to the extent that they are reflective – to the extent 
that they can “distance themselves” from their inclinations – the activity of reflection itself (or 
the activities comprising it) is optional. To the extent that an agent is in fact like that, he might 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
seek to present as metaphysical elucidations of the concept of agency are in fact substantive normative conceptions. 
Agency in the “proper” sense is not a pervasive fact but a normative ideal, which needs to be defended on 
normative grounds. This point is at least implicit in Harry Frankfurt’s discussions of “alienated” and “whole-
hearted” action, but it seems to be lost in some later discussions of the constitutive question, such as David 
Velleman’s, from whose (2000) several of the labels above are drawn. It is more evident in discussions of the 
nature of agency that emerge from a concern with one or another of the practical contexts in which the concepts of 
agency and agential attribution play a prominent role, such as discussions of moral and legal responsibility. 
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cease to be so, or at least cease to be as much like that. And the circumstances under which this 
would happen are precisely the circumstances under which a (duly reflective) agent saw no 
reason to reflect.  
Now imagine an agent who accepts the truth of Korsgaard’s voluntarist theory of 
normativity. According to that theory, whatever reasons for action there are for him are in place 
only because and insofar as he reflectively endorses the operation of certain motives or 
“inclinations” within himself. The agent believes, then, that whatever reasons he may have 
depends on his own attitude of endorsement. What view is such an agent going to take of his 
own reasons for engaging in the “reflective distancing” of his inclinations? They, like all his 
other reasons, depend on his reflective endorsement of the corresponding inclinations. Were he 
not to endorse those inclinations, his continuing activity of reflective distancing would come 
down to nothing more than an operation of impersonal motivational forces within him 
(embodied, perhaps, in a habit or automatism). As long as this habit is sufficiently unshakeable, 
it may seem as though this “application test” of Korsgaard’s view does not create any 
difficulties for her. But part of what it is to be a reflective agent, in Korsgaard’s sense, is not to 
do anything except for what one has (by endorsing a corresponding principle) affirmed to be a 
reason.108 An agent who does not endorse his own inclination or habit of engaging in reflection 
will, therefore, cease to do so (to the extent that he is capable of it).109 And ceasing to engage in 
it, in turn, would eliminate the opportunity for reflective endorsement, and thus the presence of 
any reasons for action whatsoever. Such an agent, it seems, could – provided Korsgaard’s 
                                                          
108 “Once the space of reflective awareness—reflective distance, as I like to call it—opens up between the 
potential ground of a belief or action and the belief or action itself, we must step across that distance, and so 
must be able to endorse the operation of that ground, before we can act or believe.” (2009a: 31 f.) 
109 In other words, he will cease to “be an agent” in the terminological sense introduced above. This leads me to 
think that my critique here is close to that of David Enoch in “Agency, Shmagency”. Reflection is a certain 
discipline to which an individual may or may not subject her own actions, and there is nothing incoherent about the 
idea of abdicating that discipline.  
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voluntarism is true – make all of his reasons for action “vanish” at one stroke (although it may 
not be easy to imagine how that could come to happen in practice). This is a prima facie 
unappealing implication of voluntarism.  
But not only may the disposition or inclination to reflect be under threat when an agent 
self-consciously adopts voluntarism. More importantly, his very capacity for reflection will be 
compromised. In other words: not only is there a puzzle about what will keep agents reflecting, 
once they come to accept voluntarism. The deeper puzzle concerns the question of what will so 
much as enable them to do so. My discussion up to here should have made it clear that there is 
in fact an equivocation contained in statements such as this one: “the reflective distance 
produced by the awareness of the potential grounds of our actions as grounds confronts us with 
a problem…”.110 Korsgaard is not entitled to equate, as she sometimes does, “awareness” and 
“reflective distance”, if the latter is what gives rise to the “constitutive problem” and thus calls 
for reflective endorsement. The relevant sort of “distance” is not achieved simply by virtue of 
self-awareness or self-observation. Rather, it is a type of volitional attitude that consists in 
resisting, to some extent, the motivational force of inclinations – their claim to “being the 
agent”. The constitutive problem arises because “when desire bids, we can indeed take it or 
leave it.”111 But the capacity for such resistance does not go without saying. It needs to be 
explained.  
Formulations like the following have the effect of obscuring this explanatory task: „When 
an impulse… presents itself to us, we ask whether it could be a reason.“112 Impulses are not the 
                                                          
110 2009b: 23. In other passages, Korsgaard appears to acknowledge that there is a distinction here, but only to then 
equate the two phenomena she distinguishes: “Our capacity to turn our attention to our own mental activities is also 
a capacity to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question” (1996b: 93).  
111 1996b: 97.  
112 1996b: 113. Cf. similarly (1996b: 93): “I desire and I find myself with a powerful impulse to act. But I back up 
and bring that impulse into view and then I have a certain distance. Now the impulse doesn’t dominate me and now 
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kinds of things that simply “present themselves” and then hold still for the purpose of 
questioning. On the contrary, as Korsgaard herself makes clear in the more recent passage 
previously quoted (note xx above, SC 126), inclinations by their very nature come with agential 
pretensions. If an agent is to “question” their authority, she must have some place to stand from 
which to do so. She does not first see an impulse as presenting itself, and then begin to 
deliberate about its standing. Instead, the “extrication” of her will from the impulse, so that the 
latter becomes what I earlier called a “mere object”, is itself accomplished only by way of such 
deliberation.  
The “distance” that characterizes the reflective condition is in fact a distance between the 
inclination in question and something else that makes a claim on the will of the agent – 
something that the agent acknowledges as a standard to which her action should conform. 
“Reflective distance” is an accomplishment that essentially involves an agent’s 
acknowledgement of normative constraints on her action. Agents are capable of reflective 
distance, in the relevant sense, only because and to the extent that they are already sensitive or 
responsive to (what they perceive or accept as) normative reasons. The question confronted by 
reflective agents – “Shall I do what I find myself inclined to do?” – does not merely, as 
Korsgaard claims, give rise to a “need” for reasons; it is itself already the expression of a 
critical, and that is to say a normatively engaged stance toward the relevant volitional or 
motivational state.113 The question would not arise for an individual who antecedently 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
I have a problem. Shall I act? Is this desire really a reason to act?” My suggestion is that this line of reasoning 
seems to work, without further premises, only if there is an equivocation on the concept of “distance”: as mere 
reflective awareness, on the one hand, and as involving a motivational factor, on the other.  
113 More precisely, the question is the expression of such a stance when it is interpreted other than as a purely 
prognostic question about what I will do. But under this alternative interpretation, if the question gives rise to a 
“need for reasons”, what is needed are only reasons for belief (concerning one’s course of action), not reasons for 
action. There have been attempts, on the part of David Velleman and Kieran Setiya, to explain reasons for action in 
terms of such reasons for beliefs about one’s own prospective course of action. I will set aside these views here 
since it seems clear that Korsgaard does not intend to rely on them.  
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recognized no normative or evaluative standards whatsoever. Such standards first open up what 
one might think of as vantage points, positions for a reflecting agent to occupy in order bring 
into view his own existing  motivational states and dispositions as objects distinct from him. 
Absent such a vantage point, no reflective distance can be established, because the motivational 
states in question would simply be the agent; they would be identical with his will.  
As I have tried to show, Korsgaard’s own reasoning takes exactly the reverse route. 
According to her, “normative concepts exist because human beings have normative problems. 
And we have normative problems because we are self-conscious rational animals, capable of 
reflection about what we ought to believe and do. That is why the normative question can be 
raised in the first place.”114 Here the capacity for reflection, characterized as an aspect of self-
consciousness, is invoked as an explanation of the fact that the normative question arises at all. 
This is the thesis that normativity has its “source” in reflection. But in fact, this alleged 
explanatory relation is unintelligible, or at the least, pseudo-explanatory. Reflection does not 
explain but rather consists in the raising of (specific) normative questions. Thus human beings 
“have normative problems” because they use normative concepts; and we are “capable of 
reflection about what we ought to believe and do” because we have normative problems. 
Reflective distance, in the relevant sense, is the product of an activity conducted by means of 
normative concepts: the activity of critically assessing one’s own motivational states and 
dispositions in the light of normative standards that guide such an assessment. By itself, this is 
not incompatible with what Korsgaard writes in the passage just quoted and elsewhere. The 
necessary dependence between self-reflective agency and the recognition of some sort of 
normative authority may hold in both directions. But what is not compatible with the 
                                                          
114 1996b: 46. Reflectiveness itself, or the ability to raise the practical question, is here characterized in normative 
terms („ought“), apparently without any realization of the difficulties this creates for the view on offer.  
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considerations just advanced are Korsgaard’s explanatory ambitions concerning the “source of 
normativity”. If reflectiveness and the acknowledgement of normative reasons stand or fall 
together, the suggestion that the latter derives from or has its “source” in the former is 
misleading at best. Korsgaard’s attempt to ground normativity in reflection has her committed to 
an unintelligible conception of the latter. 
There is an objection waiting to be made here. Why should it not be sufficient for 
reflective distance to arise that I care whether I am in state x or in state y – where the sense in 
which I care might be purely psychological or subjective? Why should we have to assume that 
the standards or requirements to the reflective agent holds her lower-order volitional states are 
genuinely normative?  
The response is that it is true that my argument does not show that the standards that 
inform our activity of reflection are in fact normative or authoritative, or indeed that there exist 
any standards that have genuine normative authority. But what it does show is that there is a 
problem with Korsgaard’s account. The problem is that we cannot, from the first-personal 
perspective of reflective agency to which her argument is addressed, think of the force or 
authority of all and any such standards as first deriving from our “reflective nature”.  
We can think of the problem in terms of a familiar (though contentious) adequacy 
constraint on ethical theories.115 The constraint is that a theory designed to articulate the goals of 
some activity or practice should not be such as to undermine the effective realization of those 
goals were it to be adopted by the participants in that practice. Theories that do not meet this 
constraint are, in the terminology introduced by Derek Parfit, “indirectly self-defeating”, as well 
                                                          
115 It may be objected that Korsgaard’s is not an ethical but a meta-ethical theory. But whatever the theoretical aims 




as “self-effacing” (they recommend against their own adoption).116 And these are often thought 
to be undesirable – though not necessarily fatal – features for a theory to have. The way in 
which Korsgaard’s voluntarism falls short of this constraint would be as follows. Even though it 
does not explicitly articulate a normative goal or standard, it postulates a certain phenomenon – 
reflective distance – that, I have been arguing, is best understood as a type of activity. What 
happens when someone engaged in that activity comes to accept Korsgaard’s theory? The 
answer is that such a person would be under rational pressure to abandon the sorts of attitudes – 
attitudes of taking herself to be answerable to reflection-independent normative constraints – 
that alone enable her to intelligibly engage in this activity. Engaging in the activity of reflective 
distancing requires that the person engaging in it believes herself to be answerable to normative 
constraints, rather than being their very “source”. By contrast, to adopt Korsgaard’s theory about 
the source of normativity is to put oneself in a cast of mind in which the activity of reflection 
threatens not only to lose its point, but to be so much as psychologically possible. But if this is 
true, then the adoption of Korsgaard’s theory would tend to erase the very phenomenon on 
which it builds its conclusions, and it would in that sense be indirectly self-defeating. 
Korsgaard claims that it follows from the reflectiveness thesis that “if reasons did not 
exist, we would have to invent them” (2009a: 26). And, her voluntarist thesis goes, that is just 
what we in fact do. If my considerations are along the right lines, then if reasons did not exist, 
we would have no need for them at all. This is because in the absence of normative reasons – as 
we see it –, we would not be reflective creatures (in the relevant sense) in the first place. 
Referring to reasons, Korsgaard writes that “if the dilemma springs from reflection then the 
                                                          




solution must do so as well.”117 But in fact normative beliefs are not simply the response to a 
dilemma that arises independently of them. If the “dilemma” is that “our own possible responses 
are … given to us as a heap of desires and fears and impulses, and it is up to us to put ourselves 
back together”118, then the materials of the “solution” – the normative reasons, as they appear to 
the agent – are what gives rise to that dilemma in the first place. It is only in light of specific 
reasons and values that our own responses could come to appear to us in this alienated way.  
 
8. Conclusion 
In a recent essay, Korsgaard asks: “Why do we need to evaluate the grounds of our beliefs 
and actions? What makes that necessary for us, and not for the other animals?”119 I have argued 
that this is indeed an important question to ask, but that Korsgaard deprives herself of the 
resources for answering it, at least within the confines of the first-personal or ad hominem style 
of argumentation on which she relies throughout.120 Her claim is that reflectiveness makes it the 
case that we “need a reason to act”. But the only circumstances under which this is true, from 
the point of view of an agent, are circumstances under which that agent already takes himself to 
be subject to the normative force of reasons.  
How damaging is this objection? I think that more conclusive objections to Korsgaard’s 
view may well come from other directions, some of which I have gestured at in passing. 
However, I hope that one merit of focusing on the problem that I have been belaboring is that 
doing so helps illuminate the importance of giving a detailed account of a phenomenon that 
tends to be central to constitutivist views of agency more generally.  
                                                          
117 1996b: 93. 
118 2009a: 33. 
119 ibid..  




What I hope to have shown in criticizing Korsgaard’s view is that there is a tension 
between voluntarism, as a meta-ethical position, and the reflectiveness thesis, which is a central 
presupposition of it in Korsgaard’s case. But it is also worth exploring the positive relation 
between reflection, volitional attitudes, and normative reasons. Even if reflection is not the 
“source” of normativity, it is not just idiosyncratic to think that the activity of reflectively 
“distancing” oneself from volitional states may create a space in which choice can be exercised 
with respect to attitudes that of themselves come with “agential pretensions”. This idea will 
resurface in Chapters 3 and 4 below.  
The reflectiveness thesis is a thesis about a certain volitional structure. Reflective agents 
are those of whom it is true that the content of their will cannot be identified – not even by them 
– simply by finding out what they want, but only by finding out what they want to want. (To 
point to “principles” or “laws” endorsed by an agent is one way among others – Korsgaard’s – 
of spelling out what the relevant second-order volitions consist in. Frankfurt, Bratman, 
Velleman, and others offer their own respective accounts.) Another way of putting this is that a 
reflective individual is one who is in a certain sense free vis-à-vis his first-order volitions: he is 
free to “distance himself” from them, to reject being identified with them, to reject the 
suggestion that those volitions, or the actions motivated by them, are expressive of his agency in 
the proper sense. To treat or regard someone – whether another person or oneself – as 
constituted in this way is to abstain from identifying the content of that individual’s will simply 
by recourse to his or her manifest actions. It is to treat the agent as distinct from those actions, 
and even, to a certain extent, as distinct from the motivations manifested in those actions. So 
understood, the reflectiveness thesis may well capture an important truth about how we think of 
the constitution of agents. But fusing it with a voluntarist view of normativity seems to make it 
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less rather than more intelligible. I will return to the question of what is constitutive of agency in 
Chapter 4 below. Before I do, I want to consider, in the next chapter, whether some other 
approaches to voluntarism – ones that do not undermine a larger theory on which they purport to 




Chapter 3: Reason-Creation and Normative Powers 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I examined a widely discussed attempt to vindicate a form of meta-
ethical voluntarism. I concluded that, in addition to various other problems it faces, this view is 
first-personally unstable insofar as it precludes the agents whose volitional acts or attitudes are 
supposed to be the “source” of their reasons from deliberately and (in their own view) 
intelligibly engaging in the specific sort of activity that is supposed to explain why these acts 
and attitudes can function as sources of reasons: the activity that yields what Korsgaard calls 
“reflective distance.”  
In the present chapter, I turn to two recent proposals that seek to vindicate versions of 
voluntarism about reasons that take a more restricted scope. In particular, they are not 
committed to the constitutivist project that is integral to Korsgaard’s voluntarism. On these 
views, as on Korsgaard’s, it is true that voluntary acts or volitional attitudes can give rise to 
normative reasons in a non-trivial way, and that agents can thus “create” reasons by taking those 
actions or adopting the relevant attitudes. (What makes these ways of creating reasons non-
trivial is one of the questions such accounts need to address.) One of them, by Ruth Chang 
(Sections 2–4 below), proposes a “hierarchical” form of voluntarism, which retains the objective 
of establishing the will as a “source of normativity” in much the way intended by Korsgaard, but 
without being committed to its being the only such source. I argue that this version of 
voluntarism, though not vulnerable to the objection I raised against Korsgaard’s, remains 
stipulative and insufficiently motivated. The other proposal I consider, by David Enoch 
(Sections 5–6), focuses on one particular practical context in which agents plausibly take 
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themselves and each other to be engaged in a non-trivial form of voluntarist reason-creation: the 
practice of issuing requests. I argue that Enoch’s proposal comes closer to presenting a 
defensible general model of voluntarism, but that it faces more urgently the challenge of 
triviality. I suggest, in Section 7, that a form of voluntarism that is neither stipulative nor trivial 
would do well to focus on the concept of normative power, and I indicate how the normative 
role that writers such as Korsgaard and Bratman envision for the contents of volitional attitudes 
might be accommodated by that model.   
 
2. Hierarchical voluntarism 
That persons can “create” reasons is an unremarkable observation. Like many other 
features of the world, voluntary actions and volitional attitudes are capable of rationalizing 
(exhibiting as reason-supported) various further actions and attitudes: for example, the belief 
that an attitude is present, or the action of verbally responding to it. In other words, they can be 
cited as epistemic and practical reasons. And like other events, too, actions and attitudes may 
not only constitute but also causally bring about various further states of affairs that can in turn 
constitute reasons for belief and action (e.g., what you say makes me nervous; this is a reason 
for me to do something about it). The fact that a given act or attitude either is or causes the 
existence of a fact that functions as a reason for action can be explained by reference to 
antecedent normative truths, in the light of which the act or action or its consequences, like any 
other fact or event in the world, may make certain actions and attitudes intelligible or justified. 
If this amounted to voluntarism, then voluntarism could not be a controversial view, and it 
would probably not be in itself of any deeper philosophical interest.  
If voluntarism is to be a controversial or interesting theory about reasons for action, its 
claims must be more ambitious than this. In a recent paper, Ruth Chang offers such a more 
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ambitious view. Chang seeks to establish that agents have the power to create “voluntarist 
reasons” in situations of normative indeterminacy where the pre-existing reasons that bear on 
their action have “run out”. Her aim is to outline and defend a limited version of normative 
voluntarism, which she characterizes as the doctrine that we can “endow a consideration with 
the normativity of a reason simply through an act of will.”121 Partly, what motivates this account 
is a theoretical concern arising from recent debates in meta-ethics: Her restricted form of 
voluntarism, she explains, can straddle a certain “divide in approaches to normative source”, 
namely “between those who think we can create normativity and those who think that 
normativity is somehow given to us.”122 And she summarizes the achievement of her theory as 
consisting in the fact that it “[provides] the will a secure place in understanding the source of 
normativity, however normativity itself is to be understood.”123 Thus Chang, like Korsgaard, 
seeks to give volitional acts and attitudes a role in meta-ethical explanation. But the fact that the 
role assigned to the will by voluntarism, so understood, is that of a “source of normativity” may 
also be understood as a way of disposing of the triviality worry concerning the idea of reason-
creation. I proceed by providing a brief outline of Chang’s proposal and raising some problems 
faced by it. I then deepen the explanation and critique of her proposal by considering the 
motivation for it (Section 3) and draw some lessons from the preceding discussion (Section 4). 
Chang begins her essay by discussing, and announcing her rejection of, “an assumption that 
normative externalists, internalists, and standard voluntarists all share, namely, that practical 
normativity has an univocal source. According to this assumption, all practical reasons have 
their normative source in irreducibly normative facts, or in the agent’s desires, or in her will.”124 
                                                          
121 Chang (2009: 245).  
122 Ibid. 
123 Chang (2009: 247).  
124 Chang (2009: 246). 
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To speak of a “source” of normativity, Chang explains, is to speak of “that in virtue of which the 
considerations that ultimately bear normativity – whichever they are – do so.”125 I will take this 
to mean that the “source of normativity” of a reason R, which speaks in favor of S’s ϕ-ing, is 
whatever makes it the case that, or explains why, R is a reason for S to ϕ, where this 
explanation does not itself rely on any normative truths.  
Normative externalists, in Chang’s usage, are those who think that “there is, strictly 
speaking, nothing in virtue of which a consideration is reason-providing – there are just the 
irreducibly normative facts that such-and-such considerations provide reasons,” and who thus 
“locate the source of normativity in a realm of external, irreducibly normative facts.”126 
Normative internalists are those who “locate the source of normativity in mental states internal 
to us, and in particular, in desires and dispositions to which we are for the most part passively 
related.” And normative voluntarists are those who hold that “normativity has its source in 
something we do, and, in particular, in our active attitudes of willing or reflective 
endorsement.”127  
Chang’s main interest is in an assumption which she claims these three camps share in 
common – namely, “that practical normativity has a univocal source”.128 She rejects the idea 
that there is a unitary account of what makes normative things normative. Instead, according to 
her, “practical reason is marked by a deep duality in its source.” While the will is indeed a 
“source of normativity” – i.e., it is what explains the existence of some reasons – it is not the 
                                                          
125 Chang (2009: 243). 
126 Chang (2009: 244). Chang seems to have in mind mostly writers commonly thought to share a commitment to 
some form of realism: she names Clarke, Ross, Prichard, Nagel, Moore, Scanlon, Raz, Dancy, Shafer-Landau, 
Wallace, Wedgwood, Parfit, “among others”. The positions held by at least some of these authors are not 
adequately characterized as denying that there is something “in virtue of which a consideration is reason-
providing”; that is, they do not reject the idea that the existence of normative reasons is explicable or intelligible.  
127 Ibid.  
128 One may wonder whether it is fair to attribute this assumption to all three camps. While it may characterize 
some varieties of voluntarism, the case seems less clear in the case of “normative internalists”, and contentious in 
the case of “normative externalists” (cf.  the objections to the metaphor of “source” in Raz (   : 140). 
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only one: not all normative reasons are explained by reference to the will.  Moreover, those that 
do arise from the will are “hierarchically” subordinate to those that have their normative source 
in something other than the will. In Chang’s terminology, “voluntarist” or “created” reasons are 
hierarchically subordinate to “given” reasons (though not, as we will later see, in the sense of 
deriving their normative standing from the latter). The resulting view is what Chang calls 
“hierarchical voluntarism”: It is the thesis that the will is the source of a certain class of reasons, 
called “voluntarist reasons”, which are in some way subordinate to non-voluntarist reasons, 
reasons whose normative force does not derive from any exercises of the will.   
The terminology of “given” versus “created” is not in itself of great help in understanding 
what exactly makes some reasons “voluntarist”. Among the reasons that Chang would classify 
as “given”, and would thus contrast with voluntarist reasons, would seem to be reasons that we 
have in fact created or can create for ourselves – in an unterminological sense of “create” –, by 
intentionally or unintentionally bringing into existence states of affairs that then constitute 
reasons for us to act in certain ways. Thus it may be more helpful to focus instead directly on 
what is supposed to distinguish voluntarist reasons: they are “reasons whose normativity 
derives… from our own act of will”, and more precisely, reasons which we “create for ourselves 
by taking a consideration to be a reason when our given reasons have run out.”129 Since this 
latter definition, read as containing a certain proviso (“when our given reasons have run out”), 
presupposes that the distinction between “given reasons” and “created reasons” is already 
understood (whereas I just suggested that it is in need of explanation), I will for now treat the 
first part of the sentence as amounting by itself to a definition of voluntarist reasons. I will 
return to the proviso further below. 
                                                          
129 Chang (2009: 256). 
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Voluntarist reasons are considerations whose status as normative reasons for some action of 
ϕ-ing derives from the fact that some agent “takes them” to have that status. Although nothing 
in her account requires it, let us assume, on Chang’s behalf – and in the spirit of her examples –, 
that the “taking” in question is not something that a person simply finds herself doing, perhaps 
habitually or compulsively, but rather something that she in some sense actively chooses to do; 
and, moreover, that a reason will be voluntarist in Chang’s sense only if what makes it a reason 
is, directly, a person’s choosing to take it to be such, not her choosing something else – for 
example, the cultivation of a desire – that then leads to her taking it to be a reason.130 When 
Chang introduces some examples of the creation of voluntarist reasons, it turns out that there is 
a further significant constraint on what can amount to the creation of such reasons. It is not the 
case that one can turn any fact or consideration whatsoever into a reason to φ by choosing to 
take it to be such. Rather, Chang explains, it is possible to create voluntarist reasons only in the 
following way: For any set of considerations that “are not, by hypothesis, relevant to your 
choice…, when your given reasons have run out you can, through an act of will, make them 
[i.e., the previously irrelevant considerations] reasons that are relevant to your choice. You can 
take any consideration that counts in favor of an alternative, even if irrelevant to the choice, as a 
reason for you to choose that alternative.”131  
Chang’s primary example is the making of a far-reaching life choice, where neither of the 
available alternatives has stronger or weightier reasons on its side than the other or others. 
According to her explanation, the creation of a voluntarist reason to φ is not the creation of any 
substantive new consideration in favor of φ-ing. Rather, it is a matter of making some already 
                                                          
130 It may be no accident that Chang’s account does not explicitly require these qualifications, since, as we will see, 
her account lacks the resources to motivate or defend them. The motivation for them is recognizably normative. Yet 
as I will argue, the same is true for a number of other features of her account.  
131 Chang (2009: 257). 
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existing but hitherto “irrelevant” consideration – say, that I would have time to read a book 
tonight if I chose the alternative that requires less immediate action – “relevant”, simply by 
taking it to be so. In a terminologically somewhat idiosyncratic way, she describes this conferral 
of relevance as the transformation of a mere consideration in favor of φ-ing into a reason for φ-
ing.132  
The creation of a voluntarist reason to φ thus presupposes, and therefore cannot be 
incompatible with, the prior existence of some consideration in favor of φ-ing. In fact, Chang 
makes the even stronger claim that in some cases “the voluntarist reason you create shares its 
content with a given reason you already have.”133 And as she explains in a footnote, if one is 
skeptical of her original definition, which presupposes that there can be “considerations” in 
favor of φ-ing which, for lack of “relevance”, are not reasons in favor of φ-ing, then one may 
simply construe her as claiming that all voluntarist reasons share their content with already 
existing or “given” reasons. “If every consideration that counts in favor of the alternatives is 
already a given reason (...), then the role of the will should be understood instead as creating 
new, voluntarist reasons that share content with one’s given reasons.”134 
This explanation of voluntarist reason gives rise to two complementary worries. First, it 
might seem that on this view, no creation of genuinely new reasons can take place at all. If each 
of a person’s voluntarist, “created” reasons is necessarily identical in content with some “given” 
reason she already had, then it is not obvious how her additional act of “taking” that prior 
                                                          
132 She also identifies deliberation about “given” reasons, and the creation of “voluntarist” reasons, as “two stages 
of deliberation”. I will not consider here whether this is a plausible description. Not much seems to turn on it for the 
moment: the distinction between the two stages of deliberation is explained by reference to the distinction between 
given and created or voluntarist reasons, not vice versa.  
133 Chang (2009: 257); my italics.  
134 Ibid., n. 15. The context makes it clear that two distinct reasons have the same content, in the relevant sense, if 
(i) they speak in favor of the same action (e.g., going there) and (ii) they consist in the same fact or facts (e.g., that 
it might be nice if I went) – with the exclusion of facts about the “source of normativity” of the two reasons, by 
which they can be distinguished despite their identical content.  
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consideration to be a reason will make any difference to her normative situation. If this is all that 
voluntarist reasons can be, the objection goes, then there are no voluntarist reasons. Chang 
disagrees. She argues that her constraint on the creation of voluntarist reasons is needed since “a 
given content cannot count as a reason as a conceptual matter unless that content counts in 
favor of the action.”135 But, she continues, to conclude from her constraint “that the source of 
the normativity of that reason cannot be the will” would be “to conflate the content of the reason 
with the status of being a reason.”136 From the fact that all voluntarist reasons must be identical 
in content with some antecedently existing favoring consideration, “it does not follow that the 
source of the normativity of that reason cannot be the will.”137  
The second, related worry is that if we accept that we can create reasons that are identical in 
content to reasons we already have, this will commit us to an objectionable sort of “double 
counting”. Chang raises this worry and denies its force. Even though it is true that an existing 
reason is in a certain sense – namely in terms of its “content” – merely reduplicated, the 
normativity of the duplicate stems from a different “source” than that of the original reason. And 
this is enough to properly individuate the voluntarist reason. “Why shouldn’t a single 
consideration have normativity with two different sources and thus provide two distinct 
reasons?”138 Due to the distinction in their “sources of normativity”, the original given reason 
and its voluntarist duplicate can be properly distinguished, and there is no double counting. 
                                                          
135 While it seems to me that Chang is right about her conceptual claim, it is not at all obvious why some content’s 
(or consideration’s) “counting in favor”, which admittedly is a necessary feature of its being a reason, cannot itself 
be a result of “voluntarist creation” instead of being “given”. Why should voluntarist creation be restricted to 
operating on the “status” of existing considerations in favor of φ-ing, instead of giving rise to new considerations in 
favor of φ-ing? I will suggest below that this restriction, which is not further motivated by Chang, is needed to 
ensure the “hierarchical” nature of her voluntarism, given that Chang deprives herself of other – normative – 
resources for explaining what could make voluntarism hierarchical (rather than, as it were, full-blown or 
unrestricted).  
136 Chang (2009: 257 n. 16).  




The two objections press the same point: it is not easy to see how “C is a reason for me to 
φ” and (identically) “C is a reason for me to φ” could rationally figure in deliberation as two 
distinct considerations, even when accompanied by two distinct explanations or “sources” of 
their reason-giving or normative force. There is nothing conceptually incoherent about Chang’s 
suggestion. But Chang’s response to the objection – that reasons are not exhaustively 
individuated by statements of the form “C is a reason for S to ϕ”, but that a more fine-grained 
mode of individuation would further distinguish between considerations that satisfy this 
description, by reverting to “normative sources”, or that “in virtue of which” they satisfy it – 
may show too much. For any given consideration that constitutes a reason to ϕ, there may be 
multiple true explanations of why it does so. It is an interesting and important question whether 
these explanations are themselves part of the reason – i.e., part of what rationalizes the action of 
someone who acts for that reason – or whether they are in some sense “in the background.” But 
whether answered one way or another, this question is not usually understood as bearing on the 
individuation of reasons. If there are multiple explanations of why C is a reason to ϕ, and they 
are all (as in Chang’s proposal) compatible, then it is plausible to assume either that none of 
them is part of the reason, or that they all are. To suppose, instead, that various mutually 
compatible explanations identify different reasons is to open the door to an open-ended 
proliferation of reasons. Perhaps someone else’s approval of my ϕ-ing for the reason that C, and 
the aesthetic value of doing so, and its contribution to my well-being, etc., all make it the case 
that C counts in favor of my ϕ-ing. We might adopt a terminology that speaks of so many 
different reasons in such a case. But the restriction of such “sources” to exactly two, as proposed 
by Chang, would need to be motivated by the independent plausibility of recognizing a 
fundamental distinction between just two types of “sources” in virtue of which C can be a 
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reason for S to ϕ, rather than simply a multiplicity of potentially true explanations of its being 
so.  
 
3. The motivation for hierarchical voluntarism 
At this point, let me turn to Chang’s explanation of what motivates the introduction of the 
notion of a voluntarist reason in the first place. Perhaps this will help account for the claim that 
certain exercises of the will (namely, acts of “taking to be a reason”) – and only they, and only 
under certain conditions – can function as a distinctive “normative source” of reasons: one that 
interestingly contrasts with all other considerations – in her terminology, “sources” – invoked in 
true explanations of the existence of reasons.  
Chang names two motivations for her proposal, encapsulated in two “puzzles” that she 
claims are solved by the postulation of voluntarist reasons: 
(i) Her proposal is supposed to explain how we “can have most reason to do something 
when our reasons have in some sense “run out”,” or how it can be “appropriate to 
continue to deliberate about which alternative to choose when one is practically certain 
that one’s reasons have run out.”139 
(ii) Her proposal is supposed to explain how we can “make ourselves into agents with… 
distinctive ideal rational selves if we are rationally required to follow our reasons.”140  
 
Ad (i): When reasons have “run out” 
Chang points out that sometimes, one’s reasons for action “run out”, in the sense that one is 
“practically certain” that there is no one single option most favored by reasons, and yet “when 
                                                          
139 Chang (2009: 246, 251). The metaphor of “running out” of reasons relies on the image of reasons as a sort of 
measurable currency of justification. I am not certain that this is a helpful image, but I think it is irrelevant to the 
present debate. 
140 Chang (2009: 246).  
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one chooses [to φ]… it seems that one has most reason to choose it. How can this be?”141 More 
specifically, she claims, sometimes an agent believes that her reasons have “run out”, and yet 
she continues deliberating. Why is this not plain irrational? 
There is a simple candidate answer to this question, invoking epistemic uncertainty: I 
continue deliberating as long as I am not entirely convinced that my impression that reasons 
have run out really does take into account all the information conceivably available to me, 
including, perhaps, information about my own dispositions, hopes, ambitions, etc., and how they 
would harmonize with either of the options before me, and to what extent they should inform 
my evaluation of these options (i.e., to what extent I should, or to what extent I have reason to, 
treat contingent facts about me as reasons for choosing one way or another). Chang sidesteps 
this answer by invoking the notion of “practical certainty”, meaning “a point in deliberation at 
which it would be practically irrational to second-guess ourselves”.142 And she goes on to claim 
that even in the face of practical certainty that reasons have run out – that there are no further 
relevant considerations that one has not taken into account – “it could be perfectly appropriate to 
continue to deliberate” about what one should do.143 (This is the first part of the “puzzle”. A 
second one is that in some cases it is not appropriate to go on deliberating once reasons have run 
out, which raises the question of what distinguishes the two sorts of cases. )  
Voluntarist reasons are supposed to solve the puzzle. At this point, we need to reinstate 
Chang’s proviso, which I set aside earlier, that voluntarist reasons come into play only “when 
our given reasons have run out”. Deliberation then has “two stages”: At the first stage, we figure 
                                                          
141 Chang (2009: 248).  
142 Cf. Chang (2009: 251). A curious consequence of this is that the threshold separating “given” from “voluntarist” 
reasons comes to be defined in epistemic terms.   
143 Ibid. Richard Holton suggests, plausibly it seems to me, that such practical certainty about the non-existence of 




out what reasons there are; assuming they “run out” without identifying a single most favored 
option, we then at the second stage “will a reason that supports an alternative. This willing 
creates normativity by creating new reasons whose normativity derives from the very act of 
will.”144 The distinction between the two stages of deliberation explains why voluntarist reasons 
are “hierarchically” subordinate to given reasons: it is because they have weight only within the 
fine-grained regions of deliberative space where given reasons are silent. Voluntarist reasons 
can never figure at the “first stage” of deliberation.  
This explanation makes it clear that the reach of voluntarist reasons is severely restricted. 
They are, by definition, “ad hoc” reasons, in that the possibility of their existence is relative to 
an epistemic or deliberative context.145 But this imposes significant limits on their standing as 
normative reasons: it becomes difficult to see how voluntarist reasons could serve the critical 
and guiding function of genuine normative reasons, if they can lapse simply as a result in 
changes of the epistemic or deliberative situation. Thus they do not seem to have any 
permanence or stability, such that once created, they could be appealed to – or indeed could be 
required to figure, as “given” reasons – in recurrent future deliberations.  
Another feature of voluntarist reasons raises the same problem: If having a reason to φ 
consists in nothing but the attitude of “taking” or “willing” some consideration to be a reason to 
φ, then how can a person be criticized for failing to take this reason into consideration, given 
that this failure would just be evidence that she is not taking or willing this reason to be there in 
the first place? If she does not take the putative voluntarist reason into account, arguably this is 
                                                          
144 Ibid. I will not pursue the question of why Chang thinks it appropriate to characterize the process of creating 
voluntarist reasons as a “stage of deliberation”. It may be that without this characterization, it would be more 
difficult to state her first puzzle.  
145 Strictly speaking, on Chang’s proposal, what is in this way context-dependent is the possibility of bringing them 
into existence. But the explanation of why that possibility depends on the deliberative context seems to derive from 
a view about the deliberative role that such reasons could play (which is restricted to something like a tie-breaking 
function); and a restriction on their deliberative role is a restriction on the possibility of their existence, at least from 
the perspective of deliberation.  
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sufficient to make it the case that she does not take the consideration in question to have the 
added force of a voluntarist reason. But if this is so, then it is no longer clear in what sense the 
existence of a voluntarist reason is supposed to make it the case that there is now “most reason” 
to choose some particular option, whereas absent that reason there was not. In other words, it is 
not clear that voluntarist reasons, as Chang understands them, could solve the first puzzle she 
raises.146  
 
Ad (ii): “distinctive rational identities”  
The second puzzle to which voluntarist reasons are offered as a solution is stated as 
follows: “How can rational agents both be fully responsive to reasons and at the same time 
exercise control over who they are, rationally speaking?”147 Chang claims that “if being rational 
is responding appropriately to our reasons, it is not clear how we can get enough distance from 
our reasons to be able to make ourselves into one kind of distinctive rational agent rather than 
another.”148 Voluntarist reasons, however, can account for this, since “creating reasons by an act 
of will is part of a deliberative process of making oneself into the distinctive rational agent that 
one is.”149 
To motivate the puzzle, Chang introduces the notion of a “rational identity”, which she 
glosses as “[one’s] ideal rational self”. One’s rational identity is “a function… of the reasons 
                                                          
146 We may also wonder whether there is a genuine “puzzle” here in the first place. In what sense of “appropriate” 
is deliberation past the point of practical certainty appropriate? And to the extent that it is, why and in what sense 
should we at the same time be committed to judging it “irrational”, absent the idea of “voluntarist reasons”? What 
is lacking here, at the least, is a phenomenology of deliberation which would show that it can sometimes fall into 
the two distinct “stages” whose existence Chang asserts. This phenomenology would need to be supplemented, 
moreover, by an explanation of why we should ever find it desirable or important that our choices be “rationally 
determined” (rather than just rationally eligible). Chang offers no such explanation, and that is to say, no reasons 
against the practice of “picking” or “plumping” when no single best option can be identified. 
147 Chang (2009: 260). In a more recent manuscript (presented at a conference in St. Louis in May 2010), Chang 
articulates what seems to be substantially the same puzzle (or motivation for hierarchical voluntarism) in terms of 
the notion of “commitment.”  
148 Ibid. 
149 Chang (2009: 255).  
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that determine what you have most reason to do in actual and hypothetical choice situations.”150 
And this, she argues, differs for different people, even when we imagine them placed in 
identical choice situations.  
Initially, it is not easy to discern a puzzle here. One’s individual, particular reasons for 
action at a given time will partly depend on such factors as one’s particular abilities (to succeed 
at something, to properly appreciate or engage with something, to remember something, and so 
on), one’s reasonably stable or resilient or stubborn dispositions (for example to perseverance, 
to enjoyment, to being taken to, and so on, as well as to their opposites), one’s relational and 
role obligations, and perhaps many other sorts of facts about the person one is. But the puzzle, 
Chang insists, arises when we ask not just how it could be that different agents have reason to 
choose differently (even faced with the same set of alternatives), but how it could be that a 
person can actively make it the case that she has such an idiosyncratic rational identity – how it 
is that she can “make herself” into an agent possessing one such identity rather than another.   
But why is this any more of a puzzle than the previous question of how people can come to 
have different “rational identities”? Many of the facts in virtue of which an agent has the 
particular rational identity she has can, after all, be quite unproblematically understood as the 
results of her own activity: whether or not, say, she is able to swim, whether she enjoys talking 
about the stock market or not, whether the person who suggests she change her career is a 
trusted friend or not, and so on. Chang may object that this is not what she meant by “active”: 
that neither of these cases is active enough, or active in the right sense.  The question of how we 
can “make ourselves” into distinct rational agents is not just the question how we could have 
                                                          
150 Chang (2009: 260). As before, it is not clear why the focus should be on the question of what there is most 
reason to do in a given situation. It may be best to read this sentence not as implying that for any given situation, 
there is some single course of action that there is most reason to do, but instead as allowing that what there is most 
reason to do is one of several equally favored courses of action.  
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come to be distinct rational agents as a result of some of our own past choices. Rather, it is the 
question of how we can decide, with hopes of succeeding, that in the future, our rational identity 
shall have some specific shape or other. But an obvious answer to this further question seems to 
be: we can do so by aiming at those results – for example, by cultivating in ourselves specific 
abilities and dispositions, or by developing specific relationships and roles, which we know to 
have certain likely normative consequences.  
So what remains of the puzzle? According to Chang, the problem is that our attributing to 
ourselves the ability to create our own particular rational identities is, prima facie, in conflict 
with the requirement that we be properly “responsive to our reasons.” Either our reasons fully 
determine our choices, in which case there is, allegedly, no active “making” on our part (since 
reason does not give us a choice in the matter); or our choices are underdetermined by reasons, 
in which case our making these choices is said to be, again, not a “making” of our rational 
identity, since we lack “most reason” to go for one option rather than another; or our choices 
lack rational support altogether, in which case they are “not within the scope of practical reason” 
at all and therefore do not qualify as acts of creating a rational identity for ourselves.151 But it is 
hard to see how any of these conclusions are warranted. Shaping our rational identities need not 
proceed by way of rationally shaping our identities. In cultivating ourselves in ways that will 
equip us with particular rational or normative profiles, it does not matter whether the reasons we 
already have allow us any discretion in these respects, or whether whatever we do to bring about 
these normative consequences is even licensed by reasons at all: what matters to the question at 
hand is simply that we can bring them about, perhaps without having conclusive or even 
                                                          
151 Chang (2009: 263 f.)  
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sufficient reason to do so, or even contrary to reason, and that by doing so we can shape our 
“rational identities”, in the sense stipulated by Chang.  
Perhaps we can better understand the demand for an explanation of the puzzle on Chang’s 
behalf by working backwards from her proposed solution: “you make your own rational identity 
by creating for yourself some of the reasons which determine it.”152 This, as we have seen, 
would also be a correct description of the process by which I have suggested we can quite un-
puzzlingly create “rational identities” for ourselves. To understand what specific, more puzzling 
notion of “making one’s own rational identity” Chang has in mind, we might add that in light of 
her proposed solution, the reasons through whose creation we make our rational identities must 
be voluntarist reasons in Chang’s sense. But if the puzzle itself is best motivated in terms of the 
unique solution for which it is said to call, that makes it difficult to see how the puzzle could in 
turn motivate the theoretical need for voluntarist reasons.  
Still, the question remains whether and how we can determine our own rational identities 
other than in the somewhat indirect fashion just described: that is to say, other than by bringing 
about states of affairs (and especially, states of ourselves – or perhaps more importantly: states 
of affairs that stay with us) that have certain specific normative consequences for us, and that 
have these consequences regardless of whether we have reason to bring them about. While there 
may be such ways, the notion of voluntarist reasons cannot explain their special significance as 
long as the interest of that notion has not been independently demonstrated. I have argued that 
the two puzzles, intended to serve this purpose, fail to do so; and I have suggested that the 
notion of voluntarist reasons, as introduced by Chang, may in any case be unable to explain how 
there can be those more direct ways of shaping our rational identities, given what I argued is the 
                                                          
152 Chang (2009: 265).  
102 
 
strongly contextual and will-dependent nature of those reasons, and hence their dubious 
normativity.  
 
4. Voluntarist reasons and normative powers 
To summarize my discussion so far: While it seems to me that Chang’s argument does 
address an important question – the question of the normative role of the will and of its 
rationally underdetermined exercises (acts of choice or discretion) – her positive proposal is not 
fully persuasive. What remains are the desiderata stated at the end of her article, namely, “to 
capture the main insight of voluntarism – that we can confer normativity or value on things”, 
and to do so by “[putting] the will in its proper place.”153 If my criticisms are valid, then both 
the motivation and the execution of this undertaking may have to look somewhat different from 
the way Chang envisions them.  
To see why, consider again the crucial question that, I suggested, was insufficiently 
answered by Chang’s presentation of her two puzzles: Why should we attribute to agents the 
ability to create voluntarist reasons? To classify acts, or active attitudes, of taking-to-be-a-reason 
(or taking-to-be-relevant) as an irreducible “source of normativity” is a way of obscuring the 
nature of the question of what makes it the case that such acts can have the normative 
consequences attributed to them, and have them in just the way the account claims. What makes 
it the case that the will is a “source” of normativity in just this way? It seems to me that when 
we pose this question, we are asking why certain volitional facts are accorded a certain kind of 
normative import in our practical reasoning. But this suggests that a proper answer to the 
                                                          
153 Chang (2009: 271). 
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question, unlike the one given by Chang, will in turn involve normative or evaluative 
reasoning.154  
Chang summarizes her own approach to the question in the final part of her essay. She 
asks: “But can agents really create normativity?”, explaining that “at issue here is not the ersatz 
“normative power” involved in, say, making a promise to meet someone for lunch,” but rather 
“the sort of willing involved in a genuine normative power.”155  As she points out (relying on 
her tripartite metaethical taxonomy summarized earlier), for the sort of normative principle that 
would underwrite the normative bindingness of valid promises, “the source of the normativity of 
this principle may be an irreducible normative reality.” She infers from this that someone’s 
making a promise “does not create normativity.”156 This explanation makes it clear that what 
Chang means by the ability to create voluntarist reasons is not simply an ability to bring into 
existence, merely through an act of will, a reason that was not in place before; rather, it is our 
alleged ability to make our willing something to be a reason (or more precisely, as we have 
seen, to be a relevant consideration) the non-derivative “source of the normativity” of the 
resulting reason. The explanation that hierarchical voluntarism offers for the normative import 
of certain volitional facts, or acts of will, refers to their metaphysical or constitutive status.   
This means that a normative explanation of normative powers is not available to Chang, 
just as a normative explanation of the fundamental normative role of the will is unavailable to 
Korsgaard. According to hierarchical voluntarism, “genuine” normative powers are exercised 
only in the creation of reasons whose normative force cannot be explained by reference to any 
                                                          
154 As I suggest further below, it is quite possible, indeed likely, that the specific shape of Chang’s voluntarism is in 
effect guided by normative considerations. But such considerations are not explicitly or as such put forward, and are 
indeed disavowed, as reasons for believing that her voluntarist theory is true.  
155 Chang (2009: 267 f.) (italics added). What Chang sets aside as “ersatz normative powers” is just the 
phenomenon that established usage refers to as “normative powers”; see Section 7 below.  
156 Chang (2009: 268).  
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antecedent normative truths: reasons whose normative credentials are exhausted by the fact that 
they have been willed into existence, so that no further normative explanation can be given for 
what makes it the case that some act of will is able to give rise to such a reason (rather than, for 
example, being intended to do so but failing at it). Moreover, in contrast with Korsgaard, no 
constitutivist explanation of the normative import of volition is given; hierarchical voluntarism 
does not claim that the normative role of the will is to be understood by reference to the role of 
the relevant volitions in the constitution of agency.157 All that is left to support her claim that 
such powers exist is their alleged importance for answering the two puzzles previously 
discussed. But as we saw, there is at best weak support from that direction. Even if the support 
were stronger, what the puzzles would show is only that the relevant powers exist in case the 
normative appearances presented by the types of cases that give rise to the puzzles do not 
mislead. And whether they do or not would seem to be a matter for normative debate, to which 
our beliefs about the existence of normative powers should accordingly be sensitive.  
There is a further problem. Without understanding the existence of the normative powers 
exercised in the creation of voluntarist reasons as in turn explained by normative considerations, 
it also becomes difficult to understand the “hierarchical relation” between one’s given and one’s 
voluntarist reasons. As we have seen, this hierarchical relation is meant to “[guarantee] that we 
can never create a voluntarist reason that goes against our all-things-considered given reasons”, 
since “you can’t create a voluntarist reason unless your non-voluntarist reasons have run out.”158 
For one, Chang’s own explanation forces us to conceive of the “hierarchical” relation as 
partially turning on actual, temporally extended psychological processes, such that the reaching 
of “practical certainty” concerning the underdetermination of a choice serves as a threshold 
                                                          
157 Hierarchical voluntarism gives the will a role in the constitution of “rational identities”; but these are not 
“inescapable” in the sense that reflective agency is alleged to be in the view of constitutivists like Korsgaard.  
158 Chang (2009: 269). 
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(“when given reasons have run out”). This has the problematic implication that the ability to 
create a voluntarist reason – and that is to say, the normative power to do so – depends on 
factors quite independent from the actual balance of reasons in the case at hand.  
Moreover, as we have seen, Chang’s way of accounting for the hierarchical relation forces 
her to limit the role of voluntarist reasons to the normative reinforcement of considerations that 
were already in place anyway, in order to avert the threats of “bootstrapping” and 
“arbitrariness.” But what constitutes objectionable forms of bootstrapping, and what constitutes 
arbitrariness, are again questions of value. A restriction of normative powers to the ability to 
“reinforce” existing reasons, motivated by these concerns, would not be necessary on a view 
that explained the relation between antecedent and created reasons in straightforwardly 
normative terms to begin with, rather than in the temporal and psychological terms of “stages” 
and “practical certainty.” But Chang’s definition of voluntarist reasons precludes such an 
explanation. By insisting that what makes a reason voluntarist is the fact that its normativity 
stems from a special, non-derivative, primitive “source”, she threatens to sever the connection 
between these alleged reasons and the normative domain as a whole. It therefore seems 
premature to claim that the hierarchical structure of her own proposal “avoids what is widely 
considered the most fundamental problem with voluntarism” – the problem of “objectionable 
arbitrariness” in what a person has most reason to do. For by requiring us to believe that 
“practical reason is marked by a deep duality in its source,” her proposal does not allow us to 
account for the proper place that voluntarist reasons can or should occupy within agents’ 
practical reasoning. 
There is a different conception of “normative powers” available, which I explain in section 
7 below. It is not motivated by, and does not depend on, any particular meta-ethical aims, even 
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while delivering in other respect just what Chang is seeking – namely, an explanation of the 
substantive normative role of exercises of the will, and thus a restricted form of voluntarism. 
This conception shares the two complementary main features of Chang’s proposal – the 
possibility of voluntary acts that are normatively creative, and the under-determination of those 
acts by prior normative considerations – but it explains them in a quite different way. 
Metaphorically speaking, the “space” within which discretion operates is not a negative space, 
an area that is somehow left over when antecedent reasons “run out.” It is instead positively 
constituted by antecedent reasons – specifically, reasons for investing certain voluntary acts 
with normative significance. In other words, the scope and extent – and indeed the existence – 
of that discretionary space is itself a normative or evaluative matter, rather than a metaphysical 
one that is moreover settled (oddly enough) by the psychological fact of the “giving out” of 
reasons, or the onset of “practical certainty” that they give out. This means that substantive 
normative or ethical considerations will have to be advanced to support any attributions of the 
power to create reasons in non-trivial ways.  
 
5. Enoch on Reason-Creation 
I now turn to a different proposal for vindicating a limited form of voluntarism, by David 
Enoch, which at first glance adopts a much narrower focus than Chang’s. It is an attempt to 
account for the existence of distinctively voluntarist reasons other than by reference to claims 
about the “source” or sources of normativity. Instead, what accounts for the distinctiveness of 
voluntarist reasons is a matter of the peculiar way in which they are brought into existence, in 
combination with a first-order normative explanation of why reasons can be brought into 
existence in this way.  
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In his paper „Giving Practical Reasons“, Enoch distinguishes between three interpretations 
of the notion of reason-giving – that is to say, between three (prima facie) importantly different 
things that we might mean when we speak of “giving someone else a reason.” He calls them 
“epistemic”, “triggering”, and “robust” reason-giving, respectively. The first of these consists in 
making someone aware of a reason that she already has. In this sense, to “give someone a 
reason” is simply to convey to her a piece of information; it amounts to changing her epistemic 
situation, but not her reasons for action. The second kind of reason-giving consists in bringing 
about some state of affairs that operates as a reason by activating or “triggering” a pre-existing, 
more general reason. It amounts to changing someone’s normative situation, but it does so only 
be virtue of instantiating the antecedent of some normative conditional (“Whenever X, there is a 
reason to φ”) that is not itself first made true by the act of reason-giving.  
Enoch’s goal in his paper is to establish whether in addition to these two, there is a third 
thing that we might mean by “giving someone a reason”, and which he calls robust reason-
giving. Robust reason-giving is primarily defined negatively, in contradistinction to the two 
possibilities just named: it consists in not merely pointing out but instead creating a reason, and, 
moreover, in creating a reason not simply by “triggering” an already existing more general 
reason or normative principle. To anticipate, Enoch’s discussion yields the conclusion that there 
is no robust reason-giving in this strong sense. All cases of reason-giving are cases of 
“epistemic” or “triggering” reason-giving. Absent some further explanation, this would reduce 
voluntarism to what I called a “trivial” view. However, some of the phenomena that at first 
glance might seem to invite the idea of robust reason-giving – Enoch focuses on the case of 
requesting, but he mentions actions like commanding and promising – have a sufficiently 
distinctive structure to regard them as a “very special case” of triggering reason-giving. The 
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existence of this kind of “special case” constitutes a qualified vindication of the idea that there is 
such a thing as robust reason-giving, and thus reasons whose explanation is voluntarist in a non-
trivial way.  
In this section, I will very briefly present Enoch’s argument to the conclusion that all cases 
of giving reasons in other than an epistemic sense are cases of triggering or activating 
antecedently existing conditional or general reasons, and introduce his proposal for a qualified 
vindication of “robust” reason-giving. I will then (in Section 6) examine some of the questions 
left unanswered by his proposal, and argue that they are best addressed by reverting to the 
concept of normative power in the traditional sense that was explicitly set aside by Chang.  
Enoch’s main argument for the claim that all cases of putatively robust reason-giving reduce 
to instances of “triggering” or activating antecedent reasons is that this provides the only 
plausible explanation of why and how requests and other acts of reason-giving are capable of 
creating the reasons they do. Enoch points out that there are two possible interpretations of the 
conditional “if I request that you φ, you thereby come to have a reason to φ”. On the first, 
narrow-scope interpretation, if I ask you to φ, then you thereby come to have a reason to φ. On 
the second, wide-scope interpretation, there is a reason for you to (φ in case I ask you to do so). 
But the only plausible explanation of the truth of the narrow-scope conditional, Enoch argues, is 
that the wide-scope conditional already holds, i.e., that the reason with the conditional content 
already exists. Otherwise we would be left with “the mysteriousness of a brute narrow-scope 
conditional.” 
Enoch does consider one alternative explanation of the truth of the narrow-scope 
conditional, taking up a proposal by Mark Schroeder. According to this “constitutive model”, 
the explanation for some fact’s being a reason to φ – in this case, the explanation for a request’s 
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being a reason to do what is being requested – does not appeal to further normative reasons for 
attributing this kind of normative significance to the fact in question, but claims instead that the 
existence of some fact of this kind (e.g., a request’s having been made) is simply what it is for 
there to be a reason (or at least what it is for there to be a reason of a certain kind). Enoch 
discards this alternative explanation at least for the case of requesting.159 Nevertheless, the 
availability of the alternative, “constitutive” explanation diminishes the generality of Enoch’s 
conclusion: Even if for the case of requests, the only plausible explanation of their reason-giving 
force is in terms of their activating or “triggering” the prior reason stated in the wide-scope 
conditional, this leaves open the possibility that there might be other cases of putatively robust 
reason-giving where the constitutive explanation does in fact work. I have raised some 
misgivings about this possibility, and sympathies with the insistence on the availability of a 
normative explanation, in my discussion of Chang’s voluntarism above, and will set further 
discussion of this question aside for now.160  
This leaves us with the question of what makes requesting and certain other cases of 
triggering reason-giving “special” in a way that would explain how the idea of robustness, while 
capable of being vindicated only in a qualified sense, can so much as arise with respect to 
them.161 In order to bring out the specificity of cases of putatively robust reason-giving, Enoch 
proposes to consider the characteristic intentions of someone engaging in such reason-giving. 
He argues that what sets such cases apart from the triggering of conditional reasons more 
broadly conceived is a specific set of intentions on the part of the reason-giver. For me to intend 
                                                          
159 Cf. Enoch (2011a: 12). 
160 Enoch also considers and dismisses two “extreme strategies” with regard to cases of putatively robust reason-
giving, which respectively consist in regarding the phenomenon as non-existent, on the one hand, or as inexplicably 
sui generis, on the other. Contrary to these suggestions, Enoch assumes both that acts like requesting are indeed 
capable of creating reasons, and that some informative explanation is available of why that is the case. 
161 I will follow Enoch in continuing to use the description “robust” for the specific conception of reason-creation 
yielded by this qualified vindication. 
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to robustly give another person S a reason to φ by requesting that she φ, Enoch claims, is for me 
to intend three distinct things:  
(i) to intend to give S a reason to φ, and to do so simply by communicating that 
intention to her;  
(ii) to intend to bring it about that S recognizes my intending (1), on the basis of my 
communicating that intention;  
(iii) to intend that the reason that I thereby give to S should depend “in an appropriate 
way” on S’s recognition of my intention to give her a reason to φ.162  
Moreover, in order for this cluster of intentions to actually succeed, certain “normative 
success conditions” have to be in place. Foremost among these is the existence of “an 
independent reason that is triggered by this procedure – roughly, a reason (for B) to do as A 
intends that B have a reason to do.”163 The existence of this independent reason is what makes 
requesting and other types of robust reason-giving cases of triggering reason-giving.  
 
6. The distinctiveness of robust reason-creation 
In what follows, I will explore three questions left unanswered by Enoch’s account as I have 
presented it so far:  
(1) What determines what counts as an “appropriate way” in which a person’s reason must 
depend on her recognizing the reason-giver’s intention to give her such a reason, in order 
for this reason-giving (if successful) to qualify as robust in Enoch’s mitigated sense?  
(2) What will count as a suitable independent reason, such that its “triggering” could 
constitute robust reason-giving?  
                                                          
162 Enoch (2011a: 15). 
163 Enoch (2011a: 16). 
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Both of these questions would have to be answered in order to determine whether any given 
action informed by the intentions (i) - (iii) does indeed amount to a case of robust reason-giving. 
Enoch himself does not say much about how to answer either of them. The latter, he writes, “is a 
part of the most general substantive theory of what reasons we have, a theory I unfortunately do 
not have up my sleeve.”164 (As Enoch grants in a footnote, this means that an error theory about 
robust reason-giving, and thus one of the two “extreme strategies” dismissed by him, is not 
strictly speaking ruled out by his account.) The former is disposed of by saying that “usually we 
know a deviant causal chain when we see one,” coupled with the observation that the absence of 
explicit criteria of what would amount to such deviance “does not make [the account] empty.”165 
Yet answering these two questions is important not only to vindicate the claim that there is 
indeed such a thing as robust reason-giving, but also to support the claim that this is a distinctive 
or “importantly unique” form of reason-giving. As I explained earlier, Enoch concludes that on 
his account, “robust reason-giving is a particular instance (but an importantly unique one) of 
triggering reason-giving.”166 But arguably, other kinds of reason-giving are unique in their own 
respective ways. Therefore,  
(3)  can we elucidate further to which practical or theoretical concerns the singling out of 
this specific mode of “triggering” independent reasons answers, so as to vindicate the 
claim that it is not just unique but in fact “importantly unique”? 
 
ad (1): “in an appropriate way” 
As we have seen, according to Enoch, “what is important in the case of requests is that the 
reason-giver not only intends to give a reason, but also that she intends the giving of the reason 
                                                          





to depend on the reason-receiver recognizing that very intention, and indeed on this recognition 
playing an appropriate role in the reason-receiver's practical reasoning.”167 The specification “an 
appropriate role” points to the fact that it is possible to think of cases where some person’s 
coming to have a reason to do X depends on her recognition of my intention to give her such a 
reason, but where the reason in question nevertheless does not count as “robustly given” by me. 
To say, as Enoch does here, that the recognition of my intention may not play “an appropriate 
role in the reason-receiver’s practical reasoning” is equivalent to saying that S’s reason to ϕ, 
while dependent on her recognition of my intention to give her such a reason, may not depend 
on that recognition “in the right way”.  
What are the kinds of cases that are meant to be ruled out by such an explanation, and what 
makes it the case, in general, that the dependency in question is or is not of the right kind? As 
we have already seen, Enoch remarks that what is meant to be ruled out by this condition are 
“deviant causal chains”. This would refer to cases where the recognition of the intention 
causally leads to the reason-receiver’s coming to be in a state or a situation in which she in fact 
has a reason to ϕ, but where that causal connection is somehow not the right one. However, the 
example which Enoch himself gives to motivate condition (iii) is not an instance of this kind. He 
considers a scenario in which B comes to have a reason to do what A is requesting because of 
the presence of some third person, C, who overhears the request and whom B wants to please. In 
this case, Enoch argues, there would be a reason to fulfill the request even if the request were 
insincere (i.e., if the intention to create a reason for B to φ were absent), or (we might imagine) 
if the request were withdrawn but without this withdrawal becoming known to C. What goes 
wrong in this type of situation is not, it seems to me, best explained in terms of a deviant causal 
                                                          
167 Enoch (2011a: 15). 
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chain. It is not the case that the reason-receiver’s coming to have a reason to φ stands in the 
wrong causal relation to her recognition of the reason-giving intention.168 The same is true for 
another example cited by Enoch: the dictator’s child with whose whimsical requests I have 
reason to comply for fear of sanctions on the part of its irascible father, without those requests 
therefore qualifying as instances of robust reason-giving. Here, too, it seems that there is 
nothing causally amiss with the way that my recognition of the child’s intention plays in my 
doing what the child is requesting.169 But this means that Enoch’s invocation of companions in 
guilt for the lack of a criterion of deviant causal chains, even if warranted, does not after all 
dispense him from saying more about what does and what does not count as an “appropriate” 
kind of dependence of the existence of the given reason on the reason-receiver’s recognition of 
the reason-giving intention.  
An intuitive explanation of condition (iii) offered by Enoch himself suggests a way of 
avoiding the problem of deviance. He explains that this condition “can be understood as a 
generalization of such natural thoughts as that when I ask you to ϕ, I intend that your reason for 
ϕ-ing be that I asked you to; that when I command that you ϕ, I intend that your reason for ϕ-
ing be that I said so, etc.”170 Why, then, should we not simply say that robust reason-giving 
requires that the “given” reason to ϕ should consist in the reason-giver’s complex intention (the 
intention to create a reason by communicating his or her intention to do so) – rather than saying, 
as Enoch’s condition does, that the given reason should “depend on” the recognition of that 
                                                          
168 Indeed, it seems to me that in this particular example, coming to have the reason to φ does not depend on the 
recognition of the intention at all, causal or otherwise. If A has reason to please C, and if doing what B is requesting 
would please C, then A has a reason to do what B requests, regardless of whether she recognizes this reason or not.  
169 As compared to the previous example, I am here slightly changing the identification of the relevant “causal” 
connection, making it about the causal role that the recognition of the intention plays for the reason-receiver’s 
action rather than for the existence of the relevant reason. I am not quite comfortable with the idea of conceiving of 
the practical (i.e., action-guiding) role of the intention-recognition as a causal one, but I am even less sure about the 
idea of an intention-recognition playing a “causal” role in the existence of a reason, as Enoch seems to envision. I 
may however be misunderstanding this aspect of his account.  
170 Enoch (2011a: 16). 
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intention, and depend on it “in an appropriate way”? It could seem that this modification of 
condition (iii) would not allow the problem of deviant causal chains to arise in the first place. 
Moreover, it would also seem to take care of the type of “inappropriate” scenario underlying the 
examples just described, since that scenario turns on the fact that B’s reason for ϕ-ing is simply 
not the right reason: it is not A’s intention to create such a reason for B, but rather the fact that 
some person C believes that A has that intention and would be please by B’s treating it as a 
reason, or the fact that the dictator threatens dire consequences.  
Does this mean that the theoretical lacuna indicated by the specification “in an appropriate 
way” can be filled by the modified version of (iii) just suggested, and that the specification 
therefore becomes altogether superfluous once the modification is adopted? It seems not. We 
can revise the examples so that the problem reappears. If C’s belief concerning A’s (the reason-
giver’s) intentions is reliably sensitive to A’s in fact having those intentions, then it is indeed the 
presence of those intentions themselves that constitutes a reason for B to ϕ, just as the modified 
formulation of (iii) requires. Similarly, if there is a reliable threat of sanctions connected with 
the child’s purported requests, then the child’s intending to give me a reason to φ will indeed 
constitute a reason for me to φ.171 In these modified cases, the way in which the respective 
reasons to ϕ depend on the reason-receiver’s recognition of the corresponding intentions still 
does not seem to be of the “appropriate” sort. But what makes the dependency of the reason on 
                                                          
171 It would be a mistake to object that even in the revised examples, the reason-receiver’s reason for ϕ-ing does 
not, after all, consist in the reason-giver’s intentions (so that the revised condition would be violated after all). It is 
true that the reason would not exist but for C’s beliefs about A’s intentions, and for B’s wish to please C – or, in the 
second example, but for the temperament of the dictator. But this just means that the reason-giver’s intentions are 
not a complete reason for B to ϕ: they are a reason for B to ϕ only provided certain further normative conditions. 
And that, in itself, does not mean that B’s reason to ϕ does not consist in A’s intentions; it just means that it is not 
exhausted by those intentions, which is as it should be. The aim of Enoch’s paper, after all, is precisely to show that 
it is implausible to think that the relevant intentions on the part of A could by themselves explain how B comes to 
have a reason to ϕ. As we saw before, the possibility of robust reason-giving in that sense is denied by Enoch. 
Some antecedent general or conditional reason, which is “triggered” by the relevant intentions, is always needed as 
part of the explanation of B’s coming to have a reason to ϕ. 
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the intention-recognition be of the wrong sort (or, perhaps, what makes the role that A’s 
intentions play in B’s practical reasoning be of the wrong sort) is not the fact that A’s intentions 
do not themselves constitute a reason for B to ϕ. They do (though they do not constitute such a 
reason by themselves). The “inappropriateness” in question thus appears to be immune to the 
proposed revision of condition (iii). The explanatory lacuna, and with it the need for an 
additional appropriateness clause, is back in place. How can it be filled?  
What is needed at this point is an explanation for the feeling that the way in which B’s 
reason for ϕ-ing arises from A’s request, in the case last described, is not of the right sort. As I 
have just argued, this is not a problem of causal chains, nor is it a matter of A’s intentions not 
figuring as a reason in B’s practical reasoning. The problem seems to lie rather with the further 
conditions that explain why A’s intentions play the normative role they do (and should) in B’s 
reasoning, or the grounds on which A’s intentions can furnish B with a reason to do what A 
intends to give B a reason to do: in this case, the desire to please C (or in the benefits of 
avoiding sanctions). But this is just to say that the inappropriateness in question is located at the 
level of the antecedent general or conditional reason that is “triggered” by A’s request. In the 
case where B treats A’s reason-giving intentions as reasons just in order to please C, the 
problem seems to be that the triggered reason is of the wrong sort to warrant viewing this case 
of reason-giving as belonging to the “importantly unique” class that Enoch seeks to single out.  
This suggests that the “uniqueness” in question is insufficiently accounted for by the reason-
giver’s complex intentions as analyzed by Enoch. What needs to be added after all, it seems, is a 
substantive account of the specific types of “independent” (antecedent, conditional) reasons that 
would explain what makes some cases of the intentional creation of reasons more “robust”, or 
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more “importantly unique”, than others. Question (1) above thus refers us on to question (2), the 
answer to which should at the same time indicate an answer to question (3).172  
 
ad (2): existence of a suitable “independent reason”  
As I mentioned above, Enoch distinguishes between normative and non-normative success 
conditions for robust reason-giving. The non-normative success conditions are furnished by the 
presence of the specific set of reason-giving intentions described by him, whereas the normative 
success conditions consist in the existence of a suitable conditional reason that is “triggered” by 
these intentions, allowing them to in fact achieve the normative result (namely, reason-giving) 
that they aim to achieve. My discussion so far has suggested that more explanatory weight is 
carried by the latter, normative success conditions than Enoch lets on. If it is the case, as Enoch 
seems to claim, that the non-normative success conditions – the required set of intentions – can 
account for the distinctiveness of robust reason-giving, it is only because and only to the extent 
that they already contain some reference to the normative success-condition – the specific kind 
of antecedent reason triggered by the act of requesting, or of robust reason-giving more 
generally. So an independent explanation of the “triggered” reason is needed. 
What makes it the case that the normative success condition of robust reason-giving, namely 
the existence of a suitable or appropriate “triggered” reason, is met? As I have already said, 
                                                          
172 The preceding discussion needs to be improved by distinguishing more clearly between two dependencies that 
could be at issue in discerning whether a case of reason-giving is “robust” in the requisite sense: on the one hand, 
the dependency of the given reason on the reason-giver’s communication of his intention; on the other hand, the 
dependency of the given reason on the reason-receiver’s recognition of that intention. Enoch locates the problem of 
possible “inappropriateness” at the level of this second dependency relation. What I said in footnote 168 above 
suggests that at least in the case of the two examples at hand, the “inappropriateness” consists in the fact that the 
reasons created by the requests do not depend on the recognition of the intention at all: they may come into 
existence even when the intention is not recognized; they are dependent only on the act of reason-giving and its 
accompanying intentions. This means that in these examples, intention (iii) would not succeed even if it did not 
contain any appropriateness clause. But I think that the examples could be modified, or different ones invented, 
such that the problem would be at the level of recognition after all, and would raise the question of 
“appropriateness” in the context of intention (iii).  
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Enoch declines to give a general answer. The formulation of the normative condition for which 
Enoch settles is that “there must be, independently of the attempt at robust reason-giving, a 
reason triggered by such an attempt.”173 But this, as we have seen, does not rule out 
“inappropriate” cases even when the non-normative success conditions are met. Can we be more 
specific? What distinguishes triggered reasons of the right kind, such that acts of triggering them 
qualify (uniquely) as acts of robust reason-giving, and such that intending to trigger them counts 
as intending robust reason-giving? 
Perhaps we can proceed by looking at the genus proximum again, and then searching for the 
specific difference. It is clear that there are innumerable different ways in which agents may 
create reasons for themselves and for others by intentionally “triggering” pre-existing or 
independent general reasons. All that is required for this is the deliberate manipulation of the 
world so as to bring about circumstances which, as the agent knows, will provide others or him- 
or herself with reasons to act in certain ways. As we have seen, even robust reason-giving as 
elaborated by Enoch falls under this general description. 
Some actions intended to create specific reasons in this way are such that they would create 
those same reasons if done with a quite different intention, or even completely unintentionally. 
Your reason to have the window repaired may come into existence by my breaking it, regardless 
of whether I broke it intentionally or not, and regardless of whether my intention (if I had it) in 
breaking the window was to create that reason for you or not. Other acts of reason-creation, on 
the contrary, depend on the presence if not of the intention to create just those reasons, then at 
least on the action’s being performed with an intention of some specific sort. My reason to 
                                                          
173 Enoch (2011a: 17).  
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compensate you for my breaking of the window, for example, may depend on my having broken 
it deliberately, i.e., with the intention of breaking it, rather than just by accident.174 
Even more demandingly, for some reasons, it may be the case that they arise from the 
performance of a certain action only if the action was performed with the intention of creating 
just those reasons. In these cases, the success of a certain action in bringing into existence the 
reasons in question depends on the agent’s intention to create just those reasons, and perhaps 
even on his intention to create them through that very action.175 Reasons that are created through 
the complex set of intentions that furnish Enoch’s “non-normative success conditions” of 
reason-creation by requesting would appear to be of this kind (though they may not be the only 
ones of this kind). 
But what would make it the case that an action’s bringing into existence a reason to ϕ 
depends on the agent’s intention to bring into existence just that reason not just incidentally but 
as it were essentially? As a first pass, it seems plausible to say that this will be the case only 
when the creation of the reason in question requires someone’s choosing or willing, or having 
chosen or willed, that this reason should exist. This suggests a strategy for making headway on 
the question of what is peculiar about the normative success conditions, or the “triggered” 
reasons, in these sorts of cases. The creation of a reason will conceptually require the intention 
to create it just in case there exists some antecedent general reason which makes it the case that 
(or which explains why) a certain specified kind of exercise of the will has, as such, a specific 
                                                          
174 These and other examples of a perfectly ordinary and uncontroversial ability to intentionally alter one’s own 
normative situation and that of other people, that is, to make it the case that there are various reasons for action that 
there otherwise would not have been, explain why the worry about “bootstrapping” that I previously mentioned as a 
standard objection to voluntarism is inconclusive at best and is likely to amount, when cut down to size, to a 
normative objection against specific purported instances of reason-creation rather than against the very possibility 
of intentional reason-creation.  
175 It may be more accurate to say here that the dependency is not simply on the intentions themselves, but rather on 
whatever would conventionally be warranted as being taken as an expression of those intentions. Nevertheless, to 
intend to create such reasons is to intend for one’s intentions (and not simply for one’s intention-expressions) to be 
essential to the creation of the reason. I will set these complications aside.  
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sort of normative consequence. “As such” is meant to capture the fact that these normative 
consequences attach to the act in question not contingently, because of some further 
circumstances, but simply because of the type of act it is, given the existence of a general reason 
that invests such acts with these kinds of consequences.176  
But this leads us back, once again, to the question of what characterizes the kind of general 
reason that will endow the relevant act “as such” with the normative consequence of bringing 
into existence some further particular reason (a reason to φ).  After all, “that it would please 
another person” is itself a perfectly general reason. But it is not a general reason of the kind we 
are looking for. Why not? I would suggest that the short answer is: because it does not contain 
any reference to (the value of) requests. More generally speaking, it does not contain any 
reference to the essential role played by someone’s intention, or choice, to create a reason to ϕ, 
in making it the case that a reason to φ comes thereby to exist. To be sure, the general reason 
“that it would please another person” can be activated (or “triggered”) by such intentions, if and 
when it so happens that what would please another person is just the satisfaction of some 
intention of this sort. But this reason – “that it would please another person” – can also be 
activated by all sorts of other circumstances. This is what it means to say that this general 
reason, while capable of explaining why a certain action results in the creation of a reason to φ, 
is of the wrong sort to account for the distinctiveness or specificity of robust reason-giving: it 
                                                          
176 This rules out, as it should, cases like the one where my coming to have a reason to ϕ as a consequence of 
someone’s asking me to ϕ depends on my wanting to please some third party. To the extent that (for example) this 
desire to please makes an essential contribution to my coming to have a reason to ϕ, or is indispensable for 
explaining the role that the other person’s request plays in my subsequent practical reasoning, the normative 
consequence (having a reason to ϕ) does not attach to the act of requesting as such – for example, across different 
counterfactual situations where the desire is absent. Of course the condition for the exercise of the will to play a 
reason-creating role “as such” cannot be that the relevant normative consequence should attach to this type of 
action across all possible counterfactual situations. What is required is merely that it should attach to the action in 
all counterfactual situations that instantiate the antecedent of the requisite general, conditional reason. 
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does not contain any reference to the agent’s intention to create a reason to φ, even though such 
intentions may sometimes be among the conditions that activate it.  
The problem encountered here is similar to the one underlying recent discussions of the 
“wrong kind of reasons problem”, which, put in common-sense terms, revolve around the 
question of how to demarcate intrinsic from extrinsic reasons for performing a certain action, or 
for engaging in a certain activity. This question arises in a specifically intractable form for so-
called fitting-attitude accounts of value, which aim to analyze evaluative predicates in deontic 
terms, i.e., in terms of reasons for adopting certain attitudes towards the objects of such 
predications (which could be states of affairs, actions, etc.). Since I am not here presupposing 
the correctness of any account of this sort, the understanding of the difference between intrinsic 
and extrinsic reasons on which I will rely is not subject to such limitations.177 According to this 
understanding, intrinsic reasons for engaging in some action or activity are those reasons that 
derive from the specific value of that type of action or activity. That is to say, reasons for 
engaging in a given action or activity are “intrinsic” or “extrinsic” – “of the right kind” or “of 
the wrong kind” – relative to an explanation of what is good or worthwhile about that particular 
sort of activity, as such.  
We can apply this to the case of acts or activities of robust reason-giving, such as 
requesting. What makes it the case that an independent (general, “triggered”) reason is of the 
right kind to explain how someone’s requesting that I ϕ can give me a reason to ϕ in a “robust” 
or “importantly unique” way? The answer suggested by my discussion so far is that the 
independent reason is of the right kind just in case its existence is explained by reference to the 
                                                          
177 Neither am I presupposing the incorrectness of fitting attitude accounts. If any such account is successful at 
providing an explanation of evaluative discourse in purely deontic terms, what I say in the following should be 
expressible in such terms.  
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specific value of creating reasons by way of issuing requests.178 Accordingly, abstracting from 
the specific example of requesting, a reason is “robustly given” just in case its creation through 
an act of purportedly robust reason-giving – in other words, just in case the normative change 
brought about by this act – is explicable as a “triggering” of an independent (general, 
conditional) reason whose existence is itself explained in terms of the specific value of an 
appropriate generic type of robust reason-giving.179 What makes the reason-creation in our two 
examples, and in many others, less than robust – though not therefore any less real and 
efficacious – is that the intended reasons would come into existence even if there were no value 
in the possibility of creating reasons for another person to ϕ specifically by requesting that she 
ϕ.180   
 
ad (3): “importantly unique” 
According to Enoch, what makes robust reason-giving “a particularly interesting particular 
instance” of triggering reason-giving are “the complex intentions it involves”181 I have been 
pursuing the idea that what makes robust reason-giving “particularly interesting” are not so 
                                                          
178 The distinction between reasons of the “right” and of the “wrong” kind here refers not, as in the standard 
discussions of that distinction, to the reasons for which some action is undertaken, but instead to the general reasons 
that explain why some other, “triggered” reason can be brought into existence in a certain way. It is a further 
question whether in order for some act of robust reason-giving to succeed, it is required that the “right kind” of 
general reason should play an appropriate role in the reason-receivers deliberation. 
179 I might seem to run into an obvious problem at this point. I have argued, against Enoch, that the specificity of 
robust reason-giving is best understood in terms of the general reasons that are triggered by such reason-giving. I 
have then gone on to explain what distinguishes the relevant general reasons is their dependency on the value of the 
various particular types of robust reason-giving. Isn’t this a circular explanation? I am not sure that it is, or that, 
even if it is circular, it is therefore uninformative. This worry will have to be given more consideration than I can do 
here.   
180 This formulation is meant to suggest that whatever value explains why individual acts of requesting, as such, can 
create reasons  attaches in the first place to the act-type of requesting, and to individual acts (if at all) only in virtue 
of being of that type (and similarly for other modes of robust reason-creation). The value of a type of action, in a 
sense that does not entail that there is value in individual instances of that type, could be, for example, the value of 
the ability to perform such actions, or the value of a general practice of which the (occasional) performance of such 
acts is an essential part.  I say more about this in the following section.   
181 Enoch (2011a: 20). 
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much (or not fundamentally) the specific sorts of intentions by which it is characterized, but 
rather (or more basically) the specific sorts of general reasons whose existence it presupposes.182 
On the basis of my discussion so far, it is now possible to rephrase the third question I asked 
above, concerning the practical or theoretical concerns to which the singling out of this specific 
mode of triggering general reasons answers. It becomes the question which value or values 
might account for the existence of, and lend distinctiveness to, the specific sorts of general or 
“triggered” reasons that are relied on in various types of robust reason-giving. This sets us on 
the path towards a more substantive normative inquiry, which would have to consider, for 
various putative ways of robustly creating reasons, whether they are in fact supported by the 
sorts of specific value that would set them apart from the more general phenomenon of 
triggering (even intentionally) some conditional reason or other by bringing it about that a 
suitable condition obtains. While I cannot undertake such an inquiry here, I will now try to 
explain its presuppositions a little further and to show why it may stand a better chance of 
saving voluntarist appearances than do the two types of qualified voluntarism that I have been 
criticizing.  
 
7. Normative power revisited 
So far, I have set aside the question of whether or why we should believe that there are in 
fact any independent reasons of the kind that robust reason-giving would presuppose. The result 
of my discussion of Enoch’s proposal has been that for any generic mode of reason-giving, there 
are such general reasons (which make it “robust”) just in case there is a certain value in giving 
                                                          
182 That is to say, whose existence is relied on by someone intending to robustly give a reason, as well as by those 
who accept that a reason has been given in this particular way.  
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(or creating) reasons in just this way. But more needs to be said about what such value could 
consist in, at least in general terms.  
We can start with the observation that while Enoch speaks of reason-giving as an instance of 
a non-trivial way of creating reasons at will, Chang’s concern was more generally with the 
“power” or ability to create reasons, of which the ability to create reasons by requesting would 
be an instance. Chang explicitly contrasted her own conception of normative power, according 
to which that power is normative only in its effects but not in its foundations, with an 
established conception familiar, especially, from discussions of promising. A detailed and 
influential articulation of that established conception is due to Joseph Raz, who builds on the 
explanation of legal power developed by Bentham, Hohfeld, and Hart, and generalizes it to 
practical contexts beyond the law. Raz’s proposal and the tradition on which it builds suggest 
one general sort of answer to the question of what specific value explains the possibility of 
robust or non-trivial cases of reason-creation (by giving rise to the appropriate “triggered 
reason” in Enoch’s account): it is the value of people’s ability to create reasons in these various 
ways.  
As defined by Raz, a normative power is “an ability to affect exclusionary reasons which 
apply to one’s own or to other people’s action.”183 By “exclusionary reasons” Raz means 
reasons to refrain from acting for a specified range of other reasons (specified by the content of 
the exclusionary reason), or to exclude a range of other reasons from one’s deliberation insofar 
as that deliberation issues in action. Such exclusionary reasons, he argues, are at the heart of the 
phenomenon of obligation: to be obligated or required to ϕ is not simply to have a strong reason 
to ϕ – in fact the reason to ϕ need not be very weighty at all – but rather it is to have some 
                                                          
183 Raz (1975: 101).  
124 
 
reason to ϕ as well as a reason to set aside, or “exclude”, a range of considerations that speak 
against ϕ-ing.184  
Not all ways of affecting the existence of exclusionary reasons count as exercises of 
normative power. For example, fulfilling a singular obligation (such as a promise) is a way of 
removing the exclusionary reason that partly constitutes the obligation: once one has fulfilled 
the obligation, one no longer has that reason (i.e., the reason to exclude from one’s action-
guiding deliberation a range of considerations that bear on the action one is obligated to 
perform). Once a person has done what she promised to do, her promise can no longer serve to 
rationally explain or justify her excluding from deliberation reasons for actions that would 
conflict with the action required by the promise. Similarly, one may acquire obligations by 
coming to occupy a certain role or in virtue of standing in certain relationships with other 
people. This does not show – though neither does it rule out – that any particular way of 
accepting such a role or coming to stand in such a relationship is an exercise of normative 
power, when that concept is intended in a distinctive sense that may capture a non-trivial mode 
of reason-creation.  
To explain what is special about ways of creating exclusionary reasons such that they 
constitute exercises of normative power, Raz adds another condition: an act “is the exercise of a 
power only if the reason for recognizing it as affecting norms and their application is that it is 
desirable to enable people to affect norms and their application in such a way if they desire to do 
so for this purpose.”185 This means that the distinctiveness of normative changes brought about 
by the exercise of normative power is a matter of the specific sort of normative explanation that 
accounts for why these normative changes are a consequence of the actions that bring them 
                                                          
184 Cf. especially Raz (1975: 35-48).  
185 Raz (1975: 102). For an application of this condition to the example of promising, cf. Raz (1972: 101).  
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about.186 Reasons count as created by normative powers only if the kind of act whereby they are 
brought into existence would not have that normative effect but for its being the case that it is, at 
some level of generality, good for acts of that kind to have such effects. This is just the sort of 
condition that I argued was missing from Enoch’s account of robust reason-creation.  
What is the structure of this special sort of explanation? According to the condition just 
cited, the explanation that shows some act to be the exercise of a normative power must refer to 
the desirability of enabling people to affect the normative situation in just this way. It may be 
better to set the idea of “enabling” aside since it could suggest that there must be some further 
act by which the normative power is conferred, and which must be desirable. It may be true of 
some normative powers that their existence is owed to such acts – for example, the act of 
appointing someone to an office, or of creating an office, that comes with a certain normative 
power –, but even where that is the case, the desirability or value that matters to the explanation 
of the normative power is the desirability or value of the power or ability itself, not (except 
derivatively) that of the act by which somebody is enabled to exercise it. What the condition 
comes down to is that the specific value that explains how an action can be an instance of robust 
reason-creation is the value of an ability: the ability to bring reasons into existence in a certain 
way, which is a way of bringing these reasons into existence only because it is good or desirable 
that it should be a way of doing so.  
This explanation provides us with an approach to ascertaining or establishing the existence 
of normative powers, or types of robust reason-creation: it is done by asking about their specific 
                                                          
186 For a corresponding condition with respect to legal powers specifically, cf. Raz (1972: 81), according to which 
actions qualify as exercises of legal powers in virtue of “the reasons for which they are recognized as effecting a 
legal change.”  
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value.187 As it happens, this approach is to some extent Chang’s own way of motivating the 
existence of the specific normative powers she postulates, and it seems to be at work in her 
insistence that these powers are constrained in being “hierarchically” subordinate to “given 
reasons”; but it is not part of her official explanation of the existence of normative powers. Nor 
is it part of Enoch’s explanation of the possibility of robust reason-giving, though it is in the 
spirit of his account. In the remainder of this chapter, I will ask where this normative account of 
normative power – both (in contrast with Chang’s account) of their existence and (in contrast 
with Enoch’s account) of their distinctiveness or non-triviality – leaves us with respect to the 
idea of voluntarism about reasons for action.  
 
8. Limited voluntarism  
To what extent can we satisfy voluntarist concerns by recourse to the idea of normative 
power? It is clear that on the normative understanding of normative power whose advantages I 
have been trying to show, voluntarism cannot be pervasive or unrestricted; it cannot be the truth 
about reasons for action as such. But it does not follow from this that the kinds of volitional 
states or attitudes that a voluntarist like Korsgaard places at the center of her explanation of 
normativity cannot play something like the role she envisions for them. Might it be, for 
example, that something like Korsgaard’s notion of “endorsement”, playing something like the 
normative role she assigns to it, can be rescued from the larger theory in which it is entangled 
and be re-interpreted along the lines of the normative account of normative power? In order to 
                                                          
187 In practice, it is most likely to be done by asking whether putative normative powers – ones that would furnish 
what Enoch called “normative success conditions” for common sorts of intentions and practices that are best 
interpreted as purporting to involve the exercise of such powers – can in fact be shown to possess the sort of value 
that would show them to exist. If they cannot, then on the explanation here offered, it would follow that they do not 
in fact exist and that therefore the practices, intentions etc. that presuppose them lack (to that extent) intelligibility. 
But in principle, we could also imagine “undiscovered” normative powers to be brought to light by way of this sort 
of normative inquiry. 
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assess to what extent a restricted or modest kind of voluntarism may be vindicated based on the 
considerations so far, we need to ask in more detail what exactly the ability in which normative 
power consists is an ability to do.  
Here it is worth pointing out, first, that the value-based explanation of normative power 
outlined in the previous section is of an indirect kind; this aspect is essential to understanding 
what it is a power to do. First, if the existence of a reason for S to ϕ is explained by reference to 
some act of robust reason-creation, or to the exercise of some normative power, then it need not 
be the case that there is any value in S’s ϕ-ing (except in the uninformative sense that the action 
conforms to the reason); the reason exists independently of the value of the action for which it is 
a reason. Nor need there be, secondly, any value in the act of reason-creation (the exercise of the 
normative power) itself; there could be value in the existence of the ability without there being 
value in each instance of its exercise.188 What specific reason is created by the exercise of a 
normative power is determined not by the value of that exercise or by the value of the action for 
which it purports to create a reason, but by the content of the communicative act that constitutes 
its exercise, or perhaps by the content of the intention or other propositional attitude in whose 
communication or even just adoption the exercise of the power consists.189  
As in other cases of indirect or two-level normative explanation in ethics, for example in the 
case of indirect consequentialism, it is no trivial task to show how reasons could be explained in 
this way – that is, how their normative authority could “transmit” from the value of (for 
example) some general rule, practice, ability, or disposition to individual instances of 
conformity to the rule, compliance with the practice, exercises of the ability, or manifestations 
                                                          
188 Thus the explanation is in fact doubly indirect.  
189 This formulation is meant to leave it open that there could be normative powers that are exercised other than by 
communicative acts; if there could not be, then the purportedly reason-creating attitudes in voluntarist theories such 
as Korsgaard’s or Chang’s would not even be candidates for an explanation of the kind I am exploring here.  
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of the disposition. To avoid to some extent the puzzles presented by this indirectness, a 
normative account of normative power could insist on restricting those powers in such a way 
that exercises of them could create reasons only for actions that are also in other respects 
valuable, or in such a way that only valuable exercises of them succeed at creating reasons. 
Take, for example, the highly constrained kind of normative power postulated by Chang: it is 
limited to adding force to normative considerations that were already in place quite 
independently of the exercise of the power, and it is limited to being used when there is a certain 
point or value in using it (for example, because of the need for a tie-breaking consideration).  
Whether the existence of such highly constrained powers is more plausible than the 
existence of powers that are value-independent to a greater degree is a question that I cannot 
settle here, and that in any case would have to be decided at the level of an examination of 
individual kinds of putative normative power. But imposing such constraints may in some 
respects make it more difficult to establish the existence of the relevant powers, since it would 
diminish the extent to which their exercise can make a normative difference. Moreover, even 
constraining the power will not by itself answer the question how a two-level explanation is 
possible; and as long as there is a concern with vindicating the existence of a (however 
constrained) ability, and with individual instances of reason-creation insofar as they are 
exercises of such an ability, an explanation of robust reason-creation will have to involve some 
degree of indirectness. The kinds of will-dependent reasons envisioned by voluntarists are not, 
after all, ones that merely arise in one way or another from a person’s volitional acts or attitudes. 
They are reasons that persons create at will, or at their own discretion (within limits set by the 
justification of the relevant power).190   
                                                          
190 Raz (1972: 95) offers a response to at least one source of puzzlement concerning the existence of normative 
powers, namely the will-dependence of the reasons created by them: “If a norm which can be affected by human 
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To see whether the phenomena that are at the center of voluntarist accounts like Korsgaard’s 
and Bratman’s – the “endorsement” of an identity, or the adoption of a “self-governing policy” – 
can plausibly be interpreted (when removed from the context of those theories) as exercises of 
normative power, consider now the types of reasons that may be created by such exercises. 
Some reasons created in this way are simply reasons to perform certain actions: for example, to 
do as requested, to do as one has promised, and so on. But it is different with the “exclusionary” 
reasons that were the focus of Raz’s explanation of normative power. Exclusionary reasons are 
reasons that concern a very specific type of action or activity, namely that of acting for some 
specific reason. Since they bear on the question what (other) reasons to act for, Raz calls them 
“second-order reasons”. An exclusionary reason is, specifically, a reason against acting for a 
certain range of other reasons, or to “exclude” those reasons from consideration insofar as one’s 
deliberation issues in action (though it is not a reason against performing the action 
recommended by the excluded reasons; it is merely a reason not to perform that action for the 
excluded reasons). But exclusionary reasons are not the only conceivable sort of second-order 
reason. There could equally be “positive” second-order reasons: that is to say, reasons in favor 
of acting for some specific other reasons, or reasons in favor of performing some particular 
action or type of action for some specific other reasons. Normative powers outside a legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
action is to be respected then the reasons for respecting it reveal also why it ought to be respected as created and 
regulated by human action. It is the nature of the reasons justifying the norm which determine whether acts 
affecting its existence or application are power exercising acts.” In other words, the explanation of a normative 
power, which establishes the existence of such a power, is something like a by-product of the explanation of the 
validity of a norm. Some norms are such that what makes it good for them to exist also makes it good that they 
should be subject to an ability to modify them at will, within certain limits. This leaves in place, however, the 
question about the transmission of the justification from the general desirability, be it of a norm or of the power to 
affect it, to the individual acts demanded by such a norm.  
A similar line of thought, though from a contractualist perspective, is found in Watson (2009), who claims that the 
concept of normative power offers an approach to interpreting contractualist theories of moral norms. Although I 
cannot explore the details of it here, his view seems to be that contractualism thinks of moral principles as issuing 
from the exercise of normative powers on the part of the individuals who are (or rather, thereby become) subject to 
them; and the value that explains and constrains the existence of this normative power is the value that also explains 
the validity of those principles themselves (which is why the extent of the normative power is circumscribed by the 
content of the moral principles explained in a contractualist fashion). 
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context have been discussed especially in relation to practical phenomena to whose 
understanding, arguably, the idea of exclusionary reasons is central, such as promising, 
obligation, and authority. Positive second-order reasons have not generally received as much 
explicit philosophical attention as their negative counterparts.191 But why should we think that 
normative power, in an interesting and distinctive sense, is limited to affecting exclusionary 
reasons? Why should it not extend to second-order reasons more generally?  
If our aim is to interpret the normative phenomena postulated by voluntarists in terms of 
normative powers, then thinking of these powers as abilities to create positive second-order 
reasons (abilities explained by the fact that it is valuable, at some appropriately general level, 
that people should have them) will be important. It allows us to make sense of an aspect of 
voluntarist reason-creation that tends to drop out of view in Enoch’s account of requesting but 
that is central to Chang’s notion of normative power as well as to other voluntarist proposals: if 
voluntarism has it right, agents are able not simply to make it the case that they or others have 
reason to ϕ; rather they are able to make it the case that some particular consideration p is or is 
not a reason for them to ϕ.  
It will be pointed out that the ability to create positive second-order reasons is an ability to 
make it the case that one has reason to ϕ (if one ϕs) for the reason that p, not an ability to make 
it the case that p is a reason to ϕ. Therefore whatever it is that can be vindicated in this way, it is 
not voluntarism, if voluntarism means that persons are able to make it the case that certain truths 
                                                          
191 Although it seems clear that there is a range of practical phenomena to whose analysis they are no less relevant: 
there is a familiar sense, for example, in which virtuous action is action “for the right reasons”, where the “right” 
reasons are those for which there is (positive second-order) reason to act insofar as there is reason to be virtuous in 
the relevant way. The example of morally valuable action as action performed – on a Kantian view – “from duty” 
or “from respect for the moral law” may be a special case of this. For virtuous action other than that (possibly) 
instantiated by Kantian Moralität, it may also be required that in addition to doing what the second-order reason is 
a reason to do (namely, act for the right first-order reasons), one should also not act for the second-order reason 
itself (i.e., not act in light of the aim of being virtuous). For discussion of these and related points, cf. especially the 
Postscript (1990) to Raz (1975), as well as Arpaly (2003). More generally, there are some types of actions whose 
value depends on, or is constituted by, their being done for some specific sorts of reasons and not others.  
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of the form “p is a reason to ϕ” hold in virtue of their willing it to be so. Either p is already a 
reason to ϕ, in which case a second-order reason to ϕ for the reason that p, or in light of p, if 
one ϕs, adds nothing to the recommending force that p has with regard to ϕ-ing; or p is not a 
reason to ϕ, in which case the injunction to ϕ for the reason that p (if one ϕs) would amount to 
asking that an agent act in the light of a false belief.192 But the objection overlooks the particular 
way in which second-order reasons make a difference to an agent’s normative situation.  
Supposing, first, that p already is a reason to ϕ, a second-order reason R for a particular 
agent to <ϕ for the reason that p> is not idle: if in deliberating whether to ϕ the person fails to 
consider p, or if she ϕs but not in the light of p, she has thereby failed to do something she had 
reason to do, whereas absent the second-order reason, there may have been nothing wrong with 
not considering or being moved by p (since one usually cannot and need not consider or be 
moved by all the reasons in favor of any given action). This would be a way in which 
voluntarism could build, as proposed by Chang, on already existing reasons, but do so other than 
by simply creating additional reasons that have the same content as existing ones.  
Suppose, alternatively, that p is not a reason to ϕ. In that case, the second-order reason R, 
(which we are imagining as brought into existence by an exercise of normative power) is 
nevertheless a reason to treat p as a reason to ϕ, regardless of whether or not it is. That p is not a 
reason to ϕ would be a feature of the will-independent normative situation presupposed by 
ambitious forms of voluntarism, like Korsgaard’s, which do not envision the existence of any 
reasons other than, or prior to, those created by the relevant volitional acts or attitudes. As 
Korsgaard’s theory sees it, “endorsement” – at least the endorsement of the two fundamental 
principles of practical reason – encounters a normative void but then makes it the case that 
                                                          
192 I am inserting the qualification „if one ϕs“ to indicate that second-order reasons to ϕ for the reason that p are 
not, as such, reasons to ϕ.   
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reasons entailed by endorsed principles do in fact exist. A revisionary interpretation of 
endorsement along the lines I am suggesting would be incompatible with the absence of will-
independent reasons, but it may be able to account for something close enough to the kinds of 
consequences that Korsgaard attributes to endorsement. (That is to say, it may be able to 
account for it in principle, since I am not claiming that there is in fact a normative power that 
would support the role played by endorsement in Korsgaard’s theory.) If it were the case that 
there is value in an ability to bring into existence (positive second-order) reasons to treat certain 
other considerations C as reasons to ϕ by endorsing a principle that has those considerations 
count in this way, independently (at least to some extent) of whether or not they in fact are, then 
an agent’s exercising that ability would make it the case that she now has reason to regard C as 
speaking in favor of ϕ-ing. And this means that the presence of C, or her awareness of it, could 
figure in a rationalizing explanation of her ϕ-ing. By ϕ-ing on the grounds that it is favored by 
C, she will be doing what she has reason to do. Yet it remains true, given all I have said, that 
there may be no reason for her to ϕ, and more specifically that C may not be such a reason. In 
order to capture more fully the idea of endorsement in terms of a normative power explanation, 
we might add that it is also an ability to create ordinary first-order reasons (say, to ϕ). This 
would bring us closer to the target set by voluntarism, but may still stop short of it, since the 
first-order reason to ϕ would in that case be the agent’s act or attitude of endorsement itself, not 
the further considerations C to which the content of the endorsement refers as reasons to ϕ.  
Thus my discussion will remain to some extent inconclusive here. A normative account of 
normative power may be able to capture some of the normative consequences that voluntarists 
like Korsgaard, Chang, Frankfurt, and possibly Bratman ascribe to volitional acts or attitudes 
such as endorsement, taking as a reason, caring, or adopting a self-governing policy – but 
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perhaps not all. There are also many further questions of detail regarding what it could mean to 
say that one has, or may bring into existence, a reason to act for certain reasons. For example, 
what exactly is it that one is supposed to do for those specific reasons? Do second-order reasons 
recommend performing some specific type of action, ϕ-ing, for a range of further reasons – or 
do they recommend that whatever one does, one should do it for those further reasons? Second, 
how are the reasons for which one is to act identified? Are they identified in a purely descriptive 
way, or can their specification rely on normative concepts (whether “thick” ones or, at the limit, 
the thin concept of a reason for action itself)? These and other questions are equally pertinent to 
a proper understanding of negative second-order reasons, and I will not here pursue the 
complexities to which they give rise. In general, nothing seems to speak against the assumption 
that there could be different types of second-order reasons that combine these various features in 
different ways. Moreover, there are other things that second-order reasons might be reasons to 
do besides acting for or not acting for certain other considerations; for example, they may 
concern the weight or the relative importance to be accorded to various other (first-order) 
considerations.  
If, prompted by some of the difficulties faced by the voluntarist accounts I have discussed, 
we conclude that the phenomena that matter to voluntarists are best understood as purported 
exercises of normative power, then we commit ourselves to a certain way of approaching the 
question, for any such phenomenon, of whether it can in fact play the kind of normative role in 
our practical reasoning that a voluntarist account claims it does. The extent and reach of our 
normative powers depends on the extent to which it is valuable for them to exist. Thus for any 
putative mode of voluntarist reason-creation, this way of approaching the question – in terms of 
the value of the existence of that mode – may show that there is no normative power that would 
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vindicate the appearance that there is such a mode of reason-creation. Everything I have said 





Chapter 4: The Content of Structural Rationality 
 
In this chapter I turn from questions regarding voluntarism back to the topic of 
constitutivism, albeit by a somewhat indirect route. I examine Niko Kolodny’s account of 
internal or structural rationality, which takes off from his skeptical arguments regarding the 
existence of reasons to do, on each occasion, what rationality in this internal sense would 
require. I reject Kolodny’s positive proposal regarding what structural irrationality consists in 
and offer an alternative. That alternative is nevertheless in the spirit of Kolodny’s account 
insofar as it ties assessments of rationality to the manifestation of dispositions that are 
constitutive of agency or specific forms of agency, specifically ones that are characterized by 
the presence of volitional reflexivity.  
 
1. Two ideals of rationality 
Many philosophers have claimed that we should, and ordinarily do, distinguish between two 
fundamentally different kinds of rational assessment of a person’s attitudes and actions.193 On 
the one hand – in practices of deliberation, advice, and criticism – we often ask whether what 
someone does, believes, desires, intends, and so on, is adequately supported by reasons: whether 
an action is right or permissible, a belief supported by evidence, a desire appropriate. On the 
other hand, we are sometimes interested in whether the relations between a person’s various 
attitudes meet certain standards or requirements of consistency and coherence. We remark on it 
when a person fails to take what she herself believes to be necessary means to (or facilitating 
                                                          
193 This claim should be understood as saying that there are good reasons to make this distinction. Are these reasons 
practical or epistemic reasons (to invoke another common but not straightforward distinction)? One of the results of 
my discussion will be that they are primarily practical reasons.  
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steps towards) her ends, or fails to intend what she judges she has conclusive reason to do, or 
has intentions that cannot be jointly realized. These are cases in which someone’s attitudes 
(including the intentions with which she acts) are in some way “at odds” with one another, 
regardless of whether or not they are in conformity with the reasons there are.194  
The distinction between these two kinds of rational assessment may be articulated as a 
distinction between two senses of the term “rational”: call them the substantive and the 
structural sense.195 These two senses need not be understood as competing conceptions of the 
same concept (rationality). They may simply pick out two distinct concerns that can co-exist. 
Nor does reliance on either one commit one to any particular meta-ethical view. What does 
matter, from a meta-ethical perspective, is how exactly one construes the relation between them. 
Some have argued that in the last resort, substantive rationality can or must be explained in 
terms of structural rationality: all cases of being at odds with what reason requires are 
necessarily also cases of being at odds with oneself, and they are the former because they are the 
                                                          
194 This is a loose way of pointing to the contrast. It is open to the complaint that it frames the distinction in a 
partisan way, since it seems to rule out the possibility that a person’s own attitudes could be among the reasons 
there are for her, in a way that corresponds exactly to the normative claims expressed by requirements of structural 
rationality (this is what Broome (2007a, 2007b) calls the theory of “attitudinal reasons”). Thus a proper statement 
of the distinction would have to be more careful. I believe that giving a proper statement is no trivial task, but for 
my purposes here, I will let the approximate formulations stand. 
195 Different authors use different terminology here, while ostensibly taking themselves to be addressing the same 
topic. I take the terms “substantive” and “structural” from Scanlon (2007). Scanlon (1998) speaks of structural 
irrationality as corresponding to a “narrow” sense of the term “irrational” (a sense for which he thinks that term 
should be reserved). Kolodny (2005) distinguishes between “objective” and “subjective” rationality. As we will see, 
while this may be appropriate given his own positive account of the second half of the distinction, it is not helpful 
as a neutral description of the contrast at issue.  
Many other writers have aimed to capture the same distinction, though their terminology varies. For instance, 
Darwall (1983) distinguishes between “rationality” and “relative rationality”; Parfit (1997) distinguishes between a 
“substantive” and a “procedural” sense of “rational”, while Parfit (2011) distinguishes between what we have 
reason to do and what we “ought rationally” to do; Broome (2005) distinguishes between “reasons” and “oughts”, 
on the one hand, and “requirements of rationality”, on the other; Bratman (2009) distinguishes between “norms of 
rationality” and “demands of reason”; Wedgwood (1999) distinguishes between a conception of rationality that 
stresses its “external aim” and one that stresses “internal justification or coherence”; Sobel (2001) distinguishes 
between being irrational and failing to do what one has most reason to do; Velleman (1989: 280) writes: „The 
categories of what practical reasoning favors or opposes (…) turn out to be broader than the categories of what 
there are reasons for or against. I think that we tend to use the terms ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ for the former 
categories (…) things can be rational or irrational even in the absence of reasons for or against them.” The list could 
be extended considerably.  
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latter.196 Others have claimed that on the contrary the notion of structural rationality, to the 
extent that it captures a distinctive phenomenon at all, is either reducible to or to be explained by 
reference to the notion of substantive rationality.197 Finally, it is possible that substantive and 
structural assessments of rationality are mutually irreducible, each standing on its own 
conceptual feet.198  
By comparison with the vigorous debate over these alternatives in recent years, less 
attention has been given to the closely related question that will be my focus in this chapter: 
What exactly does structural rationality require, and why? In other words, what determines the 
content of structural rationality? Writers in all of the three camps just mentioned have generally 
taken it for granted that there is at least a rough consensus over what requirements of structural 
rationality there are, and that this consensus is to some extent independent from questions about 
their exact logical structure and their normative force. Although there are disagreements over 
the details, many discussions rely on short lists of more or less uncontroversial instances of 
putative rational requirements, such as non-contradiction, consistency among one’s intentions, 
intending what one believes one has conclusive reason to do, and intending to take what one 
believes to be the necessary means to one’s ends.  
But even if there is such a consensus, we should aim to explain what its basis is. Any 
reasonably complete account of structural rationality owes us an answer to the question of what 
determines which rational requirements there are. My aim is to motivate this question, point to 
the problems faced by a prima facie appealing answer to it, and offer a sketch of an alternative 
answer that avoids those problems. I will argue that if there are such things as requirements of 
                                                          
196 At least for the domain of practical reasons, views of this type have been defended by Korsgaard (1996, 2008, 
2009a, 2009b), Smith (1994), and Velleman (2000), and possibly also by Donald Davidson, Harry Frankfurt, and 
Bernard Williams. 
197 Cf. Dancy (2000; 2008); Kolodny (2005); Raz (1999; 2005a; 2005b); Scanlon (2003; unpublished). 
198 This seems to be the position defended in Broome (2007a).  
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structural rationality at all, then there are many more than the ones mentioned – indeed, an 
indefinite number. I arrive at this conclusion by offering a positive view of what requirements of 
structural rationality are, and what determines their content.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. First I offer a preliminary sketch of what structural 
rationality is (section 2). I then consider an influential theory by Niko Kolodny that denies that 
structural rationality is normative or reason-giving, but at the same time seeks to explain the 
apparent normative or reason-giving force of requirements of structural rationality. I argue that 
this so-called “Transparency Account” of rational requirements is unsatisfactory, since it returns 
false answers both to the question of what rational requirements there are, and what it is that we 
do in appealing to such requirements (section 3). In sections 4, 5, and 6, I propose an alternative 
understanding of structural rationality, which confronts these two questions directly and outlines 
more plausible answers to them, but remains compatible with the denial that there is any reason 
to conform to rational requirements, as such. 
 
2. “Structural rationality” and the question of content 
What exactly is the familiar phenomenon, or the intuitive concern, that the notion of 
structural rationality is meant to capture? Normal language does not obviously distinguish 
between the two distinct dimensions of rational assessment. The locutions employed by 
philosophers to keep them apart – “conformity to reasons”, “conformity to the requirements of 
rationality” – are rather artificial. As Thomas Scanlon suggests, the term “irrational” may come 
closest to capturing the specifically structural dimension of assessment.199 But other expressions 
– “ought”, “should” – are standardly used in both contexts. This raises the question of what 
                                                          
199 Scanlon (1998: 25).  
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motivates the distinction between the two dimensions of assessment in the first place. Is it 
merely a philosophers’ invention? The answer depends on whether one considers the features 
that philosophers have regarded as marking out assessments of structural rationality to capture 
any reasonably unified phenomenon.  
At the most general level, we can think of structural rationality as an ideal (and of structural 
irrationality as a type of deficiency) that is presupposed or invoked in practices of criticism, 
advice, joint deliberation, and persuasion. But of course all this is true of substantive rationality 
too. Negatively speaking, what distinguishes assessments of structural rationality is their 
indifference or neutrality vis-à-vis questions of substantive rationality. One can determine 
whether a person is structurally irrational without paying any attention to whether her attitudes 
are adequately supported by reasons. 
Still, this negative characterization is not specific enough either. For it holds of all 
purportedly normative statements made from a determinate perspective or point of view that 
reflects some specific source of requirements: for example, statements about what gratitude 
requires an agent to do, or about how she should act as a member of her profession, or about 
how the law or the norms of etiquette require her to respond, or about how she ought to think or 
feel about the matter insofar as she is a Catholic, or someone’s daughter, or a signatory of a 
suicide pact. What is required or recommended from any such perspective may come apart from 
what a person has (overall or even any) reason to do simpliciter, and thus from what substantive 
rationality requires, recommends, or licenses. Yet none of the participants in these debates 




This suggests identifying the notion of structural rationality more specifically by reference 
to the specific content of its requirements. What is peculiar about them, many writers suggest, is 
that they require persons to bring it about, or that at least they require it to be true of persons, 
that certain formal relations of consistency and coherence hold among their various attitudes.200 
They may do so in two different ways: either by disallowing certain combinations of attitudes 
(those that qualify as inconsistent or incoherent), or by requiring or prohibiting particular 
attitudes given the prior presence of certain other attitudes.201  
Although it is conceivable that different requirements of structural rationality take either of 
these two forms, a number of philosophers have argued that they all take either one or the other 
form.202 This indicates a concern, on their part, to think of structural rationality as a domain of 
requirements that are in some interesting way unified. But the bare notions of consistency and 
coherence are no more than promissory notes for such an explanation. Other domains of 
                                                          
200 Cf. Broome (2007a, 2007b); Kolodny (2005); Scanlon (2007). There appears to be broad agreement that 
structural rationality never requires actions but only “attitudes”: for an explicit argument to this effect, cf. Broome 
(2005: 323; 2007a: 352-353).  In section 5 I briefly address the question of what sorts of things rational 
requirements range over. But it is worth already pointing out that it may not be easy to cite a principled rationale for 
excluding (intentional) actions from the purview of rational requirements, given the general difficulty of drawing a 
sharp line between attitudes (especially, but not only, intentions) and actions. I return to this point further below.   
201 In the first case, the “ought” of structural rationality is said to take “wide scope”, in that it ranges over a 
disjunction of attitude combinations but does not specify which attitude should be modified so as to reach one of 
those combinations: for example, rationality may require a person not to have inconsistent intentions, but be silent 
on which of a given pair of inconsistent intentions should be abandoned. In the second case, the “ought” of 
structural rationality is said to take “narrow scope”, in that it requires the agent to form or to lose some specific 
attitude, given the attitudes she currently has: for example, it may prohibit an agent from forming an intention 
whose content is inconsistent with that of an already existing intention. 
202 Thus Broome (2007c), Dancy (2000), and Wallace (2001), among others, have argued that all rational 
requirements take wide scope. Kolodny (2005; 2007) and Korsgaard (2009a) argue that all requirements of 
rationality are narrow-scope requirements.  
It is worth observing that the debate over the scope of rational requirements is in part motivated by the question of 
their normative or reason-giving force, which I mentioned in passing. A wide-scope construal of rational 
requirements holds out the promise of avoiding a counter-intuitive implication of affirming their normativity, 
namely the possibility of “bootstrapping”: of bringing into existence a reason for an action simply by adopting a 
(perhaps false) belief or a (perhaps ill-founded) intention. Construing rational requirements as taking wide scope 
seems to take care of this worry. For example, on a wide-scope view, rationality requires one to <intend to ϕ if one 
judges that one has conclusive reason to ϕ>. One may conform to this requirement either by intending to ϕ, or by 
abandoning one’s belief that one has conclusive reason to ϕ. Thus construed, it is said, the requirement does not 
allow the relevant judgment to generate a reason to ϕ. However, there are doubts that this result follows in all or 
indeed in any situation: cf. Raz (2005a) and Setiya (2007). 
141 
 
requirements, too, may require or prohibit certain combinations of attitudes, or require or 
prohibit the adoption of a certain attitude given the presence of specific other attitudes. The 
value of a certain game may require that I have the intention to win if I have the intention to 
play it properly; or morality may require that I not both believe p and intend to assert not-p. 
Thus it seems that if structural rationality is a distinctive and unified source of requirements, 
what makes it so must be something over and above what I have said so far.203 
One may of course doubt whether establishing the distinctive or unified character of 
structural rationality is an important aim. Many existing discussions are content to examine the 
structure and the deliberative role of individual requirements in a case-by-case fashion. There 
have been extensive debates concerning the precise formulation of particular requirements of 
structural rationality, such as the putative requirement to take what one believes to be necessary 
means to one’s ends and the requirement not to act or intend akratically.204 The question what, if 
anything, these various requirements have in common need not take center stage in such 
discussions. Yet there exist some philosophical motives for aiming at a unified conception of 
structural rationality.  
One such motive derives from a specific kind of meta-ethical project. Some philosophers of 
Humean or Kantian inclination hope to explain the existence of normative reasons for action – 
what I have called “substantive rationality” – by recourse to structural rationality. An agent’s 
reasons, according to such explanations, are just those considerations that an agent must believe 
                                                          
203 One suggestion might be that what distinguishes the requirements of structural rationality is their categorical 
nature. Even though their form is conditional (whether that conditional has wide scope or narrow scope), that a 
person must conform to these conditional requirements is not itself conditional on anything further about her or 
him. But on many accounts the requirements of morality (and on some, the requirements of etiquette) are 
categorical too, which makes categoriality unsuitable as a demarcation criterion. Of course certain defenders of that 
criterion will say that requirements of morality are categorical precisely because they just are requirements of 
structural rationality. But to content oneself with the categoriality criterion on that basis would be to (implausibly) 
hold the very distinction between substantive and structural rationality hostage to a specific, contested theory of 
morality. 
204 For doubts about the cogency of an alleged “instrumental requirement” cf. Raz (2005a; 2005b).  
142 
 
to be reasons, or treat as reasons, on pains of falling afoul of requirements of structural 
rationality.205 Whatever plausibility there may be to this type of view depends on the idea that 
the property of being structurally rational captures a distinctive ideal to which agents may be 
held, and to which they may hold themselves.  
A pressing question faced by such accounts concerns the status of this ideal. Why should 
agents try to live up to it? If all of an agent’s practical reasons first derive from the ideal of 
structural rationality, then it can seem that one is left without the conceptual resources to explain 
how the ideal comes to have this normative or reason-giving role in the first place.206 Some 
writers therefore adopt the strategy of claiming that the reason-giving force of structural 
rationality is explained by its role in “constituting” the kind of agent for whom there can be 
normative reasons at all.207 Call this the constitutivist strategy. If successful, it would account 
both for the normatively foundational status of structural rationality and for the unity and 
distinctiveness of its requirements. Requirements of structural rationality would be all and only 
those conformity with which is essential to the constitution of agency. Further arguments might 
then establish which specific requirements satisfy this description.208  
The constitutivist strategy has been subjected to forceful criticisms. Even if it were true that 
structural rationality plays some such constitutive role, this would be insufficient for explaining 
                                                          
205 Cf. Korsgaard (1996, 2009a, 2009b); Smith (1994); Velleman (2000); possibly also Williams (1981). 
206 The ideal may, even on this type of view, without vicious circularity be supported by reasons, if among the 
reasons to which the requirements of structural rationality give rise, for any given person, are some that speak in 
favor of being structurally rational. But one might worry that this sort of broadly circular self-supporting structure 
is insufficient to account for the alleged normatively foundational role of structural rationality.  
207 Korsgaard (2008; 2009b); Velleman (2000); and in a similar vein, Davidson (1984). 
208 For example, Korsgaard claims that the norms compliance with which is constitutive of agency are Kant’s 
Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives, possibly supplemented by a separate prudential requirement. Others 
might argue for different sets of constitutive requirements. The general constitutivist strategy is compatible with 
contextualist and even conventionalist answers to the question of what structural rationality requires. Perhaps 
different contexts, which may in turn be sensitive to shared or prevalent attitudes of “recognizing as an agent”, 
yield different sets of constitutive norms. Some philosophers who take themselves to be deploying Hegelian ideas 
argue in this direction, although I suspect (but cannot attempt to substantiate here) that they go astray both in their 
systematic claims and in attributing this type of view to Hegel. 
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its alleged normatively foundational status, i.e., for establishing that all normative reasons derive 
from the ideal of structural rationality. For one, it may intelligibly be asked whether or why one 
should aim to constitute oneself as the relevant kind of agent.209 More fundamentally, even if 
one accepts both that such constitution is an aim and that it requires one to be structurally 
rational, it is very plausible that that one need not be structurally rational at all times, without 
exception, in order to be an agent in the relevant sense. Indeed, constitutivist accounts are 
committed to denying that, lest they make it by definition impossible for agents to fail to act on 
some of their reasons (since they would thereby fail to be agents), and thus deprive those 
reasons of their specifically normative character.210 But if constituting oneself as an agent does 
not require being structurally rational at all times, then it becomes again mysterious how the 
existence of substantive reasons could be explained along these lines. For such reasons, if they 
exist, do not exist in a way that allows for exceptions.  
This latter objection to the project of according explanatory primacy to structural rationality 
has been advanced in a particularly effective way, as part of a battery of further considerations 
against the normatively foundational role of structural rationality, by Niko Kolodny. Kolodny 
argues that there simply are no reasons, constitutive or other, to comply with requirements of 
structural rationality in each case or as such.211 Yet his conclusion inherits (perhaps 
gratuitously) what I have suggested is a non-trivial component of the very kind of theory he is 
criticizing: namely, the idea that there is an interestingly distinctive and unified domain of 
requirements of structural (or, as Kolodny calls is, subjective) rationality. He therefore also 
inherits from those theories the onus of explaining how the specific content of individual 
requirements is related to whatever unifies structural rationality as a distinctive domain. I will 
                                                          
209 Cf. Enoch (2005; 2006; 2011).  
210 Cf. the illuminating discussion of the “error constraint” on normativity in Lavin (2004).   
211 Kolodny (2005). 
144 
 
now argue that while he explicitly sets himself this task, there are reasons to doubt that he 
succeeds in discharging it.212 To anticipate the result of my discussion in a slogan: Kolodny’s 
subjectivism and formalism about structural rationality make it unlikely that his account fits the 
phenomenon it is aimed to explain, that is to say, a notion of internal irrationality on which we 
commonly rely in practices of criticism and advice.   
 
3. An answer, and some problems with it: the Transparency Account 
Kolodny’s answer to the question of the content of structural rationality falls out of his 
account of its apparent normativity, which he calls the “Transparency Account”. This account 
yields a pleasingly general answer to the question what structural rationality requires.  
Recall that Kolodny denies, on grounds that I will not rehearse here, that there is always 
reason to comply with rational requirements, or (as one might also put it) that rational 
requirements are normative.213 Others have independently argued to similar conclusions, or have 
at least expressed doubts about the normativity of rational requirements.214 The purpose of the 
Transparency Account is to explain, given this skeptical conclusion, why it is that those 
requirements nevertheless appear to be normative. The explanation appeals to an asymmetry 
between two perspectives on a person’s attitudes: the agential or first-personal perspective and 
the third-personal perspective. According to Kolodny, a person is structurally irrational (in fact, 
or from a third-personal perspective) just in case she is, as it seems to her (i.e., as she sees it 
from her first-personal perspective), substantively irrational.  
                                                          
212 It may be worth pointing out that the success of his negative project of establishing the lack of reasons to be 
structurally rational in each case does not stand or fall with this.  
213 Kolodny does not deny that rational requirements express normative propositions. He denies that they are 
normative in the further sense that there is always reason to conform to them, or reason to conform to them as such. 
On this distinction (to which I return in section 5 below) cf. Raz (1975: 171-177) and Raz (1977: 153-157), as well 
as Parfit (2011: 144-45).  
214 For example, Raz (2005a; 2005b); Scanlon (2003); Broome (2007a; 2007b); Dancy (2008). 
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For example, if you judge that all things considered you ought to ϕ, but you do not intend to 
ϕ, then you will, as it appears to you, be substantively irrational: you will, as it appears to you, 
fail to conform to the reasons there are. But this is just the case in which, viewed from another 
person’s perspective, you fail to be structurally rational. Your intention will be at odds with 
your judgment, and therefore you at odds with yourself, in just the sense that is intuitively 
captured by the notion of structural irrationality.  It does not matter that your belief that you 
have conclusive reason to ϕ may be mistaken. Perhaps you are wrong in thinking yourself to be 
at odds with the reasons there are, and thus in thinking yourself substantively irrational: this will 
not make you any less irrational in the structural sense. What presents itself, from the outside, as 
an incoherence among your attitudes – specifically, between your practical judgment and your 
intention –, presents itself to you as a mismatch between one of your attitudes – in this case, 
your intention – and whatever aspects of the world that attitude should, as you believe, be 
properly responsive to.215 This, according to Kolodny, explains the “apparent” normative or 
reason-giving force of rational requirements: whoever falls short of such a requirement believes 
himself or herself to be at odds with the substantive reasons there are, and therefore experiences 
(what feels like) a genuinely normative pressure to change the relevant attitudes. 
                                                          
215 The account is a “transparency account” due to the source of the perspectival asymmetry I am describing here. 
That asymmetry, according to a familiar line of thought, results from the circumstance that from a person’s first-
personal point of view, questions (or facts) about a certain set of her attitudes are “transparent” to – i.e., answered 
or established by reference to – questions or facts about whatever considerations she believes would warrant having 
those attitudes.  
For example, the question “Do I judge that p?”, as asked by S, is usually transparent, for S, to the question whether 
p. “Usually”, that is to say: in the absence of a certain form of failure of rationality on the part of S. This important 
qualification makes room for the possibility that transparency, being a psychological phenomenon, may fail to 
obtain, and accordingly limits the applicability of the Transparency Account even apart from the larger objections 
raised below. However, as long as transparency does obtain, “I judge that” or “as it seems to me” are redundant 
from the first-personal perspective; therefore the “mismatch” encountered in cases of structural irrationality is, from 
that perspective, a mismatch between one’s attitude (belief, intention, etc.) and the reasons there are, rather than 
between one’s attitude and the content of a further attitude (one’s own judgment or belief about the reasons there 
are).  
On transparency, cf. Edgley (1969: 90); Evans (1982: 224-228); Moran (2001: 60-64); and many further 
discussions, especially relating to Moore’s paradox. 
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The Transparency Account rests on a certain rather large assumption. It is an assumption 
that, if true, would not only underwrite the Transparency Account but would at the same time 
yield an answer to my guiding question about the content of structural rationality. What the 
Transparency Account assumes is that all requirements of structural rationality, whichever they 
may be, can be “ultimately derived” from two “core requirements” (where “A” stands for some 
attitude)216:  
C+ If one believes that one has conclusive reason to have A, then one is rationally 
required to have A. 
C - If one believes that one lacks sufficient reason to have A, then one is rationally 
required not to have A. 
Insofar as the Transparency Account purports to be an account of structural rationality in 
general, it identifies as structurally irrational all and only combinations of attitudes that violate 
either one of these two “core requirements”.217 That is to say, it identifies as cases of structural 
irrationality all and only those in which a person either believes that she has conclusive reason 
to have some attitude A, but lacks A, or believes that she lacks sufficient reason to have some 
attitude A, but has A. The Transparency Account thus ensures that all cases of structural 
irrationality are ones in which a person is, as she sees it, substantively irrational. Whenever a 
person violates one of the “core requirements”, the peculiar relation between her attitudes that 
                                                          
216 Kolodny (2005: 557). Jointly, the “core requirements” are equivalent to a version (restricted to attitudes) of what 
Broome (2007a: 360) calls the “direct enkratic condition”: “Necessarily, if you are rational, then, if you believe 
your reasons require you to F, you F.” 
217 It is true that the “core requirements”, as formulated by Kolodny, express only sufficient conditions of being 
under requirements of structural rationality, not necessary ones. As stated, they allow that one may be rationally 
required to have or not to have an attitude on grounds other than one’s belief about conclusive or insufficient 
reasons to have it. But as Kolodny acknowledges, if the Transparency Account is to be a general account of the 
apparent normativity of rational requirements, all such requirements must derive from, or reduce to, the core 
requirements. Unless they do, the Transparency Account does not explain why someone who violates the 
requirements necessarily experiences herself as being in violation of what reason requires. 
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marks her as structurally irrational will at the same time be such as to make it the case that she 
believes herself to be falling afoul of substantive reasons that apply to her.  
If it works, the account has a clear theoretical pay-off: it delivers a straightforward answer 
to the question of what constitutes structural irrationality, and thus what structural rationality 
requires. Together, the two “core requirements” amount to something like a prohibition (in the 
name of structural rationality) on clear-eyed or self-conscious akrasia, in a wide sense that 
extends to attitudes other than intention.218 They say that one is structurally irrational if, for 
some range of attitudes, one has such an attitude in violation of one’s own judgment regarding 
whether to have it. Moreover, since in each such case one will believe oneself to be in violation 
of substantive reasons, an explanation of the felt normative pressure to revise one’s rogue 
attitude can do without postulating any reasons to comply with structural requirements on 
combinations of attitudes as such. Given these virtues of the Transparency Account, what could 
speak against accepting it? 
The problem, in short, is that there are reasons to think that the account will be extensionally 
inadequate even if the task of subsuming this or that particular requirement of rationality under 
the “core requirements” can be successfully discharged. This is because the Transparency 
Account limits the possibility of structural irrationality to those cases where a person has some 
belief as to whether the balance of reasons favors or disfavors her having a certain attitude. But 
this is a rather demanding condition, which sets the bar both too high and in the wrong place for 
what are plausibly regarded as cases of structural irrationality. To show how, I will here focus 
on the positive requirement C+; analogous problems arise for C –.  
                                                          
218 Does it also extend to (intentional) actions? At the least, I see no reason to exclude the intentions with which 
actions are performed from the scope of possible substitutes for “A”. This raises the more general question, briefly 
taken up in section 5, of which attitudes exactly are properly thought of as subject to the demands of structural 
rationality, and what it is about them as opposed to others that makes them suitable for such assessment. 
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(i) Too high: The core requirements apply only when their antecedents are satisfied: in the 
case of C+, only when an agent has a belief about the existence of conclusive reasons for having 
an attitude. Moreover, it is not enough that this belief should be about the set of facts F that 
(extensionally) constitutes those reasons. Rather, on the most straightforward reading of C+, the 
attitude for which those facts are held to be reasons, as well as the normative truth that F speaks 
conclusively in favor of that attitude, must themselves figure in the content of the belief. This 
may make structural irrationality turn out to be a rare occurrence. For attitudes are not 
standardly, and arguably cannot in each case be, accompanied or preceded by beliefs of this sort. 
Something like this seems to be intended by Thomas Scanlon’s observation that “judgments 
explicitly about the reasons for other judgments have a higher-order character that makes them 
somewhat artificial.”219 Even if the context of that remark did not suggest it anyway, it would be 
natural to extend Scanlon’s observation from “judgments about the reasons for other judgments” 
to judgments about the reasons for attitudes (say, about the reasons for feeling gratitude toward 
S, or intending to ϕ, or hoping for X to happen). Such attitudes are not usually had in response 
to judgments that are explicitly or self-consciously about the reasons for having them; “more 
commonly, when a belief or intention arises from a conscious judgment, this judgment is 
content-directed.”220 If this is correct, to restrict charges of structural irrationality to cases where 
such “higher-order” judgments are present would be likely to have revisionist implications for 
our practices of making such charges.221  
                                                          
219 Scanlon (2007: 91). This remark should be read as restricted to the first-personal case. In interpersonal cases, it 
is much less obvious that there is anything “artificial” about such higher-order judgments. Nor does Scanlon 
himself explain what exactly he thinks the “artificiality” in the first-personal case amounts to. Cf. also Railton 
(2006).  
220 Scanlon (2007: 91). For a large range of attitudes, the judgments that call for their presence or absence will 
plausibly contain no reference to those attitudes themselves: think of the judgments that would call for attitudes like 
joy, embarrassment, regret, distrust, reluctance, and many others. 
221 Might we imagine Kolodny to respond that he requires only dispositional beliefs, not ones that are held 
reflectively or self-consciously? Once again, the spirit of his account – its rationale of accounting for the experience 
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Like all claims about revisionism, this is of course in part an empirical conjecture that 
would need to be substantiated in detail. Even if substantiated, it would not amount to a decisive 
objection to the Transparency Account. A deeper problem resulting from the same feature of the 
account is that it threatens to make charges of irrationality unintelligible even in cases where the 
condition that the relevant higher-order belief must be present is met. For it follows from the 
account that a person could come to discover that she is (already) guilty of structural 
irrationality only in somewhat exceptional cases.  
How so? On the Transparency Account, that someone is structurally irrational entails that 
one of her attitudes is contrary to what she believes the balance of reasons recommends. In other 
words, in order for her to qualify as structurally irrational, she must have a belief regarding the 
substantive rational appropriateness of one of her attitudes. And it seems that generally, the 
presence of such a belief will ensure that a person feels some pressure to acquire or abandon the 
relevant attitude. Indeed this is just what the account relies on in accounting for the “felt” or 
“apparent” normativity of rational requirements. But recall that on the Transparency Account, 
for a person to believe that she ought to have an attitude she lacks, or that she ought to lack an 
attitude she has, is all there is to her being structurally irrational. It therefore seems that 
generally, the very same conditions that make it the case that a person is structurally irrational 
also make it the case that she believes she is. Conversely, the very same conditions that make it 
the case that she does not believe that she is structurally irrational – namely, the absence of a 
belief that her having or lacking some attitude A is against reason – will generally make it the 
case that she in fact is not structurally irrational. If so, how could it come to pass that a person 
comes to find out that she is (already) structurally irrational?  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
of normative pressure – would seem to speak against this. Such a response would, however, move his account 
closer to the one I will be defending in the next two sections.  
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The qualification “generally” in the preceding line of thought may seem to offer a way out. 
It allows for the special case where a person has the relevant belief (concerning the rational 
appropriateness of A) unawares, and comes to discover it – and thus the mismatch between her 
attitudes and the relevant reasons, and thus the fact that she is structurally irrational – only by 
acquiring a further, higher-order belief. What she would find out, in finding out that she is 
structurally irrational, is that she (already) believes that she ought to have A even though she 
lacks A, or ought to lack A even though she has it.222 But in requiring such a two-stage 
progression from an unreflectively held belief toward reflective awareness of it, the “possibility 
of discovery” for which the account makes room is a rather limited one. What the account does 
not allow is that a person could come to discover that she is (already) irrational by learning that 
there are certain standards of rationality that she is (already) violating. For unless she already 
believed (at least unreflectively) that she was subject to those standards, she would not be guilty 
of structural irrationality as defined by the core requirements, and therefore could not discover 
that she was.   
We can summarize this conclusion by saying that the Transparency Account yields a 
thoroughly subjectivist picture of structural rationality. Pending a more detailed examination of 
the ways and contexts in which charges of structural irrationality are made, this does not show 
the account to be false. But it shows that if the account turned out to be extensionally adequate, 
requirements with respect to which a person could learn that she is falling afoul of them – other 
                                                          
222 I am also assuming that she knows whether or not she has A. Unless she does (say, if she is mistaken or 
uncertain about it), she will not know whether she is substantively rational in the relevant respect. Once we grant 
that there are limits to a person’s self-knowledge, such that beliefs about her attitudes can come apart from what 
attitudes she in fact has, we should wonder whether the core requirements are in fact sufficient to explain the felt 
normative pressure that allegedly comes with violating them. It seems that what (if anything) would guarantee such 
felt normative pressure would be the mismatch not merely between a person’s belief that she lacks sufficient reason 
(or has conclusive reason) for A and her having or lacking A, but rather the mismatch between the relevant belief 
and her belief as to whether she has A. Kolodny’s quest to account for the apparent normativity of rational 
requirements thus effectively pushes him towards a position that is even more subjectivist than his stated view, 
which I am criticizing for its subjectivist implications.  
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than by learning that she already believed herself to be falling afoul of them – could not be 
requirements of structural rationality.  
(ii) In the wrong place: There is another, independent problem that arises for an account of 
structural rationality built around the “core requirements”. On such an account, structural 
rationality requires that each of a person’s attitudes conform to her all-things-considered 
judgment concerning the overall desirability of that attitude, rather than to her pro tanto 
judgment concerning its appropriateness (or “fittingness”). Even without undertaking a detailed 
phenomenology, there is reason to doubt that this is faithful to the role that assessments of 
structural rationality play in our discourse.  
The distinction between the overall desirability and the appropriateness of an attitude can be 
explained in terms of the familiar idea that some reasons that speak in favor of having an 
attitude are nevertheless “of the wrong sort.” The question, Of the wrong sort for what?, has 
been much debated in recent times. But even independently of any particular answer to it, there 
is wide agreement that for many types of attitudes there is a meaningful and generally 
acknowledged distinction between “the right kinds of reasons” and “the wrong kinds of reasons” 
for having or not having those attitudes.223 The wrong kinds of reasons are still reasons that bear 
on the attitude, and may even be decisive in a given case. For example, even if it were true that 
the offensiveness of a joke had no bearing on how funny it was, there may be good reason not to 
be amused by it, despite the fact that the reason against being amused would (again, assuming 
the falsehood of moralism about humor) be “of the wrong sort”. Judgments about the 
appropriateness of an attitude, in the sense at issue here, are based on a restricted set of reasons 
for and against it: they exclude from consideration reasons that are of the wrong kind. By 
                                                          
223 There is an extended recent literature discussing the so-called “wrong kinds of reasons problem” (the term is 
from Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen [2004]), especially in the context of assessing the prospects for a buck-
passing analysis of value. Two recent treatments are Heuer (2010) and Schroeder (2010). 
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contrast, judgments about the desirability of an attitude are based on the balance of all reasons 
for and against it.  
It may be true that what substantive rationality requires of one is that one bring one’s 
attitudes in conformity with what the overall balance of reasons recommends. But notice that 
what substantive rationality requires in this way is an intentional action, not an automatic 
adjustment of one’s attitudes to the balance of reasons. Even if the parallelism between 
substantive and structural rationality suggested by Kolodny stands, this would yield a criterion 
of structural rationality only for intentions (or intentional actions), not for attitudes more 
generally. The substantive rationality of attitudes other than intentions is determined not by their 
relation to the balance of reasons but by their relation to the more specific set of those reasons 
that bear on the appropriateness or fittingness of the attitude. It is only those more specific 
reasons that make having the attitude intelligible as an unreflective, spontaneous response to a 
situation, both in the eyes of the person whose attitude it is and in the eyes of others. What the 
balance of all reasons makes intelligible are intentions and intentional actions – as responses to 
that balance –, but not attitudes that arise in an agent other than by way of his aiming or 
intending to have them.224 By tying structural rationality to conclusive judgments, based on the 
balance of all reasons, Kolodny leaves no room for the fact that different types of attitudes are 
made appropriate, and their possession by an agent intelligible, by reference to distinct kinds of 
considerations.  
To conclude: The elegance of the Transparency Account comes at a significant cost. The 
account seeks to offer both an answer to the question of why persons feel (if they do) that they 
are required to bring their attitudes into conformity with structural rationality, and an answer to 
                                                          
224 This line of reasoning broadly follows the one found in Raz (2010). Cf. also Gibbard (1990: 36-40). 
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the question on which I am focusing in this chapter, namely, what determines the content of 
structural rationality. On the Transparency Account, the answer to this latter question is 
determined by the psychology of individual agents: more precisely, by their beliefs that the 
balance of reasons makes it desirable for them to have or lack a certain attitude. Thus 
subjectivism (regarding the presence of structural irrationality) and formalism (regarding the 
question what structural irrationality requires) go hand in hand, and both features have 
consequences that should lead us to reject the Transparency Account.  
 
4. Judgment-sensitivity 
Let me now consider a different account of structural rationality which, although in some 
respects similar to Kolodny’s, does not face either of the problems described in the previous 
section. It does give rise to difficult further questions of its own. That, I would suggest, is one of 
its virtues.  
Kolodny attributes the basic idea of the Transparency Account – “that we take subjective 
rationality, as a whole, to consist in having attitudes that cohere with one’s beliefs about the 
reasons for them” – to Thomas Scanlon.225 But as the quotation from Scanlon above has already 
indicated, it is doubtful that this is in fact his view. Instead, he offers a conception of structural 
rationality that dispenses with the element of higher-order or “attitude-directed” judgment.  
The main elements of Scanlon’s view of structural rationality are presented towards the 
beginning of What We Owe To Each Other. Scanlon there introduces the concept of a judgment-
sensitive attitude. According to Scanlon’s definition, judgment-sensitive attitudes (hereafter 
JSA) are  
                                                          
225 Kolodny (2005: 559) 
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attitudes that an ideally rational person would come to have whenever that person 
judged there to be sufficient reasons for them and that would, in an ideally rational 
person, “extinguish” when that person judged them not to be supported by reasons of 
the appropriate kind.226  
The sense of “ideally rational” that Scanlon is relying on here is what I have been calling the 
structural sense. That a person judges there to be sufficient reason for her to have a certain 
attitude does not require her to have that attitude in order to be substantively rational, since her 
judgment may be mistaken and there may in fact be no reason to have the attitude in question.  
There are obvious similarities between the question whether an agent’s attitudes meet 
Kolodny’s “core requirements” and the question whether the agent’s attitudes exhibit 
“judgment-sensitivity”. Indeed we can reformulate the definition of JSA to yield at least a 
partial characterization of structural rationality: structural rationality requires (perhaps among 
other things) that an agent’s judgment-sensitive attitudes satisfy the conditions given in 
Scanlon’s definition. It is only superficially tautological to say that on Scanlon’s definition, 
structural rationality requires that an agent’s judgment-sensitive attitudes be judgment-sensitive. 
The first occurrence of “judgment-sensitive” in the preceding sentence corresponds to a 
classificatory or aspirational sense of that term, by which it picks out a set of attitudes as 
appropriately held to standards of structural rationality. The second occurrence corresponds to a 
success sense of the term, which refers to the way the attitudes thus classified behave in an 
ideally rational person.  
Both Kolodny’s “core requirements” and the judgment-sensitivity requirement drawn from 
Scanlon mark as irrational an agent’s having attitudes that fail to conform to the relevant 
                                                          
226 Scanlon (1998: 20).  
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judgment on the part of the agent. Where the accounts diverge is with regard to the question of 
what the relevant judgment consists in. In contrast to the core requirements, the requirement of 
judgment-sensitivity is at least open to a reading that does not stipulate that the relevant 
judgments must be about the very attitudes that should (rationally speaking) be sensitive to 
them. It is true that Scanlon’s initial definition of judgment-sensitive attitudes invites a reading 
along the lines of the core requirements, and it is of course possible that Scanlon changed his 
mind in the later article. But even in the original definition of JSA that I have quoted, “judged 
there to be sufficient reasons for [the attitude]” can be read in such a way that what structural 
rationality requires is for an agent to have (or lack) a certain attitude when she makes a 
judgment about the considerations that in fact bear on the appropriateness of that attitude, rather 
than to have or lack an attitude only when she makes a judgment that is directly about its 
appropriateness (or about the reasons for it, as such).  
Whether or not this is in fact the conception intended by Scanlon, thinking of structural 
rationality along these lines avoids the problems that arise for the Transparency Account. It does 
not restrict the possibility of structural irrationality to the perhaps rare cases where an agent has 
explicit higher-order beliefs about the rational grounds of his own attitudes; it makes it 
intelligible how an agent could take himself to find out that he was already, unnoticed by him, 
in a condition that makes him an appropriate target of a non-substantive type of rational 
criticism; finally, it enables assessments of structural rationality to be sensitive to the distinction 
between the overall desirability of an attitude and its appropriateness.227  
                                                          
227 That Scanlon intends the first two consequences of his account is suggested by the passage about the 
“artificiality” of self-reflexive higher-order attitudes quoted earlier. That he intends the third one is suggested, for 
example, by the remark in Scanlon (2008: 91) that “insofar as charges of irrationality rest on the clash between 




Yet there is an obvious worry here. Interpreted along the lines of an ideal of judgment-
sensitivity, the notion of structural rationality is in danger of losing its specific practical function 
in a different way. To see why, it is necessary to consider a further putative adequacy criterion 
on an account of structural rationality, in addition to the ones to which I have been drawing 
attention in piecemeal fashion along the way. One might think that assessments of structural 
irrationality, whatever else may be true of them, are distinct from assessments of substantive 
rationality not only in being in one way or another relativized to an agent’s own attitudes228, but 
also in (their grounds’) being epistemically accessible to the agent in a readier or more secure 
way than is the case for assessments of substantive rationality. It can seem, in other words, that 
while structural irrationality may escape an agent’s notice, it should be immediately apparent to 
him once pointed out. Call this the epistemic internality of structural rationality, as distinct from 
its content internality. As we saw, on its most plausible reading the Transparency Account 
guarantees the epistemic accessibility of structural irrationality; that is simply the flipside of its 
particular strategy for explaining the felt normativity of the core requirements.229 By contrast, 
the account I presented as an improvement on the Transparency Account fails to meet the 
epistemic internality constraint, by allowing for situations where an agent is not merely unaware 
of his structural irrationality but remains uncomprehending of it, or sincerely in denial of it, 
even when it is pointed out to him. 
                                                          
228 However, as mentioned before, there are conceptions of substantive rationality that seek to derive the latter from 
structural rationality, or tie substantive reasons to structural rationality, so that substantive rationality too turns out 
to be relativized to an agent’s attitudes. The doubtful plausibility of such approaches apart, the distinguishing mark 
between substantive and structural that I mention here may be salvaged for them by recourse to degrees of 
directness of attitude-relativity, as well as by recourse to the different proper types of “anchoring” attitudes for 
assessments of structural and of substantive rationality.  
229 For the same reason, the Transparency Account has the effect of obscuring the distinctness of the two putative 
features of structural rationality I just named, content internality and epistemic internality. On the Transparency 
Account, the two never come apart.  
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Should we accept the claim that epistemic internality, in the sense just proposed, is a 
defining characteristic of assessments of structural rationality? In answering this question, we 
come to an important juncture. The simple but unhelpful thing to say is that the answer will 
depend on what practices and activities exactly we are seeking to give an account of when we 
seek to explain what judgments of structural irrationality are judgments about. But even without 
trying to do that in any detail, I want to offer some reasons to be wary of subscribing to the 
epistemic internality constraint. Consider for a moment what sensible rationale there might be 
for adopting that constraint. One thought here is likely to be that to offer assessments of 
rationality in the structural rather than the substantive register allows us to defer to some extent 
to the perspective of the agent of whom such an assessment is made. This may serve the 
purpose, in second-personal contexts, of helping us persuade or convince another person, by 
presenting certain actions and attitudes as ones that she was already intending anyway (though 
obliquely), or was already committed to (though “implicitly”). Beyond contexts of advice or 
persuasion, such ascriptions may also have a place in criticizing others for violating expectations 
that it seemed reasonable to have of them, given what we know about their intentions and 
beliefs and assuming that they are not structurally irrational. The epistemic constraint seems to 
receive less if any support from the third-personal, purely evaluative or classificatory use of 
ascriptions of structural irrationality, except insofar as that use is derivative from the second-
personal ones just mentioned. Of course we can imagine practices of third-personal evaluative 
assessment that accord a central role to the constraint. But the question is whether and why such 
practices would thereby fasten on an important concern.  
The question of rationale would merit much more extensive discussion, but my point here is 
a limited one: what we are really asking about, when we ask about the importance of the 
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epistemic constraint, is whether what I characterized as immediate epistemic access is indeed 
being relied on in contexts like the ones I mentioned, in which judgments concerning structural 
rationality and irrationality have their proper place. It seems to me that it is not. Just as we 
should resist the subjectivism of the Transparency Account because of its implausible 
consequences, we should avoid a mitigated subjectivism that holds our ascriptions of 
irrationality hostage to an agent’s self-perception in what is only a slightly more indirect way. It 
is true that whatever else may be the case about norms of structural rationality, one of their 
distinctive features is that they serve to judge an agent “by his own lights” or “by his own 
standards”, in some relevant sense. This is what I called, a moment ago, the “content internality” 
of assessments of structural rationality. To offer an explanation of what exactly constitutes an 
agent’s “own lights” or an agent’s own standards is to offer an account of the constraint of 
content internality. As long as we articulate this constraint in a way that ensures a meaningful 
sense of “the agent’s own lights” (cf. section 5 below), there is no compelling reason to 
additionally adopt the epistemic internality constraint and to thereby rule out the possibility that 
it might sometimes take some amount of convincing to bring someone to adopt or lose some 
attitude, or to perform or refrain from some action, on the grounds that the content of their own 
judgment or intention commits them to it on pains of some incoherence (of which they would be 
guilty whether they noticed it or not).  
There is the further question of what an account that replaces Kolodny’s “core 
requirements” by requirements of judgment-sensitivity has to say in response to the question 
which after all motivated the Transparency Account: namely how, given that there is no reason 
to conform to them, it could nevertheless appear as though one should always try to satisfy 
requirements of structural rationality. My short answer is to deny the observation. What is true 
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to is that one will always feel normative pressure to have the attitudes one believes to be 
substantively rational. This is the phenomenon the Transparency Account seeks to exploit for an 
account of structural rationality. But it can be so exploited only when structural rationality is 
construed as narrowly as it is in Kolodny’s account. For the requirements of rationality as 
defined by that account, it is necessarily true that one feels pressure to conform to them. But 
outside the confines of the account, we can no longer presume that the very phenomenon whose 
intelligibility Kolodny claims requires the account does indeed obtain. Persons may in fact not 
always be gripped by the requirements of structural rationality. The Transparency Account itself 
generates the explanatory challenge it then steps in to meet:  the guaranteed and perfectly 
general experience of a normative pressure to be structurally rational.  
 
5. Internal and external in assessments of structural rationality 
To be irrational in a structural sense is to fail to conform not to reasons as such, but to the 
reasons there are (for some specific attitude, in virtue of its being of a certain type) by one’s own 
lights. Kolodny’s account of structural rationality supplies a clear notion of failing by one’s own 
lights: it is to fail to conform to reasons, as one believes. If, as I have been urging, we reject that 
account and replace it by a conception of structural irrationality along the lines I have been 
sketching, what could serve as an appropriate notion of “a person’s own lights”? In other words, 
what can we say, at least in general terms, about what I called the constraint of content 
internality? What makes it the case that when an agent’s attitude is out of step with a relevant 
judgment on the part of that agent, this can be a case of internal or structural irrationality even if 
the relevant judgment is not itself about the appropriateness or justification or those attitudes?  
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The first thing to recognize here is that on any plausible account, the standard that 
constitutes a person’s own lights, or perspective, need not be one that is present to her mind at 
the moment at which she is said to be irrational. For example, it need not be the content of an 
occurrent belief. This would seem to be true even of the judgment about conclusive reasons for 
or against an attitude that Kolodny envisions as playing the relevant role. And once we allow 
that the relevant standard need not be the content of an occurrent belief, we can begin to 
consider identifying an agent’s own lights with standards that are anchored in his or her 
psychology in more indirect ways.  
Secondly, recall that whatever attitudes of an agent assessments of the rationality of the 
agent’s further attitudes are relativized to, all such assessments also have a non-relativized 
aspect or dimension. In whatever way their content internality is spelled out, it should not 
detract from what I called the categorical character of the requirements of structural rationality. 
The relativity to an agent’s psychological attitudes is part of the content of these requirements, 
not part of their applicability conditions. This seems to be the point of John Broome’s 
observation, quoted above, that structural rationality, for all its attitude-sensitivity, necessarily 
has a dimension of “strict liability”.  
How strict? To say that the attitude-relativity or internality of rational requirements is part 
of their content rather than their applicability conditions is not to deny, after all, that there are 
certain applicability conditions. Requirements of structural rationality apply categorically only 
to those who meet those conditions; and it is plausible to think that the conditions themselves 
consist in certain psychological features. One is subject to rational requirements only if one has 
those psychological features – abstractly speaking, features in the absence of which one could 
never be said to be internally irrational. What those features are is no less interesting a question 
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than the question regarding the psychological elements that ensure content internality – that is to 
say, the psychological elements that make it the case, for some particular attitude, that for it to 
fail to be judgment-sensitive is for the agent to fail by her own lights. And the answer to the 
former question might serve as a guide to answering the latter. For plausibly, requirements of 
structural rationality apply to an agent just in case it is possible for that agent to fail by his own 
lights. Indeed, “failing by one’s own lights” is one intuitive, if loose, characterization of what 
structural irrationality consists in.  
What then are the applicability conditions for requirements of structural rationality? If we 
were to accept Kolodny’s Transparency Account, the answer would have to be that among these 
conditions is the presence of higher-order judgments – whether explicit or tacit – regarding the 
extent to which one’s other attitudes are favored by the balance of reasons. And what makes it 
structurally rational or irrational for an agent to have those other attitudes is whether they are as 
these judgments determine they should be. Thus on Kolodny’s account, the applicability 
conditions for rational requirements – the psychological features that make it the case that there 
is such a thing as “the agent’s own lights” – coincide with the psychological features that 
determine, in each given case, which particular other attitudes the agent may rationally have. 
But on a different account of structural rationality, these two things need not coincide. If we 
think of the requirements of structural rationality as requirements of judgment-sensitivity, we 
need not identify the relevant judgments (those to which the various attitudes are sensitive in a 
rational agent) with the psychological features that make assessments of structural rationality 
applicable to an agent in the first place.  
Thus it is open to the judgment-sensitivity account to offer as a candidate for the agent’s 
own lights psychological features other than the specific judgments to which the various 
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judgment-sensitive attitudes should be sensitive. One sort of candidate for these features (that is, 
one candidate for satisfying the constraint of content internality), in the spirit of Kolodny’s 
account, would be higher-order judgments or beliefs on the part of the agent, perhaps ones that 
are in some way tacit or implicit. The content of these judgments would be the objective 
correlates of the various specific requirements of judgment-sensitivity themselves: that is to say, 
propositions stating that specified types of attitudes are appropriately sensitive to specified sorts 
of features of the world. Furthermore we could, and probably should, imagine these higher-order 
judgments to incorporate various kinds of indirection in their specification of these 
requirements. They need not and probably cannot be judgments that spell out, case by case, 
what features of the world any given attitude should be responsive to; more likely, this 
specification will have a certain degree of generality, which could consist in reference to such 
things as roles and values. Since what those various more general elements specify as the proper 
supporting grounds for this or that type of attitude is not reducible to beliefs on the part of the 
agent, there is a clear sense in which the agent could come to find out, in any given case, that he 
is subject to structural irrationality or self-defeat.  
There is another kind of candidate for the role of an agent’s own lights that I would like to 
very briefly – and somewhat speculatively – mention here, in light of the questions I have been 
pursuing in the previous chapters. Instead of thinking of content internality as established by 
appropriately general judgments or beliefs on the part of an agent, we might look to the agent’s 
will. Doing so is suggested, again, by the thought that our understanding of the applicability 
conditions of assessments of structural rationality seems like a natural guide for becoming clear 
about the sense in which structural irrationality is a distinctively internal failure. For it may be 
thought that a person’s judging that certain kinds of attitudes should properly be sensitive or 
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responsive to specific types of features of the world is not sufficient to make it the case that she 
is irrational if she has such an attitude without believing those features to obtain (or lacks the 
attitude even though she believes that the features obtain). At least, the internal failure or 
incoherence would seem to be of a stronger kind if it were an incoherence in a person’s willing, 
rather than just a mismatch between her higher-order (normative) judgments, her more 
particular world-directed judgments, and her attitudes. Structural irrationality would be an 
incoherence in a person’s will if the agent’s “own lights” consisted in, or at least essentially 
involved, a certain kind of volitional engagement. The relevantly “internal” standards would 
accordingly be those to which an agent is committed or which she endorses, perhaps by being 
committed to or endorsing certain roles, practical identities, self-governing policies, and the like, 
which specify that certain kinds of attitudes should be sensitive to certain sets of facts. And to 
say that an agent is being structurally irrational would then amount to making a statement about 
the relation between her attitudes and her will, rather than simply about the relation between her 
attitudes and her judgments.  
If one were to pursue this second line of thought regarding the constraint of content 
internality, the extent to which an individual conforms to requirements of judgment-sensitivity 
would correlate with the extent to which that individual is an agent, at least on the constitutivist 
conceptions of agency I introduced in Chapter 1 that are centered on the idea of volitional 
reflexivity. According to those conceptions, agency in creatures with a self-reflexive will – that 
is, creatures with volitions directed at their own further volitions and motivational states – 
requires the establishment of some form of volitional unity. Agency is therefore identified 
primarily with those privileged attitudes that establish such unity either synchronically or over 
time (such as endorsements of general principles or practical identities; or the complex self-
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reaffirming volitional state that Frankfurt calls caring; or the higher-order volitions that Bratman 
calls self-governing policies). But agency requires not only the presence of those constitutive 
volitional attitudes, but also that the individual’s more particular motivations and attitudes 
conform, by and large, to the content of the higher-order, constitutive attitudes. Structural 
irrationality, on this view, is their failure to do so.230  
This correlation between structural rationality and “constituting oneself” as an agent is again 
in the spirit of Kolodny’s Transparency Account: as Kolodny sees it, it is constitutive of an 
individual’s being an agent that he or she exhibit, at least by and large, the “executive virtue” of 
conforming to the core requirements (or, as he calls it in later essays, Believed Reason).231 
Accordingly, the difference between the two accounts of internality I have just sketched is a 
difference in what is thought to constitute an individual’s agency, and what at the same time 
explains her susceptibility to specifically internal irrationality: her (self-reflexive) will, on one 
account; her reflective judgment, on the other. Whether these two kinds of account are 
competitors or whether they can instead peacefully co-exist or even complement each other will 
depend on how exactly we explain the concepts of judgment, will, and the relation between 
them – a large undertaking that lies entirely beyond the scope of this dissertation.  
Let me note, finally, that constitutivist theories could in principle also take the form of 
strongly normative (or moralistic, or perhaps “aretistic”) conceptions of agency that yield a third 
and as it were anomalous understanding of internality, or of an agent’s own lights. On such 
conceptions, individuals are irrational, and to that extent deficient as agents, if their attitudes fail 
to conform to the relevant factual judgments, regardless of the presence any further 
                                                          
230 At the limit, this line of thought could lead to the collapse of the very distinction between structural and 
substantive irrationality: namely if the content of the relevant higher-order volition is simply, and uninformatively, 
that one’s actions and attitudes conform to the reasons there are.  
231 Cf. along similar lines the considerations in Raz (1999: 17-21). 
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psychological features whose content it is to prescribe that these kinds of attitudes should be 
responsive to these kinds of facts. At most, such content – the kind that renders the agent 
vulnerable to charges of structural irrationality or self-defeat – would have to be ascribable to an 
agent in a very oblique or indirect way. On such conceptions, our knowledge of what exactly 
structural rationality requires of an agent depends neither on information about that agent’s 
higher-order beliefs or judgments nor on information about her higher-order volitions. The 
standards failure to conform to which is said to amount to structural irrationality or self-defeat 
are instead identified in an agent-neutral way. If they are nevertheless held to be the agent’s 
“own lights”, this is not in virtue of any descriptive facts about the contents of that agent’s mind 
but rather in virtue of the fact that what it is to be an agent (or a certain kind of agent, identified 
in aretaic terms) is, in part, to conform to those very standards.232 
Such an objectivist conception of standards of structural rationality is in fact a non-optional 
element of the more agent-relative conceptions I have outlined, and even of the strongly 
subjectivist conception of structural rationality defended by Kolodny. What is constitutive of 
being an agent, on all those conceptions, is general (though not necessarily exceptionless) 
conformity with some standard that is quite independent of any particular individual’s 
psychology. On Kolodny’s account, for example, this is the “core requirement”: the agent-
neutral (and agency-constituting) standard of conforming, on any given occasion, to the further 
and more straightforwardly “internal” standard supplied by the higher-order (i.e., attitude-
directed), all-things-considered normative judgment of that particular agent. The “strict liability” 
                                                          
232 How that conformity is explained may in turn make a difference to how the agent is assessed: it could be 
explained either by the fact that the agent is held to those requirements, or by the fact that the agent holds himself to 
them. When this distinction is thought to make an important difference, we are on our way towards the more agent-
relative or reflexive conceptions of internality, and structural irrationality, that I outlined before.   
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of structural rationality can be tempered by incorporating reference to elements of particular 
agents’ psychologies, but it cannot be entirely eliminated.  
What unites all three types of account I have briefly outlined here is that the relevant 
“lights” – the specifically internal standards by reference to which an agent’s structural 
rationality is assessed – are identified by reference to those attitudes that most “speak for” the 
agent on a given occasion; that is, by reference to those attitudes that have what Bratman calls 
“agential authority”, such that conformity with them is what agency, in a demanding and 
significant sense, consists in.233 The particular explanation of internality offered by 
constitutivists like Bratman, Korsgaard, and Frankfurt, who are also voluntarists, is that what 
structural rationality requires of an agent is determined by the particular content of those 
authoritative attitudes, which differs from one agent to another, in combination234 with the 
agent-independent functional standards (for example consistency, coherence, or stability) to 
which one is subject in virtue of having attitudes of these types. The explanation offered by 
Kolodny, in turn, was that what structural rationality requires is determined by the contents of 
an agent’s attitude-directed judgments, in combination with the agent-independent “core 
requirement” that one’s attitudes conform to those judgments. But as I have indicated, other 
kinds of explanation are possible: we can imagine more objectivist types of constitutivism that 
accord little or no role to the idiosyncratic contents of agents’ psychologies, and make 
assessments of well-functioning or well-constituted agency depend solely on the degree to 
                                                          
233 What the significance or relevance of this specific conception of agency consists in is of course a further, and 
large, question. To say, as constitutivist writers like Frankfurt, Bratman, Korsgaard, Velleman, and others all do 
more or less in passing, that it reflects a concern with the value of “autonomy”, is at most the beginning of an 
answer.  




which an agent’s attitudes are in step with what that agents judges to be, at a largely descriptive 
level, the facts of her situation.235  
 
6. The content of structural rationality 
In the previous section, I tried to complete my case for thinking that failing to conform to 
reasons by one's own lights – and in that sense, being structurally irrational – need not consist in 
failing to conform to reasons, as one believes. If in thinking about what structural rationality 
requires we were to settle for the judgment-sensitivity account I have proposed, what would 
follow regarding the content of structural rationality?  
First, it is worth observing that no less than Kolodny’s “core requirements” (pace Kolodny), 
the requirements of judgment-sensitivity may not exhaust the requirements of structural 
rationality. But in contrast to the core requirements, they put the question of the content of (part 
of) structural rationality back on the agenda, which the Transparency Account had made to 
recede into the psychology of individual agents. To the extent that we think of structural 
rationality as consisting in the sensitivity of attitudes to relevant judgments, we are faced with 
the question which judgments are the relevant ones for any given type of attitude.236  
Recall that on the Transparency Account, the question of the relevant judgments receives a 
simple answer: for any given attitude, the judgment to which it ought rationally to conform is a 
higher-order judgment about whether the balance of reasons requires or disallows one’s having 
                                                          
235 And this will usually mean that such assessments turn, in an even more objectivist fashion, on whether an 
agent’s attitudes are in step with what are in fact (from the perspective of the assessing party) the proper grounds 
for those attitudes, assuming that agents generally have true descriptive beliefs about their situation. 
236 There are at least two further questions that are plausibly thought of as relating to the content of structural 
rationality, but which unlike the question I am here pursuing arise equally for the Transparency Account: (1) For 
any given type of attitude, in what way it is required to conform to the relevant judgments, i.e. what counts as the 
appropriate kind of “sensitivity”? (2) What types of attitudes are properly regarded as judgment-sensitive (in the 
classificatory or aspirational sense), i.e., are properly held to the requirements of structural rationality? My view is 
that the basic answer that I will defend with respect to the question “which judgments?” – i.e., that this is a question 
properly addressed to first-order normative theory (and practice) – applies to these two further questions as well.  
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that attitude. The connection between attitude and judgment is thus established by the content of 
the judgment itself. Once we abandon the Transparency Account, this solution is no longer 
available. But my discussion of that account already pointed to an alternative answer, which 
may be given on behalf of the judgment-sensitivity account. Briefly stated, the answer is as 
follows: the judgments to which a given type of attitude should be sensitive, in order for an 
agent to be structurally rational, are judgments based on those reasons that would make the 
attitude appropriate, fitting, or intelligible – in other words, judgments based on the “right kind 
of reasons” or the “standard reasons” for the attitude in question – as determined from the 
perspective of those further standards conforming to which is constitutive of agency (whether 
these are an agent’s higher-order judgments, or an agent’s higher-order volitions, or even wholly 
external, agent-neutral standards of good agency). 
 As above, I will here make do with an intuitive understanding of the notions of 
appropriateness, fittingness, and the like, since trying to vindicate them in any detail would 
amount to entering a wide-ranging debate that is somewhat tangential to my aims in this chapter. 
The important result, for my purposes, is that construing (part of) structural rationality as 
judgment-sensitivity, lays to rest any hope of supplying a simple formula from which all 
structural requirements could be generated, or even a short, tidy list of such requirements. 
Structural rationality, so understood, cannot be reduced to a prohibition on clear-eyed 
akrasia in the way envisioned by Kolodny. Instead, we are faced with an indefinite variety of 
requirements – as many as there are types of attitudes that an agent may have for either the right 
or the wrong kinds of reasons. The core requirements may still hold for a limited range of 
attitudes: those to which no such distinction applies. This might be the case for many types of 
intentions and intentional actions, though perhaps not all. Beyond that – for attitudes like 
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resentment, disappointment, gratitude, and many others – we will think that what makes them 
substantively appropriate or inappropriate are merely subsets of the overall set of reasons that 
bear on their desirability. Correspondingly, what makes having them structurally rational or 
irrational is their relation to those of an agent’s judgments that are directed at the relevant 
subsets.237 All this is consistent with denying, as Kolodny and others have done, that there is any 
reason to be rational in the structural sense, as such. 
If I am right, a simpler and neater account of structural rationality is not to be had. What we 
are left with in specifying the content of structural rationality is a piecemeal and complex task, 
which is not independent from an allegiance to some more or less specific conception of agency. 
How do we go about this task? One possible answer, which could seem to be suggested by the 
denial on the part of Kolodny and others that structural rationality is normative, is that this is a 
matter for empirical investigation: psychologists and sociologists may study which structural 
requirements people invoke as a matter of fact. But such a deflationary view would be a 
premature reaction to the denial that there are reasons to be structurally rational, as such. To the 
extent that the deflationary view is motivated by the thought that other types of answer are ruled 
out by the skepticism regarding the reason-giving force of structural rationality, it is ill-founded. 
For it is entirely compatible with the skeptical view to maintain that establishing the content of 
requirements of structural rationality – whatever their normative status – is a task for substantive 
practical reflection.  
                                                          
237 I am passing over a number of further difficulties here, especially having to do with my rejection of the 
epistemic internality constraint in the previous section. Even though I there argued that that constraint, which is 
built into the Transparency Account, is implausibly strong, I granted that it arises from legitimate concerns, which 
may instead be satisfied by way of the details of the content internality constraint. The conditions for ascribing 
some rationality-anchoring judgment to an agent would be an obvious place to make good on this. While I do not 
have the space for a more detailed attempt of this kind here, the idea of a judgment’s being “directed at” some 
specific set of considerations is meant to point to a notion of judgment whose ascription conditions are somewhat 
more demanding than those for belief more generally.  
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To be sure, we can observe much historical and cultural variation regarding the answer to 
the question what considerations (and therefore, what judgments) bear on the appropriateness of 
which attitudes. But we can intelligibly ask, in any given case, whether it makes sense to treat – 
whether there are reasons for treating, or against treating – some particular type of attitude as 
answerable to those specific sorts of considerations. In other words, the answer to the question 
of content may well turn, at least in part, on what particular standards there is reason to apply in 
judgments of structural rationality. This, in turn, is likely to depend on the purposes served by 
making such judgments.  
On this understanding, the question of the content of rational requirements, no less than the 
question of what range of attitudes they apply to, is at bottom a normative question, although it 
may of course accord some significance to which requirements people do as a matter of (social) 
fact rely upon. This is compatible with skepticism about the intrinsic normativity of such 
requirements since the fact (if it is a fact) that we are justified in bringing expectations of 
conformity with certain requirements or standards to bear on various practical and deliberative 
contexts, and that ethical reflection can lead us to see better reasons for applying some such 
standards rather than others, does not entail that there is any general reason to conform to them. 
We merely need to be careful to keep apart the “should” expressed by the demands of structural 
rationality, on the one hand, from the question of what the content of these demands should be 
(given their de facto role in our practices), on the other.  
For example, at least some requirements of structural rationality might usefully be 
understood as serving to articulate and codify certain normative perspectives, or genres of 
evaluation, by which agents may guide and evaluate their own and others’ actions and attitudes, 
and which need not (although they may) constitute reasons to do as they recommend or require. 
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It is certainly striking that various canonical requirements correspond to different candidate 
virtues. Different articulations of the instrumental requirement, for example, are so many ways 
of cashing out the putative virtues of efficiency and effectiveness. Intending in accordance with 
one’s conclusive judgment is to realize the putative value of following one’s conscience. The 
concept of agency itself, on one or another of the conceptions of it that are sufficiently thick 
such that they could be thought to generate (or constitutively involve) norms of structural 
rationality, may well itself just be a special case of a requirement-generating value or ideal. 
These considerations merely set the scene for further investigations. Proximally, they have 
the effect of reuniting the requirements of structural rationality with the kinds of perspectival 
assessments from which I was concerned to set them apart at the outset of this chapter. Short of 
advocating a positively deflationary view here, it is worth pointing out that the distinction 
between the former and the latter, and thus the unity and distinctness of structural rationality 
itself, may at least turn out to be conceptually shallow. Some requirements belong to 
perspectives of internal, structural assessment that are more central to our self-understanding 
and our valued practices than other such perspectives. Those are the requirements that give rise 
to charges of incoherence, or of being at odds with oneself. The question of the peculiar force of 
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